


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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1690

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20 July 1982

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1690

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW OF BREZHNEV BOOK 'ON LENIN AND LENINISM'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 8-14

[Article on publication of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's book "O Lenine i leninizme": "Revolutionary Banner of Our Era"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The greatness of an era is measured by the scope of achievements of the class which determines the main direction and main content in the development of public life, by the depth of progressive transformations made by this class, and by the scale of the revolutionary renewal of the world. Human history is counted in tens of thousands of years. It contains many sharp turns, banner events and major achievements of peoples, classes and prominent individuals in the progressive movement of social progress. But not one era has produced such grandiose and abundant changes as the era of the downfall of capitalism and establishment of socialism begun by the Great October; the era where the working class led by party members became the motive force and the teaching of Lenin, the great continuer of the cause of Marx and Engels, became the ideological banner.

"No matter what the heights scaled by mankind, it always will remember that the gigantic figure of Lenin--thinker and revolutionary--stands at the sources of communist civilization." These words of Comrade Brezhnev which he expressed in a report dedicated to the centennial of Vladimir Il'ich's birth ring out as a recognition of outstanding services to present and coming generations of man, whose deeds and ideas embodied the meaning of the modern era.

A revelation of the permanent importance of Leninism's ideas, a demonstration of the depth of Leninist analysis of social development and the grandeur of Lenin's works, and an explanation of his method and work style--that is the primary content of the new collection of works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev entitled "O Lenine i leninizme" recently published by the Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury. It includes reports, articles, speeches, presentations and greetings of the CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, which encompass the period from 1964 through 1981.

This book has two inherent features which determine its ideological charge and importance. First of all, the transforming force of Leninism is revealed in it using the vital material of our days, in the course of coverage of current problems of the world revolutionary process, the struggle for peace, the building of socialism and communism, questions of proletarian internationalism, and the strategy and tactics of communist parties. On becoming familiar with the book one is clearly persuaded that Leninist thought illuminates all affairs of the CPSU, the Soviet people and true revolutionaries of the planet. Every line of Leonid Il'ich's new work is a reflection of the party's gigantic work of practical implementation of the great leader's behests and the creative development of his heritage.

Secondly, the book is written by an outstanding political and state figure of modern times, a tireless continuer of the revolutionary Leninist cause who earned the respect of all progressive mankind, a fervent fighter for peace and security of nations, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The contents of the collection show persuasively how our party, its Central Committee and the CC Politburo headed by Comrade Brezhnev are following the course of communist creation and strengthening of peace and are guided by the principles and methods which were born of the alloy of Leninist thought and the Leninist cause.

The new historic era demonstrates the fruitfulness of the revolutionary transformation of the world. Many nations have burst once and for all from the sphere of capitalism and are creating a new, communist social system. Elimination of the colonial system of imperialism has been virtually completed. There has been an immeasurable increase in the power of the international working class. The world communist movement has turned into the most influential political force of modern times. World history has not known such dynamism of social development.

And it is impossible not to be struck by that ingenious perspicacity in determining revolutionary changes in the world which characterizes Lenin's works. It is impossible not to be surprised at the confidence with which the leader of the working class foretold the victory of the forces of progress and socialism over the forces of imperialism and reaction. And he not only foretold it, but contributed to this with all his work. "There is no person," notes Comrade Brezhnev, "whose thoughts and deeds have had such a decisive influence on the fate of all mankind" (p 105). Lenin's genius revealed the patterns of the revolutionary process in the era of the downfall of imperialism and establishment of a new system, illuminated the step of world history with the light of the communist ideal, inspired the hearts and minds of millions of people throughout the world for the struggle for the victory of socialism, and armed the working class and all toilers with a true compass--revolutionary theory. In imaginatively elaborating the ideas of Marx and Engels and generalizing the experience of historic progress in the new stage, Lenin created a teaching which rightly is called the Marxism of the modern era. He gave a new impetus to the development of communism as a science, enriching all three component parts of Marxism with major discoveries. "The strength and depth of Lenin's theoretical thought and its general importance for the world revolutionary movement is explained by the fact that this

thought formed on the firm base of dialectical and historical materialism and itself always served its creative development" (p 114).

Lenin bequeathed that we regard the theory of scientific communism as an eternally living, developing teaching. This is a most important guarantee of the fulfillment by Marxist theory of the role of lodestar in the masses' revolutionary struggle. An innovative approach to social science, party principle, the high flight of revolutionary thinking, a constant sense of the pulse of daily life, the link between theory and practice, and an ability to see the interests of a specific class behind any programs and statutes--these features of the Leninist style of scientific work will remain an unsurpassed example for our party's creative thinking. The CPSU invariably is true to Lenin's principles of theoretical endeavor. They permeate the entire content of Brezhnev's work "O Lenine i leninizme." "There is no force in the world which could undermine or weaken our unshakable faith in Marxism-Leninism"--that is the primary idea of the collection (p 14).

Being the founder of the Communist Party, a new type of party, leader of the victorious socialist revolution and the architect of the socialist state, Lenin acted not only as a theorist, but also as an organizer and manager of fundamental social-economic transformations of society. Leninism is a model of unity of scientific theory and practice of revolutionary struggle for communism.

Lenin created the 3d Communist International and laid the foundations of the international communist movement, which is the directing force in the struggle against imperialism. The experience of socialist revolutions in countries of various regions and various continents (Europe, Asia, America) confirms that they were carried out on the basis of general principles discovered by Lenin. Leninism is an international teaching, the banner of struggle by the international proletariat and all progressive mankind. And it is natural that representatives of revolutionary forces throughout the world have turned and are turning for advice to V. I. Lenin and the very rich depository of knowledge and experience of the great theorist and leader.

A most important feature of Lenin's activities which drew the hearts of millions of the planet's people is his consistent struggle against wars and their chief source--imperialism. The Soviet people and our Communist Party deeply grasped and firmly defend Lenin's behest to safeguard peace. The policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems elaborated by Lenin is exerting an ever more definitive influence on contemporary international relations. People have not known the horrors of world war for almost four decades. This has been achieved above all because Lenin's ideas of peaceful coexistence are being implemented firmly and consistently by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community acting with a broad spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on very important problems of international life. The CPSU and fraternal parties consider the struggle for peace to be their most important, most urgent task. This is then the Leninist approach to resolving global problems of modern times. "/It is not preparations for war which doom nations to senseless waste of their material and spiritual riches, but strengthening of the peace that is the clue to tomorrow/" (p 291).

The grand USSR Armed Forces stand on guard over peace and the achievements of socialism. Comrade Brezhnev notes that "our dedication to the cause of peace not only does not contradict but, to the contrary, assumes the most attentive, solicitous attitude toward national defense. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin taught us: 'Prepare seriously, intensively and steadfastly to protect the homeland, to protect the socialist Soviet republic!' We also always remember the instructions of our great leader that preparation of the country for defense demands 'no impulse or call' but 'lengthy, strenuous, very persistent and disciplined work on a mass scale'" (p 13). The party sacredly fulfills Lenin's behests. The combat might of the Armed Forces is being kept at a proper level in strict conformity with his teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. Lenin's genius penetrated deeply into the nature of the complex phenomenon of the Army's readiness to repulse imperialist aggression, and it revealed the relationship of this readiness to the soldiers' awareness, combat schooling, discipline and vigilance.

To be always on guard with respect to the intrigues of imperialism and to keep the Motherland's defensive capability constantly up to the mark--these instructions of our party's leader possess enormous mobilizing and organizing force. They prompt us to thoroughly analyze and consider the international situation and draw necessary conclusions therefrom for raising the Army and Navy's combat might.

In fulfilling their patriotic and international duty, Army and Navy personnel persistently master contemporary combat equipment and strive for a further increase in combat readiness. Districts, groups of forces and fleets carry on a vigorous struggle to fulfill combat and political training plans. Soviet military personnel sacredly follow Lenin's instruction not to rest on one's laurels but go further without fail and invariably achieve more. They take an active part in the patriotic movement of the whole people for a worthy celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation.

An improvement in combat proficiency and in field, air and naval schooling is achieved on the basis of a growth in the personnel's political awareness. A study of Lenin's ideological-theoretical heritage and persistent implementation of resolutions of the 26th party congress and its Central Committee plenums, and of Comrade Brezhnev's instructions on defense matters serve to multiply the Army and Navy's spiritual forces. Growing ideological conditioning and the sociopolitical and job activeness of servicemen is a guarantee of an increase in vigilance and combat readiness of units and ships and of excellent mastery of weapons and equipment.

Army and Navy personnel pass on like a baton from generation to generation the allegiance to Leninist ideas on defense of the socialist homeland. By their selfless military labor they are making a worthy contribution to the nationwide cause of strengthening the Motherland's might and the struggle for building communism.

Lenin's entire life was dedicated to serving the interests of the working class and working people and to the cause of revolutionary reorganization of social life on the basis of collectivism, justice, good and beauty. He considered creative activities to be the main task of the victorious proletariat. The teaching on building socialism and communism was the crown of his creativeness. Comrade Brezhnev said that "an all-penetrating depth of mind, breadth of outlook and boldness of thought were necessary in order to preserve clarity of orientation in a Russia turned upside-down and plowed anew by war and revolution and in the very complex interweaving of social-economic trends, political forces, and contradictory views and sentiments, and to find and present in a theoretically faultless form the chief, primary directions of the movement toward socialism. And Lenin did this" (p 121).

The New Economic Policy, industrialization, collectivization, the cultural revolution, creation of the foundations of socialism, resolution of the question of nationalities, strengthening of the moral-political unity of society and of national defense, victory over the shock forces of imperialism in the Great Patriotic War and the rebirth of the national economy became historic milestones in the path of the Soviet people, who were carrying out the designs of their leader. "Lenin's ideas won. . . . That which was a plan became reality" (pp 121-122). Merging with revolutionary, creative practice, the foremost theory became embodied in the reality of the social system of socialism.

A developed socialist society was formed in the USSR by the heroic labor of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party. The CPSU's theoretical contribution--elaboration of the concept of developed socialism in creative cooperation with other fraternal parties--also contributed to this historic achievement. Herein is one further proof of the vital force of Leninism and the triumph of Lenin's prevision. Back in the first years of Soviet power he substantiated the possibility of building a mature socialist society. Lenin's creative approach to an analysis of reality became the standard of CPSU activity. Comrade Brezhnev points out that the party successfully fulfills its role specifically because it devotes proper attention to comprehension of everything occurring, to a generalization of new phenomena in life and /to the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory/ (p 323).

Elaboration of the concept of developed socialism permitted the party to clarify and concretize the days and dates for realization of its program objectives, define strategy and operating tactics for a lengthy period, develop fundamental directions of economic and social development up to 1990, develop and adopt a new USSR Constitution, and pose and substantiate the task of making changes and additions to its Program. The Communist Party's creative Leninist approach was revealed clearly in the brilliant combination of scientific analysis of changes in the social-class structure of Soviet society with a forecast for the future. The conclusion of the 26th CPSU Congress as to the possibility of development of a classless structure of society serves by and large as a reliable reference point of the CPSU's social policy for the future and a stimulus to new explorations by social science already within the historic framework of mature socialism. The collection also mentions other creative achievements of the CPSU in the field of Marxist-Leninist theory: about the substantiation of the conversion of a state of the dictatorship of

the proletariat into a socialist state of the whole people; principles of elevating the CPSU's managing role in a developed socialist society; the party's economic strategy in the present stage and tasks of improving the economic mechanism and the entire system of scientific management of society; and principles of rapprochement of countries and peoples of the socialist community.

Materials of the collection note the outstanding role of the party in the further development of Lenin's teaching on the question of nationalities. Lenin's approach to this problem was precise and clear: Party members are for the right of nations for self-determination including separation. At the same time "we are internationalists to the end and strive for the voluntary alliance of workers and peasants of all nations" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 184). By cementing the friendship of the multinational family of Soviet society, ensuring the legal and actual equality of all nations and nationalities, and carrying out very profound changes in the way of life of all classes, layers, nations and nationalities of the country, the CPSU and Soviet state created conditions for a solidarity of society unprecedented in history and formation of a historically new social and international community of people--the Soviet people. Comrade Brezhnev points out that the Leninist friendship of peoples is "our invaluable property, one of the most significant achievements of socialism and one that is most dear to the heart of every Soviet citizen. And we Soviet citizens always will safeguard this friendship as the apple of our eye!" (p 195).

Comrade Brezhnev's new book clearly reveals the meaning of all CPSU policy and the primary direction of its efforts--concern for the people's welfare and for satisfying the material and spiritual needs of workers, and creation of conditions for the individual's comprehensive and harmonious development. As in previous stages, under conditions of mature socialism economics serves as the foundation for resolving social tasks. The development of economics for the sake of satisfying the workers' needs is the primary and most interesting policy for party members. That was Lenin's approach. That is the CPSU's course in the present stage as well. A truly Leninist humaneness and Leninist concern for people can be seen through all concrete tasks which the party advances at its congresses and CC plenums. "Concrete concern for the concrete person and his needs and wants represents the beginning and end of party economic policy" (p 297).

The party advanced as current national economic guidelines for the 1980's and for the 11th Five-Year Plan demands for fuller and more effective use of the country's production potential, completion of the economy's transition to the track of intensive development, assurance of a further upsurge in agriculture, development of a special food program and improvement in management of the economy.

Soviet citizens know well that an improvement in welfare depends to a decisive extent on the labor contribution of every member of society, on the strengthening of discipline, personal responsibility, thrift and an economical approach to matters. The working person is the master of his country. Herein lies a great achievement of socialism. Lenin indicated that the deeper the transformation which we wish to carry out, the more we have to elevate interest in it and a conscientious attitude and the more we have to persuade more

and more millions and tens of millions as to this need. The party is striving to implement this statement of the leader with the entire content of its activities. Comrade Brezhnev notes that the party's economic policy "in joining and merging with the creativeness, initiative and energy of the masses . . . ensures our society's steady advance along the path of an increase in workers' welfare and creation of the material and technical base of communism!" (p 299).

The Soviet people are obligated for the outstanding achievements and successes to their vanguard, the Communist Party, which Lenin characterized as the mind, honor and conscience of our era. Historic experience confirms the correctness of the conclusion as to the party's growing role in the life of society during the period of developed socialism. Comrade Brezhnev said that "the great energy of Lenin's mind and the beating of Lenin's fervent heart continue to live in the party's affairs" (p 133).

The party's strength lies in allegiance to principles of Marxism-Leninism, in the monolithic unity of its ranks and in its indestructible link with the popular masses. At the same time historic experience convinces us that where a ruling Marxist-Leninist party uses its authority in society, weakens its links with the working class and the people, and deviates from Leninist principles of party life, the positions of popular power weaken and a serious threat arises to the achievements of socialism. This is why we cannot relax attention to such matters as strengthening the fighting capacity of the party and all its organizations, concern for the party's qualitative make-up and for increasing party members' activeness, strict observance of party discipline, and the further development and cementing of the link with the masses.

An important condition for success lies in the general establishment of the Leninist work style. "And the Leninist style is a creative style alien to subjectivism and permeated with a scientific approach to all social processes. It assumes high demands on itself and others, precludes complacency, and opposes any manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism" (p 233). The Leninist style is a capacious, rich and many-sided concept. We not only understand Vladimir Il'ich's ability to manage and his uncommon ability to grasp the essence of the matter in a complicated intermingling of situations and make faultless decisions on the most complex and at times involved matters. We admire Lenin's principle, organizing talent, firmness, boldness, decisiveness and inflexibility in achieving set goals, and his astounding industriousness.

Lenin's moral make-up also is infinitely dear to us. His qualities as an ingenious thinker, unsurpassed organizer and manager, fighter and revolutionary merge inseparably with the qualities of a person of crystal purity and exceptionally personal charm. Lenin was able to create an atmosphere of collectiveness in his work, rally and unite people on the basis of common interests and inspire confidence, strength and optimism in the hearts of people who worked with him and under his direction. Comrade Brezhnev notes that "his keen, creative mind, invincible logic, depth of analysis, boldness of

conclusions and actions, indomitable passion as a revolutionary and at the same time his very great humaneness, simplicity and sensitivity--all this was and will be for us a reference point in life and an invaluable support and help in today's affairs" (p 240).

The repository of Lenin's ideas and affairs is invaluable and inexhaustible. Today it is impossible to be a revolutionary or fighter for the happiness of nations and just organization of social life without mastering the riches of this repository and without relying on the Leninist heritage. Lenin's image and his immortal ideas serve as a living source of inspiration for more and more generations of fighters and creators. A study of the works of Vladimir Il'ich, of his entire remarkable life given entirely to the people and of the heroic traditions of the Communist Party which he created comprise the pivot of all work of communist indoctrination of workers, development of the ideological conviction of Soviet citizens, and a comprehensive and harmonious development of the individual.

A mastery of Leninism makes it possible to think broadly, act in a state manner, on a broad scale, substantiate reality in all its contradictory development, employ effective means for resolving urgent tasks, approach any matter imaginatively, purposefully, from the standpoint of communist ideals, become properly oriented in a new situation and see the trends and prospects for development. Lenin taught that the entire matter of communist indoctrination and all propaganda must be organized on the political experience of economic construction. The CPSU directs ideological work so that party policy merges with the activity of the masses so as to achieve in fact a uniformity of ideological-theoretical, political indoctrination, organizational and economic work. Herein is the guarantee for a successful increase in the workers' political culture, for developing in each member of society an active position in life as a builder of communism, and for resolving as a complex the tasks of political, labor and moral indoctrination of Soviet citizens.

The book "O Lenine i leninizme," which brought together statements about Vladimir Il'ich by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, a prominent follower of his work, is a major contribution to the further implementation of Lenin's precepts. It teaches us to live and work in a Leninist manner.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

USTINOV ADDRESSES MILITARY GRADUATES RECEPTION

'PRAVDA' Report

PM021251 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 82 p 2

[TASS report: "Protecting Socialist Gains and World Peace"]

[Text] A reception in honor of military academy graduates, arranged by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, was held in the Grand Kremlin Palace on 30 June. The reception was attended by generals, admirals and officers of the USSR armed forces and the fraternal socialist countries' armies who have successfully completed their studies at Soviet higher military training establishments and the professors and teachers who have trained ideologically tempered, highly skilled cadres for the army and navy.

Present at the reception were Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense; CPSU Central Committee section chiefs I.F. Dmitriyev and N.I. Savinkin; B.N. Pastukhov, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, USSR ministers, chairmen of USSR state committees, USSR first deputy and deputy defense ministers and other prominent military commanders.

The reception was addressed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov. He congratulated the graduates and personnel of the military academies on the latest batch of military specialists to have improved their skills and conveyed to them combat greetings, cordial congratulations on the completion of studies and success in their future work from Marshal of the Soviet Union L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the USSR Defense Council.

The reception participants greeted this information with tumultuous, prolonged applause.

The career of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, loyal continuer of the cause of the great Lenin and the cause of October, outstanding politician and statesman of modern times and indefatigable fighter for peace and social progress, the minister stressed, is tied up with the heroic biography of the Soviet

armed forces. For all of us he is an inspiring example of unshakable loyalty to military duty, unbending courage, steadfastness and selflessness and devoted service of the communist party, the Soviet people and our socialist motherland.

In his multifaceted activity Comrade L.I. Brezhnev devotes constant attention to military building, the development and refinement of the armed forces and the training of military cadres. Allow me, comrades, to express our cordial gratitude to Leonid Ilich for his attention and to wish him good health and many years of fruitful work for the good of the people and in the name of socialism and world peace.

Then D.F. Ustinov read out the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers greetings to the military academy graduates. It cordially congratulated the officers of the Soviet armed forces and socialist community countries' armies and wished them further success in military labor and in ensuring the reliable defense of socialist gains and world peace.

The greetings message to the graduates of military academies, the minister said, is a striking new manifestation of the concern of the communist party and the Soviet Government for the armed forces and for our officer cadres. At the same time it is an order to worthily discharge one's sacred duty of defending the socialist homeland. He expressed confidence that the academy graduates will respond to this concern with tireless, active, creative work on enhancing the combat readiness of formations, units and ships and will honorably carry out this party order.

You, the speaker continued, are entering a new stage of your service in the year of a glorious jubilee--the 60th anniversary of our multinational motherland, the USSR. The Soviet people and their armed forces are preparing to mark the jubilee with new achievements in the fulfillment of the plans of the 11th 5-year period and the storic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The recent local Soviet elections turned into a striking demonstration of the monolithic unity of the party and people and the total support by our country's working people and the troops of the armed forces for the CPSU's Leninist domestic and foreign policy.

The Communist party and Soviet state are doing all they can to provide peaceful conditions for the building of communism. The peace program for the eighties, adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress and creatively developed in the well-known speeches by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, is consistently implemented. There was a tremendous positive response through the world to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's message to the second UN General Assembly special session on disarmament which states the Soviet Union's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Aggressive U.S. imperialist forces are fiercely opposed to the Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy course. Through their fault, the situation in

the international arena has undergone a sharp increase in complexity. The United States and NATO, setting themselves the goal of achieving military superiority over the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, are engaging in an intensive buildup of arms, above all nuclear arms, modernizing their armies and stepping up material preparations for war. A sharp deterioration in the Near East situation has resulted from Israel's new aggression, undertaken with U.S. consent and support. The Beijing hegemonists' increasingly close alignment with bellicose circles of imperialist reaction represents a great danger to the cause of peace.

Our party assesses the world situation soberly and realistically. As Comrade L.I. Brezhnev once again stressed at the CPSU Central Committee May plenum, our party, while continuing the persistent, purposeful struggle for the relaxation of international tension, maintains the country's defense capability at the necessary level. Thanks to nationwide concern, the level of technical equipment of our armed forces is improving steadily. The standard of combat skill is improving and the moral and political tempering of Soviet servicemen is strengthening.

In a single combat formation with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact and the other socialist community countries, the Soviet armed forces reliably defend the great gains of socialism and the cause of peace and social progress.

D.F. Ustinov went on to dwell on certain tasks which must be resolved by the graduates of military academies. The labor of Soviet officers, he said, enjoys nationwide honor and esteem in our country. The officers are invested with full responsibility for the mastery of new types of weapons and combat hardware, for the quality of training of units, ships and formations and for their combat readiness. They are entrusted with training and educating personnel and organizing the entire life and activity of troops and naval forces. Military matters are developing intensively, and this means that officer cadres are required to have increasingly high professional qualifications, a keen feeling for what is new and the ability to notice their subordinates' initiative in good time and support it. It is your paramount duty, on the basis of regulation requirements, to skillfully train and educate servicemen and do everything to strengthen military discipline. Strong military discipline and firm regulation order are a decisive condition for the attainment of excellent results in training and in service and the improvement of combat readiness.

Party political work is a powerful, tried and tested means of successfully resolving the tasks facing the armed forces. All officers are called upon to master all forms and methods of this work and to carry it out actively, constantly and in concrete form. The attention of communists and all military cadres was drawn to this by the recent sixth all-army conference of primary party organization secretaries.

Military leaders, D.F. Ustinov noted, must not stand aloof from the major, responsible work toward which the Soviet people are oriented by the food

program adopted by the CPSU Central Committee May plenum. It is necessary to explain this important political document in subunits and units and on ships, to inculcate in servicemen a really careful, economical, thrifty attitude toward all that our country gives the armed forces and to do everything possible to develop military units' subsidiary and kitchen plots. And those who take part in the harvest and give assistance to the countryside in carrying out other operations must set examples of shock labor. All this will be a weighty contribution by soldiers to the fulfillment of the food program.

In conclusion the USSR defense minister assured the party's central committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Soviet Government and Comrade L.I. Brezhnev personally that the officers graduating from academies in this jubilee year will fulfill their patriotic and international duty in exemplary fashion, tirelessly increase the combat might and combat readiness of the armed forces and vigilantly protect the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the security of our socialist motherland and all the socialist community countries.

Other speakers at the reception were Lt Col V. Churilov, graduate of the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy; Lt Col Engr L. Sigut of the Czechoslovak People's Army, graduate of the K. Ye. Voroshilov Academy of the general staff of the USSR armed forces; and Prof Maj Gen Avn G. Suglov, faculty chief at the Yu.A. Gagarin Military Air Academy.

The reception in honor of graduates of military academies took place in a warm, cordial atmosphere.

'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' Report

PM081453 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jul 82 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "Reliably to Defend Socialism's Gains and Peace on Earth. Kremlin Reception in Honor of Military Academy Graduates"]

[Excerpts] A festive atmosphere reigned in the halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace 30 June. A reception in honor of military academy graduates was held there by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The following met with the military academy graduates: Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; I.F. Dmitriyev and N.I. Savinkin, chiefs of CPSU Central Committee sections; B.N. Upastikhov, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; USSR ministers; chairmen of USSR state committees; Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of the armed forces general staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact states' joint armed forces; Army General A.A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Marshal of

the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General V.F. Tolubko, Air Chief Marshal P.S. Kutakhov, Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov, Army General S.K. Kurkotkin, Army General A.T. Altunin, Army General V.M. Shabanov, Marshal of Engineering Troops N.F. Shestopalov and Army General I.N. Shkador, USSR deputy defense ministers; also, army generals, marshals of categories of troops, generals and admirals, and officers of USSR Defense Ministry main and central directorates.

The reception was attended by generals and officers of the USSR armed forces and of the fraternal socialist countries' armies trained in Soviet military educational institutions. With them were commanders, political workers and instructors of military academies.

The reception was addressed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, who was greeted warmly by those present.

The mission entrusted to our armed forces is noble and exceptionally responsible, Comrade D.F. Ustinov said. It is a great honor to serve in their ranks, to continue the heroic traditions of older generations and to augment the legendary glory with which the combat banners of the army and navy are covered. I am sure that you will be worthy of this high honor through all your life and impeccable service!

The labor of Soviet officers enjoys nationwide honor and respect in our country, the speaker pointed out. They are invested with full responsibility for the mastery of new types of weapons and combat hardware, for the quality of training of units, ships and formations and for their combat readiness. They are entrusted with instructing and educating personnel and organizing the entire life and activities of troops and naval forces.

All this demands great intensive and purposeful work. The knowledge that you have acquired within the academies' walls is undoubtedly a good foundation for you. But it must constantly be deepened and widened. Troop practice is now your chief teacher, a strict and exacting teacher. Learn indefatigably yourselves while training subordinates. Never be satisfied with what has been achieved, and make creative use of combat experience and the experience of older comrades.

Military matters are developing intensively, and this demands of officer cadres increasingly high professional qualifications, a keen feeling for what is new and the ability to notice their subordinates' initiative in good time and support it. In order to keep in step with the demands of the times it is important constantly to keep a finger on their pulse and to know how to pick out the chief tasks from the whole diversity of current tasks and to concentrate the personnel's main effort, will and energy on them. You must not confine yourselves just to today's affairs and concerns. This could result in a loss of perspective. And the modern military leader will be unable to work successfully without the ability to perceive tomorrow.

The work of a military leader, whatever post has been entrusted to him, is, in the final analysis, work with people. And, for it to go well, it is necessary to know one's subordinates well and be close to them.

Real authority is achieved through persistent labor, zealous fulfillment of one's duties, high exactingness toward oneself above all, party principledness, a personal example of high morality, sincere attention to one's subordinates and profound knowledge of their needs and interests. This is when real closeness to people comes about, and not just for show. When the commander's word assumes not only the legal but also the moral force of law. When the military leader will be able to become the heart and soul of the military collective, rally it around himself, mobilize his subordinates' will, energy and knowledge to resolve common tasks, lead them and carry them along by his example.

Of course, it is no simple matter to achieve this authority. But it is absolutely essential--both for the officer himself and for our armed forces as a whole. I am convinced that every one of you is capable of it!

In order to resolve this task, the defense minister pointed out, it is necessary to organize all work among troops and in fleets according to the regulations. The regulations are a kind of mine of wisdom and of the best experience of more than one generation of Soviet servicemen. At the same time they are a code of laws, whose letter and spirit must be strictly fulfilled. It is the paramount duty of officers, backed by the regulations' demands, skillfully to instruct and educate servicemen and to strengthen military discipline in every possible way. Strong military discipline and firm regulation order are a decisive condition for achieving excellent results in studies and service and for improving combat readiness.

Party political work is a strong, tested means of successfully resolving the tasks facing the armed forces. All officers must master all its forms and methods and conduct it actively, continuously and graphically. For every officer, regardless of the post he holds, is an educator and a champion of party policy in the army and navy. And he must ably rely on party and komsomol organizations and make full use of their creative potential and their influence for asserting a healthy moral climate and an atmosphere of harmonious, cohesive, purposeful work in collectives. The recent sixth all-army conference of primary party organization secretaries drew the attention of communists and all military cadres to this.

Military leaders, Comrade D.F. Ustinov pointed out, must not remain aloof from the great and responsible work to which the Soviet people are oriented by the food program adopted by the CPSU Central Committee May plenum. It is necessary to actively explain this very important political document in subunits and units and on ships, to foster in servicemen a really thrifty, economical and assiduous attitude to everything that our country gives the armed forces and to develop in every possible way the subsidiary and kitchen plots of military units. And examples of shock labor must be set by those

who will have to participate in gathering the harvest and assist the countryside in doing other jobs. All this will be the soldiers' weighty contribution to fulfilling the food program.

Every graduation from the academies, the USSR defense minister continued, is a kind of result of the great labor of commanders, political workers and the teaching staff. On behalf of the Defense Ministry's leadership he cordially thanked them and wished them new successes in training and educating military specialists with high qualifications. The speaker expressed warm wishes for successful work in strengthening their armies' combat might in the interests of the common cause--the defense of peace and socialism--to our brothers in arms, the officers of the fraternal socialist countries' armies who have graduated from Soviet military academies.

In conclusion Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov assured the party's Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Soviet Government and Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev personally that the officers who have graduated from the academy in the jubilee year will fulfill their patriotic and international duty in an exemplary manner, tirelessly enhance the armed forces' combat might and combat readiness and vigilantly safeguard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the security of our socialist motherland and all the socialist community countries.

The reception in honor of military academy graduates was held in a warm, cordial atmosphere and demonstrated the unity and cohesion of military cadres around the Leninist communist party, its central committee and the Soviet Government.

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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 1-2

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ARMED FORCES

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: BASES FOR STRENGTHENING USSR'S DEFENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 15-24

[Article by Maj Gen A. Kuzovnikov, candidate of historical sciences, and Col N. Ustyakin, candidate of historical sciences: "Reliable Protection for Peaceful Labor"¹; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The people's welfare and a lasting peace. These two primary objectives, which are simple and clear, determine the work of the Communist Party and Soviet state and their demands for the future. Advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980's as a whole, the grandiose program for national economic and social development is backed up by a foreign policy program which is just as impressive and realistic. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in a speech at adjournment of the congress that "our party proved once again that the Soviet people not only have the desire, but also the political will to do everything for the sake of peace, a firm and lasting peace. We not only have the will to fight for peace, but also a precise, clear-cut program for this struggle" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 219).

Having confirmed with all definiteness the firmness of the course toward continuing and deepening detente and stopping the arms race, the party congress at the same time gave proper attention to questions of strengthening the defense might of the USSR and its Armed Forces. There is no contradiction in this. The party is assessing the international situation soberly. Under conditions of the increase in the military threat stemming from imperialism it is following Lenin's wise behest firmly: Accompany steps toward peace with a straining of all our military readiness, remembering that our Army is a real guarantee against encroachments on the part of imperialist powers (see V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XL, 248).

The historic opposition of the two systems--socialist and capitalist--leaves an imprint on all international life. The 26th CPSU Congress noted that at

1. The article is recommended for use in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups in studying the topic "The 26th CPSU Congress on strengthening the defense might of the USSR and its Armed Forces under conditions of the contemporary international situation."

the present time the world situation is characterized by growing tensions and the sharp clash of directly opposed political courses.

On the one hand the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are conducting a course toward curbing the arms race, preserving and strengthening detente and protecting the sovereign rights and freedoms of peoples. This is facilitated by the strengthening of the economic and political position of the socialist community and by the military-strategic balance it has achieved with the capitalist world. As Comrade Brezhnev emphasized in a speech in Kiev on 9 May 1981, "we were able to influence the international climate with our weight and our politics and make it less severe. International relations have been developing under the badge of detente for an entire decade."

On the other hand, imperialism and the entire world reaction do not wish to reckon with true reality. Embittered by the growth in forces of peace and progress, they are attempting to undermine detente and conduct a policy of building up arms, making threats, intervening in the affairs of socialist countries and suppressing the liberation struggle of nations. The world situation became sharply aggravated by the early 1980's and is continuing to heat up as a result of the sharp turn in politics of the United States and its NATO allies and an intensification of its aggressiveness.

The increase in aggressiveness of imperialism is not a chance trend. It reflects the fact of a further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the class reaction of the imperialist bourgeoisie to successes of the world revolutionary process, and the bourgeoisie's attempt to resolve internal contradictions and difficulties along paths of external expansion, the arms race, and the preparation and unleashing of predatory wars. In pushing the slanderous myth of the "Soviet military threat" and fiercely attacking detente, militant circles of the United States and NATO essentially are not concealing their goal of achieving military superiority over the world of socialism and returning for themselves the positions lost and the role of rulers of the peoples' destinies.

Much evidence can be cited of the increased aggressiveness in politics of the United States and its allies and accomplices. For example, in rejecting Soviet peace initiatives, American ruling circles are taking matters to a break in existing understandings and agreements between the United States and USSR on arms limitation. At the same time, official U.S. military doctrine includes provisions for delivering a "preventive" nuclear missile attack on the USSR, unleashing a "limited" nuclear war in Europe, and the simultaneous waging of two large nonnuclear wars and one local war in other parts of the globe. Large-scale preparation of the physical base of war, including one with unlimited use of nuclear weapons, are being carried out in the interests of implementing the aggressive global aspirations of American imperialism.

There was a sharp increase in appropriations for military purposes with the arrival of the Reagan administration into power. While Pentagon expenses had tripled in the period 1960-1980, they will increase 2.2 times just in the period 1981-1985 and by the end of this period will be \$303.9 billion annually (as a comparison, the United States did not even spend \$330 billion for all of World War II).

In the "strategic program" for the 1980's announced by the White House, primary emphasis is placed on building up offensive weapons--nuclear missile, neutron, chemical and other weapons. The United States is urging its European allies to speed up military preparations. NATO plans envisaging the deployment of some 600 launchers for new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe represent a great danger in particular. The United States also is drawing Japan into the orbit of its aggressive politics. Here militarism is raising its head ever higher. Washington's attempts to take advantage of Beijing's antisoviet course in the struggle against peace and socialism also are being activated.

In pursuing imperial objectives and laying claim to the role of world gendarme, American imperialism shamelessly declares vast regions and even continents as the sphere of its "vital interests." This relates to Latin America and Africa, the Near and Middle East, and Southwest and Southeast Asia. The United States is expanding the network of its military bases on foreign territory and hastily knocking together a "rapid deployment force" of many thousands--a tool of aggression and terror.

"Adventurism and a readiness to stake mankind's vital interests for the sake of their own narrow, selfish goals--this is what is manifested especially nakedly in the politics of the most aggressive circles of imperialism," stated the CPSU CC Accountability Report to the 26th party congress. The substantiation of this conclusion is confirmed in particular by the unceasing attempts by the United States and NATO to artificially create an atmosphere of international crisis around events in Poland and take advantage of them to undermine the entire system of European security.

Under these conditions, as noted by the 26th CPSU Congress, the party and state are forced to keep a constant focus on questions of strengthening the defensive might of the country and its Armed Forces.

The party is accomplishing tasks of building communism and organizing its military protection in an indestructible link. In so doing it strictly follows Lenin's instruction on the dialectical unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military potentials as the primary components of the state's defensive might. This unity now has become even closer and more many-sided.

The economic potential and its component, military-economic potential, has a determining role to play in strengthening national defensive might. Engels wrote that weapons, composition, and organization of the Army and Navy, and tactics and strategy "depend above all on the degree of production achieved at a given moment and on means of transportation" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], XX, 171). In elaborating this thesis, Lenin pointed out that without very serious economic preparation it was impossible to wage a modern war against imperialism, and that such preparations must begin with the country's economic upswing (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXV, 390, 391).

The following data indicate the level of development of the Soviet economy. At the present time the USSR holds first place in the world in production of 18 of the most important kinds of industrial products. Our industry produces in a year approximately as many products as are produced by all countries of Western Europe together. The Soviet Union is the only major industrial state in the world which bases its economic development on its own fuel-energy and other natural resources.

Industrial production will increase 26 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan. The output of finished rolled metal in 1985 will be 118 million tons, 1.555 trillion kilowatt-hours of electrical power will be developed, and 630 million tons of oil and 775 million tons of coal will be produced. The volume of machine building and metal working products will increase by at least 40 percent during the five-year plan. But it is not only a matter of quantitative indicators. The current five-year plan will become an important stage on the path to completing the transition of industry and other sectors of the national economy to a primarily intensive path of development.

An important role in strengthening the economic base of national defense lies with agriculture, where the average annual production volume will increase 13 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan; the comprehensive development of transportation and communications equipment; and an improvement in the distribution of productive forces.

A rise in the level of development of all sciences and implementation of their achievements has been and remains the chief direction of the build-up in scientific-technical potential. The building and military protection of a new society is simply inconceivable without science, especially with the present-day scientific-technical revolution. Our native science has great achievements in resolving tasks of the national economy and national defense as well as the further development of Soviet society.

Science and scientific-technical progress influence the strengthening of national defensive might in many directions. They contribute to an improvement in nuclear missile weaponry and conventional means of armed struggle. The party devotes much attention to the development of Soviet military science, which is making necessary clarifications and changes to methods of conducting combat operations, to troop organizational structure and to the system of command and control. The achievements of military-theoretical thinking are being introduced widely into combat and political training practice, which contributes to an increase in Army and Navy combat effectiveness.

At the present time economics, science and technology in our country are at a level permitting successful resolution of the most urgent tasks of defense importance. Their capabilities will increase even more in the 11th Five-Year Plan. "There can be no doubt," declared Comrade N. A. Tikhonov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the party congress, "that our valorous Armed Forces will be provided with everything necessary to withstand reliably the attempts by imperialist forces to achieve military superiority" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 128).

Moral-political potential, the firmness of which is determined above all by our country's socialist social and state system, reflects the ability of the Soviet people and their Army to endure the ordeals of war should it be imposed on us and to activate all their material and spiritual forces to defeat the aggressor.

A further strengthening of the moral-political potential of national defensive might is connected with the accomplishment of a large complex of tasks of the social-political and spiritual progress of Soviet society as outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress. The development of a social-class and national structure of Soviet society will strengthen social unity and the fraternal friendship of all nations of our multinational Motherland even more. There will be a rise in the level of ideological-political, social and international solidarity of the Soviet people as a historically new community of people. There will be a cementing of the material and spiritual principles of the socialist way of life and of the development of a new person. The party course toward development and improvement of socialist democracy contributes to a further strengthening of our state of the whole people--the chief tool for building and protecting a new society, strengthening the unity of the people and Army, and increasing the masses' political, labor and creative activeness.

The increase in the Communist Party's managing role as the nucleus of the political system of Soviet society strengthens its influence on all walks of life, including the area of military organizational development. The Soviet people's unity about the party and its Leninist Central Committee ensures the growth not only of the country's moral-political potential, but also other potentials of its defensive might.

The strengthening strictly of the USSR's military potential as well, with its basis being the combat potential of the Armed Forces, will be assured during the 11th Five-Year Plan. Military potential also includes the state's military-mobilization capabilities and civil defense. It is determined by the level of development of military doctrine, the development of military science and so on.

The strengthening and build-up of all primary components of national defensive might is accomplished through the Soviet people's selfless labor under direction of the Communist Party. The CPSU CC decree on the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation states: "The tasks advanced by the party for the 11th Five-Year Plan and for the entire period of the 1980's meet the vital interests of the Soviet people, and they are struggling persistently to accomplish them."

The present state of Soviet military organizational development is characterized by a further increase in the party's role in managing the Armed Forces. This is determined above all by the special responsibility of missions set for the Army and Navy, aggravation of the international situation, and intensification of military danger.

The 26th CPSU Congress gave high praise to the level of development of the Soviet Army and Navy and performance of patriotic and international duty by the Motherland's defenders. A firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indomitable morale--that by Comrade Brezhnev's definition is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Weapons and combat equipment comprise the material basis of the Army and Navy's combat effectiveness. Lenin pointed out that in war "the one who has the greatest equipment, efficiency, discipline and the best vehicles will come out on top..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVI, 116). The Great Patriotic War confirmed this persuasively. Using the advantages of a socialist economy, the Soviet Union produced almost two times more military equipment, and of a better quality, than fascist Germany and its allies during 1941-1945. This was a very important condition of our victory over the aggressor.

The technical outfitting of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces is at the level of demands of a modern war thanks to constant concern by the party and people and successes in development of economics, science and technology. They have everything necessary for reliable protection of socialism's achievements.

In carrying on the arms race, the United States and other NATO countries are laying special emphasis on qualitative improvement of weapons and combat equipment. The party is taking account of this in its military-technical policy. Comrade Brezhnev emphasizes that "it is our duty to the people to continue to keep the country's Armed Forces at a high level so that Soviet military personnel always have the most up-to-date weapons, with which the imperialists could not help but reckon, and we will perform this duty sacredly!"

The combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces is not just predetermined by their technical outfitting. Weapons and combat equipment do not ensure combat might and decide success of combat actions of themselves. Our party has proceeded and is proceeding from Lenin's thesis that no matter how high an army's technical outfitting may be, the chief and deciding force in war remains man, who of course has mastered combat equipment to perfection.

High military proficiency, i.e., the personnel's ability to use their entrusted weapons and combat equipment and the ability of military cadres to control subordinates in peacetime and under combat conditions, acts as an important component of the Armed Forces combat potential. Just the fact that every other officer has a higher military or special education indicates the level of professional training of our military cadres. Some 80 percent of first-term servicemen also have a higher or secondary education, and the others have no less than an eighth-grade education. More than 84 percent of draftees now coming into the Armed Forces have mastered various specialties in industry and agriculture. All this permits the personnel to master sophisticated equipment in short periods of time.

Exercise "Zapad-81" was a clear indicator of the level of combat readiness achieved by the troops and naval forces. Personnel displayed courage, initiative and the ability to act and employ their weapons expertly in combat in a

dynamic, difficult situation approximating conditions of combat reality to the maximum. The exercise also demonstrated the increased level of the staffs' operational-tactical training.

Demands on military proficiency rise considerably under contemporary conditions. First of all, means of armed conflict are developing rapidly and becoming more sophisticated, which introduces substantial changes to the methods of preparing and conducting combat actions. Secondly, there will be no time to complete training or retrain under conditions of modern warfare with its dynamic combat operations. Thirdly, the crew-served nature of weapons expanded and enriched the very concept of military proficiency. Now the success or failure of a combat mission may depend on the training level of even one serviceman. There has been a simultaneous increase in the significance of skilled, coordinated actions of teams, crews and subunits, i.e., of entire military collectives.

It is very important for military cadres and above all for commanders as the organizers and managers of personnel training to take account of all these objective circumstances. The primary principle of combat training is to teach the troops what is needed in war. In a war one must be able to conduct offensive and defensive combat, day or night, in the most difficult situation, and effectively employ weapons and equipment to the limit of their combat capabilities. All this is achieved through rational organization of the training process. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov states that the key in troop combat training is the performance of tasks of tactical and weapons training and the improvement in methods of combat actions. And it is not simply the performance of these tasks, but performance of them with an invariably high quality.

Socialist competition has been and remains a powerful factor for intensifying military labor and increasing the personnel's proficiency. Begun in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation, it is being conducted in the Army and Navy under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" Competition helps in the search for and use of reserves for more successful accomplishment of combat and political training missions and for strengthening efficiency and discipline. The degree of competition's influence on the personnel's practical deeds depends above all on how skillfully it is organized and what concern is shown by commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations for development of the personnel's activeness and for publicity, propaganda and adoption of foremost experience.

The quality and effectiveness of combat training directly depend on officers' methods proficiency. The experience of many subunits and units indicates that the personnel's level of military proficiency is higher where the officers themselves above all have mastered weapons and equipment expertly, approach the organization of classes and practices imaginatively and with a high sense of responsibility, and develop a spirit of competitiveness. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that a further improvement in the work style of cadres is a necessary condition for success in any sector. It stands to reason that this also relates to the matter of military training and indoctrination.

The third most important component of the Armed Forces combat potential is indestructible morale, i.e., our soldiers' readiness and capability to accomplish missions of any complexity successfully and steadfastly endure moral-psychological and physical stresses and, in case of war, the most difficult ordeals. Lenin said that "in any war victory is determined in the final account by the state of spirit of those masses who are shedding their blood on the battlefield" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLI, 121).

The indestructible morale of the Soviet people and their military personnel was one of the sources of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. Now it is already the sons and grandsons of the past war's heroes who stand in the ranks of the Motherland's defenders. They did not go through the severe ordeals which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time it is required by the interests of national security and defense of peace, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th party congress, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome all difficulties.

The role and importance of morale in the Armed Forces combat potential now are exceptionally great. For this reason its further reinforcement is an insistent necessity. The high political-moral state of the Motherland's defenders is shaped by the entire tenor of our developed socialist society and by the Soviet way of life itself. At the same time much depends on the level of party-political and indoctrination work in the Army and Navy and on the extent to which the development factors which the Armed Forces possess are used.

The efforts of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations are aimed at detailed propaganda of Marxist-Leninist theory, the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, CPSU policy and the works of Comrade Brezhnev; and at explaining and organizing fulfillment of 26th party congress resolutions. As noted by Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Arm Gen A. A. Yepishev, "detailed assimilation of Leninist ideas about defense of the socialist homeland and CPSU policy, and perception of the objective need for keeping the Armed Forces in constant combat readiness act as the most important spiritual stimuli for improving the personnel's special schooling and increasing combat readiness, discipline and efficiency."

Daily Army and Navy service, combat training, and especially tactical problems and exercises, flights and naval deployments, field firings and missile launchings, and operational readiness have great capacities for moral-political and psychological conditioning of military personnel. It is important for officer cadres to approach every exercise and problem from party and political positions, emphasize their significance for strengthening national security, and also use them more fully to develop the personnel's endurance, boldness and combat activeness.

The state of military discipline is one of the indicators of the personnel's morale and of the level of the Armed Forces combat potential as a whole. It is the duty of all military cadres and of party and Komsomol organizations to

indoctrinate soldiers in a spirit of strict observance of Soviet laws and develop in them a readiness and inner need to carry out the demands of regulations and the oath strictly under all conditions and in any situation. The deciding role here belongs to the commander with unity of command, his personal adherence to discipline and order, and high exactingness toward himself and subordinates.

Inasmuch as all components of the Armed Forces combat potential act in indissoluble unity, the adoption of new equipment, training personnel in combat specialties, and development of their qualities as conscientious, steadfast and capable defenders of the socialist homeland must be carried on in the very same unity.

The 26th party congress expressed confidence that our Armed Forces will continue to stand reliably on guard over the Soviet people's peaceful, creative labor. Reliably means in constant combat readiness which, in the figurative expression of Comrade Brezhnev, is the crown of combat proficiency in peacetime and the key to victory in war.

The Soviet Union threatens no one as it strengthens its defensive capability and increases the Armed Forces combat readiness. These measures are a lawful response to imperialism's aggressive preparations. In accomplishing the responsible missions of protecting peace and socialism in combat cooperation with armies of Warsaw Pact member nations, the USSR Armed Forces always are ready to perform their patriotic and international duty. They possess everything necessary to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

Recommendations for Seminar

The seminar on the subject /"The 26th CPSU Congress on strengthening national defensive might and a further increase in combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces"/ has the purpose of helping students gain a deeper understanding of the features of the present-day international situation, the reasons for intensification of the military threat proceeding from imperialism, the substance of party congress guidelines on defense matters, as well as the missions of military cadres stemming therefrom.

The following questions should be covered in the class: 1. The 26th CPSU Congress on strengthening the aggressiveness of imperialism and the need for reinforcing the Soviet state's defensive capability. 2. The 26th CPSU Congress on the party's foreign policy activities as an important factor in consolidating the achievements of socialism. 3. The significance of the Soviet people's achievements in economic, social-political and spiritual development of Soviet society for strengthening national defense and the combat potential of the Armed Forces. 4. Basic directions in the work of officers in the interests of mobilizing personnel for exemplary performance of tasks of increasing troop combat readiness and for strengthening military discipline.

It is advisable to begin the seminar with a presentation by one of the students of the paper /"The 26th CPSU Congress on the Armed Forces as a reliable guardian of the Soviet people's peaceful, creative labor."/

In discussing the /first question/ we must proceed from an analysis of the contemporary international situation given in materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and in Comrade Brezhnev's speech at the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress.

It is important to focus attention on the fact that the course of imperialist powers headed by the United States, having the goal of undermining detente, aggravating the situation in the world and working up the arms race, is not accidental. It reflects the very essence of imperialism which, as Lenin noted, is distinguished in its fundamental economic features by the least love of peace and love of freedom and by the greatest general development of militarists (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVII, 248).

In the United States for example all sectors of the economy have been enlisted for the manufacture of military products. Seventy-five percent of the capacities of the aviation and missile industry, over 70 percent of the shipbuilding industry and some 50 percent of the electronics industry are working for the Pentagon. Almost four-fifths of scientific cadres are connected in one way or another with exploration in the military sphere. The growth of militarism and the arms race are leading to enrichment of the military-industrial monopolies, a strengthening of their position in the American economy and intensification of their influence on the country's foreign policy course.

The process of militarization and its concomitant increase in imperialism's aggressiveness have more than just economic roots. It is above all a class reaction of the monopolistic bourgeoisie to radical changes of the world's social and political make-up which occurred in the 1970's. It is a question of a strengthening of the position of world socialism and successes of the national liberation struggle of nations and of the working movement in countries of capital. The bosses of imperialist states assume it possible to cancel or at least halt by force of arms the historic improvements in the world arena of an irreversible character.

Imperialism's reliance on strength forces the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community to display high vigilance and show concern for reliable assurance of their security. Comrade Brezhnev declared in a speech at the 17th Soviet Trade Union Congress: "The militaristic course and aggressive politics of the NATO bloc headed by the United States force us to take steps to keep national defense at a proper level. This is the stern necessity of today's world and it of course requires the diversion of no small means to the detriment of our plans for peaceful construction. But as I have had more than one occasion to say, we are not losing and will not lose a single ruble for these purposes over that which is absolutely necessary for ensuring the security of our people and their friends and allies."

In examining the /second question,/ note must be taken of the importance of the CPSU's foreign policy work for strengthening the achievements of socialism and cementing universal peace. The CPSU CC decree on the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation emphasizes: /"Under conditions of an aggravation of the

international situation caused by the politics of imperialism and American imperialism above all, vigorous implementation of the Leninist peace strategy defended by our party and state is of primary importance for the destiny of mankind."/ This strategy found concrete embodiment in the Peace Program for the 1980's advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress and supplemented by new foreign policy initiatives of Comrade Brezhnev.

Soviet foreign policy, which is by its nature a class, internationalist policy, is aimed at reducing the threat of war, deepening detente and preserving peace. The strengthening of our friendship and cooperation with fraternal countries of socialism--the chief bulwark of peace on earth--serves to attain these goals. The CPSU is developing relationships of combat solidarity with all detachments of the international communist and working movement and is consistently conducting a course toward expansion of cooperation with liberated states. The Soviet Union is working actively for peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, for resolving thorny issues through talks, and for curbing the arms race. By turning to materials of the 26th CPSU Congress we can examine all these primary directions in foreign policy activities of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

/The third question/ permits revealing the sources of our Motherland's defense might and showing the importance of successes of the economic system, science and culture for strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Lenin taught that war is a test of all economic and organizational forces of nations and that success in any war "is decided . . . by the economic system" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIV, 41). The link between the economic system and defense has become even deeper and more varied under present-day conditions.

We must emphasize above all that under conditions of socialism the economic potential and its component--the state's military-economic potential--are used most effectively. For example, during the Great Patriotic War more was produced in the USSR than in fascist Germany for every million tons of steel smelted: 2.6 times more aircraft, three times more armored equipment, and four times more of all kinds and calibers of artillery pieces.

Modern warfare places growing demands on all sectors of the national economy. Let's take metallurgy, where the quantity and quality of weapons depend directly on its status. According to foreign press data, building a light cruiser requires at least 5,000 tons of high-grade steel and building a silo and organizing a strategic missile position takes tens of thousands of tons.

The importance of the oil and oil refining industry for national defense is great. For example, as noted by the foreign press, it takes up to 300,000 tons of fuels and lubricants to conduct a modern front-level operation. These are only a few of the data which give an idea on the extent to which the Army and Navy's material needs have risen.

Realization of quotas of the 10th Five-Year Plan permitted a significant increase in the Soviet Union's economic potential. We now produce more steel, cast iron, petroleum and a number of other products than the United States.

Fulfillment of 11th Five-Year Plan quotas will strengthen the material basis of national defense even more.

In revealing the content of the scientific (scientific-technical) potential, we must examine the concrete directions in which it affects the country's defensive might. In particular it is important to direct attention to current problems of Soviet military science and demonstrate its growing role in raising the Armed Forces combat effectiveness. In mentioning the essence and role of the moral-political potential it is apropos to clarify how fulfillment of appropriate resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress will affect its strengthening.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Armed Forces combat potential represents a firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indomitable morale, it is advisable to examine its characteristics and ways of strengthening it during discussion of the /fourth question./

In describing the Armed Forces technical outfitting as one of the components of their combat potential, [the instructor] should demonstrate the increase in the Army and Navy's combat capabilities. It stands to reason that greatest attention should be given to his own branch of the Armed Forces and his own combat arm, as well as to the subunit and the unit where the group's students are serving.

In the face of the growing arms race unfolded by the United States and its allies in the aggressive NATO bloc, the Communist Party and Soviet government have been forced to continue to be concerned with improving weapons and combat equipment. They have been forced to allocate the necessary means for this in order to secure our country and its socialist friends against attack and prevent aggression. In this regard it is extremely important that the means allocated for national defense be used thriftily and most effectively. It is a most important duty of every Soviet soldier to safeguard combat equipment, weapons, and state and military property and use supplies economically. Concern for the country's wealth and for strengthening its Armed Forces is manifested here.

In revealing the essence and importance of the personnel's high military proficiency in the Armed Forces combat potential, [the instructor] should analyze thoroughly and fundamentally the status of combat training in the unit or aboard ship and discuss concrete ways for its improvement and the officers' tasks in this area. We are speaking about a further improvement in field, air and naval schooling, and of tactical and weapons training above all. Military proficiency is inconceivable without exemplary mastery of weapons and combat equipment. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov emphasizes that "combat readiness is based on a high degree of troop schooling, which demands that the training and indoctrination process approximate combat conditions to the maximum and that there be a decisive stop put to indulgences and oversimplifications. Teach what is necessary in war--this principle has been and remains fundamental in all the work of the Armed Forces."

The seminar also must reveal the essence of indomitable morale as one of the components of Armed Forces combat potential, clarify in more detail the heightened demands on moral-political, combat and psychological qualities and on personal discipline, and examine officers' work of developing this in subordinates.

A further increase in the CPSU's role in managing the Army and Navy is one of the most important principles of Soviet military organizational development. The seminar naturally has to reflect the work of Army and Navy party organizations and all party members aimed at accomplishing combat and political training missions. An increase in activeness, initiative and principle in the work of party organizations is a necessary condition for further strengthening of the Armed Forces combat potential.

Resolutions of the 26th party congress and of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum interconnect the tasks of building communism and struggling for peace with a further reinforcement of our country's defense might. It is the patriotic and international duty of Soviet military personnel to struggle actively for their implementation, to raise the Soviet Army and Navy's combat readiness even higher, and safeguard the peaceful, creative labor of their people vigilantly and reliably.

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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON COMMAND AUTHORITY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 80-86

[Article by Maj A. Gara, post-graduate of the chair of journalism of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "Obey Commanders Implicitly and Protect Them in Combat"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The class on this topic is conducted by the method of a narrative and a lively, full-scale discussion. Six hours are provided for it, with this time best allocated as follows: Give two hours to the narrative, two for independent preparation and two hours for a discussion on the topic.

In the process of studying the material students will gain a deeper understanding of the role and importance of command cadres in the life and work of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the essence of one-man command in the Army and Navy. The class is intended to help develop in privates and seamen a respect for their commanders and chiefs and to develop habits of implicit obedience.

/During the narrative/ the following questions should be covered: 1. Soviet commanders are true sons of the people and conductors of CPSU policy in the Army and Navy. The essence and importance of one-man command in the USSR Armed Forces. 2. Respect commanders and chiefs and carry out their orders and instructions implicitly.

/In a short introduction/ the remark should be made that Soviet military cadres are the backbone and organizing force of the Army and Navy. Utterly dedicated to the great cause of communism, our commanders, political workers, military engineers and technicians are active conductors of CPSU ideology and policy into the soldier masses, and skilled organizers of the personnel's training and indoctrination. Under conditions of a sharp exacerbation of the present-day international situation caused by military preparations of imperialist powers headed by the United States, they are doing everything to ensure that the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships is at a level meeting the demands of the Communist Party and Soviet government and guarantees a resolute defeat of any aggressor.

/1. Soviet Commanders are True Sons of the People and Conductors of CPSU Policy in the Army and Navy. The Essence and Importance of One-Man Command in the USSR Armed Forces/

In beginning presentation of the first question [the instructor] should remind students that Communist Party management contains the chief source of might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces. The party and people have placed a very responsible task on the Armed Forces--assuring the reliable protection of the socialist homeland. Army and Navy personnel have everything necessary for this. The selfless work of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia in our country created a powerful economic and scientific-technical potential, which is the firm foundation of its defensive capability. The Soviet Army and Navy constantly are outfitted with first-rate weaponry and combat equipment and they have remarkable military cadres.

The system of cadre training for the Soviet Armed Forces is being steadily developed and improved. There is a constant increase in the ideological-political level, education, culture and professional schooling of our commanders, political workers and engineering-technical personnel in the Army and Navy. Lenin showed steadfast concern for training just such military cadres who combine a knowledge of the job with communist conviction. Speaking of the tasks of Soviet military organizational development, he noted that in building a new army we must take commanders only from the people. "Only Red officers," emphasized Vladimir Il'ich, "will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to strengthen socialism in our Army. Such an army will be invincible" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVII, 200).

Building armed forces of a new, socialist type also required new command personnel of the young Republic of Soviets. In the first post-October days professional revolutionaries, foremost workers, and officers, generals, privates, seamen and NCO's of the old Army and Navy who went over to the side of Soviet power were sent to command positions. Subsequently the formation of Soviet military cadres took place on the basis of a network of command courses, military schools, and other schools and academies set up in the country.

As early as 1920 over 80 percent of Red Army command personnel were of worker or peasant extraction. By the end of that same year the country had 153 military educational institutions, which prepared some 40,000 Red commanders for our Army and Navy.

Proletarian military cadres played an enormous part in the defeat of joint forces of foreign interventionists and the internal counterrevolution during the Civil War. In the future as well the party constantly undertook necessary steps to reinforce the Army and Navy with highly conscientious, ideologically conditioned command cadres who were well prepared in the military and technical sense.

Fascist Germany treacherously violated the nonaggression pact and on 22 June 1941 attacked our country without a declaration of war. This demanded extremely intensive efforts of the party to organize a rebuff of the enemy. A

multimillion-man army was mobilized in exceptionally short periods of time, the network of military schools and courses was expanded and preparation of command personnel for the Soviet Armed Forces was accelerated. During the Great Patriotic War the country's military educational institutions produced over two million officers who skillfully managed subordinates' combat actions and displayed personal bravery, heroism and courage.

The present generation of Soviet officers is true to the famed traditions of their predecessors. Officer cadres have a deciding role to play in training and indoctrinating Soviet Armed Forces personnel and in maintaining unremitting combat readiness of subunits, units and ships. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov emphasized that "their profession is responsible and honorable. The Motherland entrusted them with its dearest property--our remarkable youth, whom they must train in military affairs, indoctrinate and, when necessary, lead into battle. And Soviet officers are honorably justifying this trust and performing their military duty with high responsibility."

Now over 90 percent of the officer corps of our Armed Forces are party or Komsomol members. Over half of Soviet officers have a higher military or military-special education. The proportion of engineers and technicians in the Army and Navy has increased considerably. They comprise up to 45 percent of all officers.

Exceptionally important and responsible tasks have been placed on Soviet military cadres. In order for them to be accomplished successfully, the Communist Party, following Lenin's behests, established the principle of one-man command as the most important principle of Soviet military organizational development. It is one-man command that assures firmness and flexibility in command and control, precise organization and discipline, and the commanders' high sense of responsibility for combat readiness, training and indoctrination of subordinates.

The USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulations state that the commander of a unit or ship (subunit) is a one-man commander and bears personal responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet government for constant combat and mobilization readiness of his entrusted unit or ship (subunit). He is responsible for combat and political training, indoctrination, military discipline and the political-moral state of the personnel; for the status and safekeeping of weapons, combat and other equipment, ammunition, fuel and other supplies; and for the material, technical, medical, trade and everyday services, and financial support to the unit or ship (subunit).

The completeness of the commander's rights and responsibility is reflected in his decision and order. The USSR Armed Forces Code of Disciplinary Punishment states that the order of a commander (chief) is law for subordinates. An order must be carried out implicitly, precisely and on time.

One-man command in the USSR Armed Forces differs fundamentally from one-man command in imperialist armies. This stems from the fundamental difference of the Soviet state and its Army from bourgeois states and their armies. Imperialist armies are a tool of antipopular, aggressive politics of the exploiting

classes. The chief purpose of such armies is to preserve the rule of imperialists, wage reactionary, predatory wars and put down the revolutionary and national liberation movement of the people.

The capitalist state ensures a careful selection of command personnel and retains officers in service in the army who wholly share the political views and ideology of the bourgeoisie. The officer corps of armed forces of capitalist countries consists almost fully of representatives of propertied classes and reflects their interests. One-man command in imperialist armies serves as a means of suppressing the will of subordinates and command personnel act as a force hostile to the main soldier mass.

The Armed Forces of the Soviet state were created by the party and people. They serve the people faithfully and protect their revolutionary achievements, freedom and independence. It is fully understandable that one-man command in our Army and Navy also is exercised in the people's interests and is a most important means for reinforcing the USSR Armed Forces--a reliable guardian over peace and socialism. "One-man command in the Soviet Army," stated Comrade Brezhnev, "is organized on a party basis. This means that in his work the commander constantly must rely on party and Komsomol organizations and make full use of their mobilizing force, authority, and creative activeness to increase the combat readiness of units and ships."

Further it should be noted that there are many commanders in every unit, ship and subunit who are capable organizers of the training and indoctrination process and true masters of their work. It will be apropos if the propagandist tells about some of them in the class.

Warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers are reliable assistants to officers in training and indoctrinating personnel. It is desirable to remind the students that the institution of warrant officers was introduced in the USSR Armed Forces by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase dated 18 November 1971. A new detachment of professional military persons, who were given a great responsibility for successful accomplishment of combat and political training missions, joined the combat formation of the Motherland's defenders.

Warrant officers make no small contribution to the training and indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel, strengthening discipline and raising combat readiness. The majority of them have proven themselves to be people who are politically mature, experts in equipment and weapons, specialists of a high class and thoughtful indoctrinators of their subordinates.

Sergeants and petty officers make up the largest detachment of Soviet commanders. Their role in the life and combat activities of the troops and in the training and indoctrination of personnel is a great one, for they are the closest and immediate supervisors of privates and seamen. This places many demands on them. Sergeants and petty officers are with the personnel constantly. In heading teams, crews, squads and battle stations, they teach subordinates above all by personal example to endure steadfastly all burdens and deprivations of military service and set examples of faultless performance of their duty to the Motherland.

It must be emphasized that the Soviet commander is not simply an official who has been granted the right of command. He is a thoughtful indoctrinator, an authoritative senior comrade to his subordinates and the soul of the military collective. Along with high exactingness, our commanders show paternal concern for privates and seamen, delve deeply into their needs, share with them the joys and grief, and create a healthy moral atmosphere in subunits, units and aboard ships.

A vivid, fascinating image of the Soviet commander arises from the pages of the book by Comrade Brezhnev "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs]. Leonid Il'ich discusses Vasilii Alekseyevich Koptsov, commander of a tank unit at Peschanka. He writes: "I still recall this demanding commander and sincere person with great satisfaction. . . . He was the first regular officer whom I came to know: It is usually said of such that they are the backbone. By caste of character he is a person of few words, strong-willed, always with a smart appearance and cheerful. He was for me both a mentor and an example of a genuine commander who dedicated his life to indoctrinating Soviet soldiers who could come to the defense of our great Motherland at any moment."

The commander's remarkable moral-political and combat qualities always are evaluated on their merits by every soldier. This finds vivid confirmation in subordinates' respect and love for their commanders. Soviet soldiers see the defense and protection of commanders in combat even at the cost of their own lives as a sacred duty. The words from the USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulations sound for them like a supreme moral obligation: ". . . implicitly obey commanders (chiefs) and protect them in combat."

...The subunit commander was seriously wounded in a fierce fight against the fascists. Pvt Mitrofan Pribytkov rushed to help him, but at that very moment he himself was wounded in both legs by enemy shell fragments. Despite this, however, the soldier managed to heave the unconscious commander onto his back and, overcoming the pain, crawled with him to cover. The officer and his subordinate ended up in the same hospital and recuperated together.

In sending off his son to serve in the Navy after the war, Mitrofan Pribytkov instructed him: "Always remember, son, about your commander, protect him and heed him in everything, let him be in my place." The son strictly followed his father's behest. Once Officer Gutsalo was approaching a ponton on which work was under way, in a boat. Suddenly a strong wind came up, a roller hit the boat and capsized it. Gutsalo ended up in the icy water and was threatened with death, but then Smn Pribytkov, son of a frontlinesman, hastened to the officer's assistance and rescued him.

It should be noted that as senior and more experienced comrades to their subordinates, Soviet commanders also have come to their help more than once. The Great Patriotic War history and peacetime days of combat training know many examples of heroic acts by officers where, at the risk of their lives, they helped privates and seamen in dangerous situations.

...In one tactical exercise a group of scouts commanded by Lt V. Smirnov headed into the "enemy" rear. They had to proceed stealthily, over an

untrodden route. On one of its sections the soldiers' path was blocked by a swift, rapid-filled river, constricted on both sides by steep, precipitous banks. Lt Smirnov made a bold decision to throw a line over the river and begin crossing along it.

At first everything went well, but when Pvt N. Shalkatov was above the river the sapling with the end of the line secured to it, already being thoroughly loosened by that time, suddenly leaned over and began to slip over the precipice. It seemed disaster could not be averted: There were sharp rocks below. At this moment, scorning the danger, the officer firmly grabbed the rope with one hand and the bare root of an adjacent tree with the other and began to hold the soldier suspended. Sgt Kolmanenko, Pvt Samar and other soldiers immediately rushed to assist their commander. Shalkatov succeeded in making his way safely to the opposite bank. The reconnaissance group continued performing its assignment.

In completing presentation of the first question, [the propagandist] should note that Soviet Armed Forces commanders firmly and steadfastly implement party policy and its resolutions on further strengthening national defense. Being true sons of their people, they skillfully train and indoctrinate subordinates and develop in them the moral-political and combat qualities needed for reliable protection of the Motherland and the great achievements of socialism.

/2. Respect Commanders and Chiefs and Carry Out Their Orders and Instructions Implicitly/

The commander... When people pronounce this word they usually get a mental picture of a person with an excellent knowledge of military affairs who is demanding and at the same time concerned for his subordinates, capable of leading them confidently in the most difficult situation and, should it be necessary, draw them by personal example for an exploit for the sake of the Motherland.

The commander's military proficiency and personal example always has been one of the grand traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces. On fields of battle for the homeland's freedom and independence our commanders were a model of unshakable ideological conviction and patriotism, steadfastness and valor, combat proficiency and self-control; and they developed the personnel's unbending will to win over the enemy.

...The machinegun company headed by Gds Sr Lt I. K. Sobko, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union, distinguished itself in fighting in the Kursk Bulge. His subordinates steadfastly held their positions. In critical moments of fighting the commander-party member always was in the most dangerous sectors. He skillfully directed fire, inspired the machinegunners and showed concern for timely supply of ammunition. One of the Maxims fell silent while another counterattack of the Hitlerites was being repulsed. The officer rushed there. The machinegun was intact but the gunner and second crew member had perished. The company commander himself laid down at the weapon and began to annihilate the fascists with accurate bursts. Enemy submachinegunners repeatedly flowed

around his pit. Sobko carried the machinegun to new positions and continued to conduct accurate fire. That was repeated several times. The machinegun company killed a total of several hundred Hitlerites in that fierce fight. Some 200 of them were cut down personally by the commander, Gds Sr Lt Sobko!

The mobilizing force of the commander's personal example also is exceptionally great in combat training. The commander's exemplary conduct on the exercise field, during flights, on deployments and in all daily life unites the personnel, inspires them to overcome difficulties and generates in them a desire to carry out his every order in the best way possible.

...Motorized riflemen of the company commanded by Sr Lt A. Novgorodtsev (he presently has been advanced in position) had to carry out a responsible and difficult weapons training exercise at night, in bad weather. Noticing the uncertainty of some personnel, the commander cheered up each one with a warm word and stressed that the motorized riflemen were fully capable of performing the exercise. Then he was first to move to the firing line and hit all targets without a miss. Inspired by the commander's example, the company personnel successfully fired the exercise.

This episode, as well as many similar to it, convincingly indicates that today's generation of commanders is worthily continuing the grand combat traditions. In close contact with party and Komsomol organizations, the commanders are directing the personnel's efforts at selfless military work, vigorous participation in socialist competition and accomplishment of difficult missions of tactical exercises, flights and long deployments. The officer considers it a matter of his honor to serve for subordinates as an example of strict observance of the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations and his own official duties, and of faultless performance of moral and ethical norms of conduct.

In placing great and responsible tasks on our commanders the Communist Party and Soviet state also provide them with appropriate rights. A special place among them is held by the right to give orders and issue instructions which have the force of law for subordinates and must be executed implicitly, precisely and on time. In issuing an order the commander always is guided by the interests of the Soviet state, our Armed Forces and combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship, and by the legal norms and requirements of communist morality.

The relationships of superiors and subordinates in the Soviet Armed Forces--an army of a new, socialist type--are arranged on the basis of a commonality of social-political interests and goals, equality before the law, and mutual respect and trust in each other. Therefore the commander's order gains special force under such conditions. Soviet military personnel carry it out with understanding, selflessly, and with a profound realization of their duty as the Motherland's defenders.

Soviet Armed Forces soldiers and sailors regard their commanders with great love and respect, seeing in them senior comrades given the trust of the party and people. And they receive orders from them as orders of the Motherland.

Military service is severe. It brooks not the slightest deviation from requirements of discipline and the commander's orders. But the categorical nature of these demands and orders fully conform to the moral principles established in our society. Moreover, Soviet military discipline fully conforms to the demands of communist morality inasmuch as it is based on our servicemen's profound ideological convictions.

In taking the military oath and the oath of allegiance to the socialist Motherland, the young soldier solemnly pledges before a formation of his combat comrades "to be an honest, brave, disciplined and vigilant soldier, to keep military and state secrets strictly, to observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, and to carry out unquestioningly all military regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs." From that moment a great responsibility is placed on him for security of the socialist homeland and his native people. The conscientious, implicit fulfillment of the military oath, orders and instructions becomes the yardstick of the Soviet soldier's moral conduct. It is not just because that is what the commander demands, but also by virtue of his complete inner agreement with these demands.

Obedience to one's commander and faultless execution represent one of the primary qualities characterizing a disciplined soldier. This helps the fighting man hold out in a clash against the enemy and win over him. This valuable character trait tempers the soldier's spirit, gives him determination in achieving the goal, and conquers faintheartedness, confusion and fear in a difficult, critical situation.

The soldier is obligated not simply to submit to the commander's order, but submit to it implicitly, unconditionally, with readiness to carry out an assignment in the best way possible and in the designated time. The commander's order is not a request or a wish, but a categorical and unconditional demand. The soldier has no right to doubt the expediency and need for the order or to discuss it, let alone question the commander's actions. On receiving an order he answers "Yes sir," and then executes it.

The serviceman has to be especially attentive in listening to the commander's order and if something is not quite understandable, he must ask for an explanation. An incorrectly understood order may entail improper actions, and this is fraught with dangerous consequences in a combat situation. Here is an example from the past war's experience. A group of five naval infantrymen was landed in the enemy rear and given the mission of conducting observation, revealing itself in no way and entering action only in the most extreme case. The scouts were in the enemy rear for several days and everything was going well. Suddenly they noticed a group of Hitlerites moving carelessly along a hollow. Our fighting men encircled and killed them and gathered up documents and weapons. On returning to their unit they received punishment instead of praise, for the commander's order had not been carried out. The group had revealed itself and as a result performance of an important assignment had been disrupted. The enemy began a sweep and discovered a second group of our scouts, which was forced to return to base. An order not fully comprehended by subordinates served as the reason for making the situation in this sector of combat actions complicated.

Strict, precise execution of a commander's orders does not preclude soldiers from displaying useful initiative or resourcefulness. A serviceman is obligated to make independent decisions boldly in particular difficult situations arising in the course of affairs and assume responsibility for their execution. And it stands to reason that he must not forget that initiative is good only if it does not go at cross purposes with demands of an order, but contributes to its most successful and rapid execution.

Here is an episode which occurred during the war in the fighting for Pechenga. Party member MSgt Ivan Lysenko moved up to enemy barbed-wire entanglements with a group of soldiers. The commander's order came: Negotiate the obstacle with a decisive dash and capture an enemy battery. After estimating the situation rapidly Lysenko, who had a powerful build, crawled under a cross-piece, ripped it out of the ground and, heaving it onto his shoulders, stood upright and passed his comrades on to the battery. The Hitlerites fled, not expecting a surprise attack. The commander's order was accomplished successfully thanks largely to a soldier's sharpness and to the initiative of a brave soldier and party member.

It should be noted that such qualities of soldiers and sailors as initiative and resourcefulness in executing orders are especially necessary in modern combat, which is distinguished by great intensity, dynamic action, and abrupt and rapid changes in the situation. Under such conditions the fighting men's passiveness and sluggishness simply are disastrous.

And here is where special mention must be made of the fact that a serviceman's discipline and execution are inseparable from his high military proficiency. Will there be much use, for example, in a member of a launcher crew if he runs quickly to the launching position at the combat alert signal, but in so doing forgets the sequence of his actions and begins to confuse things and hinder others? This more likely will have a negative effect on the crew's performance of the assigned mission. The better a soldier knows his job and the combat equipment entrusted to him, the more precisely, skillfully and confidently he acts in carrying out a command or order.

In taking the oath the private and seaman swear to be brave and not spare their blood or life itself in fulfilling military duty. In carrying out a commander's combat order the soldier may get into a situation where only his personal courage and heroism will be needed for successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. On getting into such a situation it is impossible, inadmissible and even criminal to display cowardice or try to "justify" non-fulfillment of an order by the complexity or danger of the situation. It was not for nothing that the frontline soldiers said: "One can die, but it is impossible not to carry out an order."

...This occurred during the historic Battle of Moscow. The crew of a heavy tank where MSgt V. A. Grigor'yev was driver-mechanic received the order to attack the Hitlerites in the company combat formations. A column of fascist tanks appeared ahead. There were seven of them. At a command from the company politruk, V. Shabunin, gunner S. Stupin opened fire. One enemy vehicle, then another was knocked out but the enemy also succeeded in hitting our tank.

The direct hit of a shell on it damaged the turret and jammed the main gun. It was impossible to fire any further and the fascist tank was approaching. It still was possible to manage to withdraw, but this meant opening the road to the enemy. And Grigor'yev made the decision to undertake a ram. "Let's go!" was the only thing the politruk had time to shout. Our KV [type of heavy tank] came down on the enemy vehicle with all its 50 tons of weight and then overturned it. That was how one of the first tank rams in the Battle of Moscow was accomplished. Driver-mechanic Viktor Antonovich Grigor'yev became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Subsequently he served for a long while in tank units, then worked as a design engineer and only recently retired on a pension.

Having received the baton of courage and allegiance to military duty from the frontlinesmen, new generations of Soviet soldiers continue the combat traditions. In fulfilling demands of the oath and regulations and carrying out commanders' orders, the Motherland's defenders often display courage, valor, steadfastness, endurance and at times even truly heroic exploits even in peacetime. Our Army and Navy are the best school for developing these qualities and for the moral-psychological conditioning of young men.

Military service demands constant readiness for heroic actions. It involves risk and at times also danger to life. Extremely intensive, acute situations arise at times during combat training and service and while performing missions assigned by the commander, where one must display self-control, boldness and resolve and put down a fully natural feeling of fear. The daily service of privates, navymen, airborne personnel, submariners, border guard personnel, combat engineers and soldiers of other specialties bears a heroic character even in peacetime and demands maximum exertion of all mental and physical forces. Performance of operational readiness, guard and watch services, tactical exercises, flights, sea and ocean deployments, missile launches, field firings, negotiation of water lines and other obstacles, parachute jumps, throwing live grenades, and participation in neutralizing ammunition found after the war serve well to develop high moral-combat qualities... All this tempers the soldier's will and character and develops his ability to endure hardships steadfastly and act vigorously and decisively in the conditions of modern combat; and to be ready to execute any order received without sparing his energy or life itself.

It only has to be borne in mind that true bravery cannot be foolhardy. In executing an order the brave soldier looks boldly into the face of danger, acts fearlessly and if necessary even sacrifices himself. But in so doing he calculates his actions coolly and takes sensible precautionary steps to ensure performance of the combat mission assigned by the commander in the best manner. And in no instances in life does bravery have anything in common with ostentatious bravery, bravado or the scorning of safety measures. At times people died during the war years through the fault of such "brave spirits." And even in peaceful days the moral and physical damage from recklessness, scorning of safety precautions and all kinds of "dashing behavior" is very significant.

Famed pilot Triple HSU A. I. Pokryshkin said it well on this score: "In my view the main element in an exploit is its social importance. An exploit is performed for the sake of people. For it is not a matter of the risk to which a person subjects himself, but of the socially useful result to which the display of courage and valor leads."

...The path to any height begins with the first relatively simple step. The path to an exploit also begins with seemingly simple things. A person must accustom himself to follow strictly the procedures and rules established in the Army and Navy and the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs in things large and small. There would seem to be nothing special here in forcing oneself to arise quickly and without fuss at the "Reveille" signal, take one's place in formation, make the bunk neatly, always have a smart appearance and be in uniform, march dashing in formation and salute each other. But all this represents far from trivial matters. The soldier or sailor who has not become accustomed to following established procedures in such everyday situations simply will not be ready psychologically to prove himself in a genuine, important matter or carry out a responsible assignment honorably. The sloven, idler, and the dissolute, unorganized person is organically incapable of demonstrating combat activeness, initiative or selflessness in a decisive minute.

And so one has to develop conscientiously in himself from the first steps of Army or Navy service a habit for discipline, strict efficiency, faultless obedience and execution. A soldier is obligated to force himself to strictly follow established procedures and always act as the military oath demands and as the regulation commands always and everywhere, when the commander is nearby and when he is not in the vicinity. The inner need to be disciplined and enthusiastically carry out the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs morally elevates the soldier and permits him to control himself and his acts conscientiously in any situation and display self-control and composure. In a combat situation all motives of such a fighting man are aimed not at how to avoid difficulties, but how to perform the assigned mission and his military duty in the best manner. And it is this desire that is the basis of any selfless act or combat exploit for the sake of the Motherland.

In completing presentation of material on the topic, [the propagandist] should emphasize once again that conscientious obedience and execution represent a most important indicator of discipline of soldiers and sailors and their proper understanding of their high patriotic duty. A soldier who faultlessly obeys all the commander's orders and is inwardly ready not to spare himself but to perform an exploit is a true Soviet patriot, an ideologically persuaded and conscientious defender of our great socialist Motherland.

/During independent training/ the students study Lenin's works "Letter to Workers and Peasants on Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIX, 152, 155, 156), and "Speech at Broad Workers' and Red Army Conference in Rogozhsko-Simonovskiy Rayon 13 May 1920" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLI, 120-121); "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR] (articles 31, 32, 59-65); Comrade Brezhnev's report "CPSU Central

Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress and Upcoming Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 63-67), and the chapter "The Feeling of the Motherland" from Comrade Brezhnev's book "Vospominaniya" (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 1, 1982); the USSR Armed Forces Code of Disciplinary Punishment (Chapter 1); and Chapter 11 of the text for political studies "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Motherland] (Voyenizdat, 1978).

/In the process of the discussion/ the instructor can ask the students the following questions: 1. What is Soviet military discipline? 2. Why is it necessary to obey commanders and chiefs implicitly? 3. Where is the soldier and sailor's execution manifested? 4. Why does the importance of military discipline rise under present-day conditions? 5. What is the essence of one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces?

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FOLLOW-UP ON REPORTED SHORTCOMINGS IN POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) p 96

[Article: "In the Wake of the Journal's Coverage: 'The Crack'"]

[Text] That was the title of an article by Lt Col V. Kalinkin published in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 2, 1982. It revealed serious shortcomings in political indoctrination in one of the military construction detachments.

The critical remarks were deemed correct, was the report the editors received from the Siberian Military District political directorate. They were examined at a conference with chiefs of political entities and discussed at party meetings of construction units.

The journal's article became the subject of a serious discussion in the party organization and in the detachment collective. A number of concrete proposals were expressed at an open party meeting for creating a healthy moral climate in the subunits, and criticism was addressed to some party member-managers who did not always heed the opinion of colleagues in their work and permitted themselves a haughty, noncomradely attitude toward officers and employees. A party evaluation was given to the existing shortcomings in command training of officers and warrant officers and in organizing political studies with military construction personnel and the professional growth of political officers.

Detachment commander Lt Col N. Krayev, deputy commander for political affairs Maj I. Kamenetskiy, and deputy commander for supply Maj M. Koynov were given strict party punishment for omissions in political indoctrination work and not taking proper steps to reinforce an atmosphere of friendship and troop comradeship in the detachment's subunits and establishing healthy moral relationships here.

The district political directorate also is taking a critical assessment of its own omissions noted in the article by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL. It has been recommended that all political entities study in more detail how the soldiers' concrete needs are being satisfied in the units and subunits, how complaints and applications are examined and how reception is arranged on personal matters. Then the results of this work are to be discussed in party organizations and at management conferences.

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MILITARY JOURNALISTS' CONFERENCE ON DUTIES HELD

PM111333 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 82 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Military Journalists' Conference"]

[Text] A conference of leaders of the central military press has been held at the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. It examined the tasks of military newspapers and journals and all ideological institutions in explaining and publicizing the report delivered by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, "on the USSR food program for the period through 1990 and measures for its implementation," and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) plenum.

There was also an examination of the military press' tasks stemming from the materials of the 19th Komsomol Congress and the sixth all-army conference of primary party organization secretaries.

The conference was addressed by Col Gen A. Lizichev, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. Taking part in the conference were the deputy chiefs of political directorates of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces who are chiefs of propaganda and agitation sections.

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'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' ON MILITARY SUPPORT OF 'CLASS BROTHERS'

PM071341 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Patriots, Internationalists"]

[Excerpt] As patriots and internationalists, Soviet soldiers have demonstrated many times their readiness to respond to the request of their foreign class brothers to support them. We are touched even today by the nobility and courage of the Soviet volunteers who fought bravely as part of the international brigades in Spain and the heroic feats of the Soviet servicemen on the Halhalin Gol, providing help fraternal for the Mongolian people in defeating the Japanese aggressors.

Our victory in the great patriotic war was a world historic international epic feat of the Soviet armed forces. At that grim time, all the nations and ethnic groups of our country rose in its defense shoulder to shoulder, displayed mass heroism and an unswerving will for victory, defeated the fascist aggressors and saved the peoples of the world from enslavement and destruction. Soviet servicemen-internationalists fulfilled with honor the great liberating mission entrusted to them by history itself.

Today it is the sons and grandsons of the great patriotic war heroes who fill in the ranks of the motherland's defenders. They have not undergone the severe tests which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic and internationalist traditions of our army and our peoples. "...Whenever," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "it is required by the interests of the country's security and the defense of peace, when victims of aggression need help, the Soviet serviceman will appear before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome all difficulties."

Whenever it has been required, our servicemen have fulfilled their internationalist duty with credit and honor, providing help for the peoples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the defense of the gains of socialism. The Soviet army and navy are a powerful link in the defensive alliance of fraternal socialist community countries and Warsaw Pact members.

The motherland's armed defenders are always ready to fulfill the tasks arising from their state's treaty obligations. The glorious deeds of the

personnel of the limited contingent of Soviet troops temporarily on DRA territory at the request of that country's government and providing its people with help in defense of the April Revolution gains once more provide cogent proof of this.

The USSR armed forces are a reliable bulwark of peace and the people's security and an invincible barrier in the way of imperialism's aggressive strivings. This role of theirs has grown even more in the conditions of the modern international situation and the increased danger of war from the United States and the other NATO countries. In this situation, Soviet servicemen see their patriotic and international duty in tirelessly enhancing their combat readiness and vigilance and strengthening their discipline and organization.

All ideological and political education work in the army and navy is subordinated to the resolution of the tasks which arise in this connection. Commanders, political organs party and komsomol organizations are mobilizing personnel to achieve new frontiers in combat improvement and socialist competition to fittingly greet the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. Preparation for this glorious event, it was noted at the sixth all-army conference of primary party organization secretaries, enables work on educating servicemen in the spirit of friendship among the USSR peoples and proletarian internationalism and on rallying the multinational servicemen's collectives to be considerably activated.

Educating internationalists means revealing profoundly, clearly and cogently to servicemen the advantages of the Soviet way of life, the triumph of Lenin's national policy and the tremendous international significance of the experience of the party and the Soviet people's struggle for communism. A task of prime importance is to bring home to every serviceman the historic significance of the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) plenum, the propositions and conclusions of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's report at the plenum and the USSR food program.

In both mass and individual work comprehensive use must be made of the revolutionary, labor and internationalist traditions of the CPSU, the working class and the working people of the whole country and the glorious combat traditions of the Soviet armed forces. They contain an inexhaustible supply of tremendous ideological power.

All this work must be carried out in close liaison with the life of the troops and naval forces and with the tasks being resolved by them. In developing in Soviet servicemen the qualities of ardent patriots and internationalists, a persistent effort must be made to ensure that they understand profoundly and distinctly that the real expression of these noble qualities is above all their tireless martial labor, their constant readiness to come at any moment to the defense of the historic gains of their people and the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and their readiness to continue to stand vigilantly on guard over peace and international security.

The allegiance of the Soviet armed forces to the ideas of proletarian, socialist internationalism and the friendship and fraternity of the motherland's defenders are the greatest source of their invincible might.

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ARMED FORCES

GEN KURKOTKIN WRITES ON IMPROVING ARMY CONDITIONS

PM080859 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Army General S. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR armed forces rear services: "In the Interests of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The supreme goal of our party's economic strategy is the steady improvement of the people's material and cultural living standard. It was stressed in the 26th CPSU Congress decisions that the main task of the 11th 5-year plan is to ensure the further improvement of Soviet people's well-being on the basis of the steady, progressive development of the national economy. "The more mature our society becomes," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has noted, "the more attention we can and must devote to working people's day-to-day needs--housing, nutrition, the service sphere, health care and education--all that determines a person's well-being and mood." The "USSR food program for the period through 1990" adopted by the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) plenum was a vivid new manifestation of the party's concern for people.

The further improvement of military life is also organically connected with the growth of the country's economic might. The Communist Party, its central committee and Comrade L.I. Brezhnev personally display tireless concern for the motherland's defenders and for satisfying their material, consumer and cultural needs and requirements. The army and navy receive all they need to ensure normal service, study, everyday life and leisure for personnel.

But no matter how rich our potential, it is important to utilize it skillfully and thriftily. To this end persistent, purposeful activity is needed, and often creativity and initiative on the part of commanders, political organizers and specialists in the rear services. Much also depends on the significance which a particular commander or chief attaches, among his other duties, to organizing his subordinates' living conditions in strict accordance with the requirements of regulations and instructions. Whether he regards this work as a kind of "appendix" to other measures to increase the combat readiness of the unit or ship, or whether he sees it as closely associated with the resolution of his main task. Yet there can be no two opinions here. As was noted at the all-army conference of primary party

organization secretaries, the correct organization of personnel's living conditions and leisure is a necessary element of regulation order; concern for people and for satisfying their needs and requirements is concern for high military discipline and the subordinates' readiness to fulfill their military duty.

That is how things are indeed organized most often. In units and on ships much has been done to ensure a full life for personnel and to provide servicemen with everything laid down. This is promoted, in particular, by the patriotic movement "exemplary living conditions for every garrison," which has been widely launched in the army and navy. In the course of review contests held among troops, what has been achieved is consolidated and augmented and questions of everyday arrangements are resolved comprehensively for each garrison (military camp). And where the movement is supported by commanders and political organizers and has taken on specific organizational forms, the living conditions of personnel and servicemen's families are steadily improving.

On the credit side, I would like to note the organization of affairs in the strategic missile force, the Belorussian and Leningrad military districts, the group of Soviet forces in Germany and the Black Sea fleet. Just in the first 18 months of the current 5-year plan, in these places many modern, well-appointed barracks, mess halls [stolovaya] and clubs, as well as apartment blocks and various cultural, consumer and utility projects, have replaced old ones. Another positive fact is that special attention is being devoted to remote garrisons, where there has to be everything for people to lead a full life: from the club and school to stores and preschool institutions.

What are the main guidelines for organizing military life in the modern way? As regards KIT, this means, for instance, creating soldiers' consumer services combines in each unit, instead of various workshops. They must act as a complex to ensure both timely washing facilities for personnel and the laundering, repair, dry cleaning and tinting of uniform. There are exemplary combines of this kind in the units where the KIT services are headed by officers V. Nakonechnyy, V. Govorukha, A. Kaplun and many others. It is also important to improve company facilities, ensuring the conditions for maintaining servicemen's regulation appearance and their strict observance of the rules of personal hygiene and the wearing of the military form of dress.

The further development of medical services is associated with the provision of modern equipment for medical institutions and the introduction of leading methods of investigation and treatment in the treatment and diagnostic process. One sign of the times is the appearance at medical centers in many units of laboratories and diagnostic offices. There is a constantly expanding network of district, fleet and central sanatoriums, leisure homes and tourist bases. In 1981 alone their capacity increased by more than 1,000 places, and by the end of the 5-year plan it will increase by nearly 6,000 more.

In leisure organization the course has been set of providing family passes for officers, ensigns and warrant officers.

Important criteria for the improvement of trade are the extension of the network of trade and consumer enterprises and the improvement of the standard of service for purchasers, customers and clients. The self-service method, for instance, now accounts for 62 percent of all goods sold in military camps. The number of fairs and consumer days held in remote garrisons has increased sharply. There are more soldiers' and seamen's canteens [chaynaya; literally, tearoom] in units.

In a word, much has been and is being done. But it cannot stop there. Life is rushing ahead. Demands on troops' combat readiness are increasing, and thus so are physical, moral and psychological demands on servicemen. People's cultural level is rising steadily. As a result new demands are made on material and consumer provisions and cultural services. Today more than ever before the troops' living conditions and their combat readiness are indissolubly united. So the further improvement of military life is a most important task not only for rear services workers, but also for military councils, commanders, political organizers and party, trade union and komsomol organizations. In any conditions--stationary and field conditions--all the necessary living conditions must be created for servicemen so as to promote the timely, high quality fulfillment of the tasks set.

To this end it is very important to carry out appropriate political education work, including on an individual basis. The party's demands for attention toward people and their needs and requirements must be brought to the attention of every officer, ensign and warrant officer. All servicemen must be taught to be thrifty and careful. Political organizers and party organizations are acting correctly when they periodically discuss these questions and resolutely cut short attempts by certain officials to justify shortcomings in terms of "objective" factors.

What "objective" factors could justify, for instance, the case where, in one garrison in the Transbaykal military district, the construction of the bath and laundry building took 10 years? Or instances of failure to supply personnel with uniforms in good time, as happened in the Kamenets-Podolsk Marshal of Engineering Troops V.K. Kharchenko Higher Military Engineering Command School and in certain units of the central group of forces and the far eastern military district? Or the fact that the most valuable food products and certain industrial goods intended for remote garrisons have not arrived there in a number of instances?

All this cannot be explained except in terms of the neglectful attitude of specific officials toward service duties and their low degree of exactingness toward their subordinates. Judging by these instances, certain commanders, political workers and leaders of services simply do not study the servicemen's needs or seek to satisfy them rapidly. So concern must be displayed for the more careful selection and placing of cadres and their education

and training. Where people's living conditions are concerned, we need sensitive, sympathetic, enterprising workers whose hearts are really in their task. That is why an important reserve for improving military life can be seen in work with cadres.

I would like to dwell particularly on the problems of organizing catering for personnel. Today most mess halls in military units are equipped and operated up to the standard of the country's best public catering enterprises. As an example, I could cite the unit where food services are headed by Sr Lt Ye. Yegorov. Here a two-story soldiers' kitchen and mess hall has been constructed, with spacious, light dining rooms and leisure halls, lovingly decorated with splendid photographs, prints and pictures. Mainly executed by the servicemen themselves. Exemplary order and a high standard of serving of food are always ensured in the mess hall, and the food is notable for its variety and high taste qualities. Much helps to achieve this, but the most important condition of success is that the unit always remembers: The mess hall is not just a place for feeding servicemen, but a place of cultural and esthetic education for them.

Against the background of such examples, instances of poor organization and catering, the preparation of unattractive food and sometimes the failure to fully supply norms appear particularly unacceptable. In a number of places mess halls are not repaired for a long time and the necessary equipment is lacking. On exercises, food is sometimes provided late and cold. Every such instance must be the subject of a principled party assessment. And they must be looked at in two ways. It is bad that people are not fed properly. It is also bad that the food issued for them is wasted or used for the wrong purpose. So there is both moral and direct material harm. Both must be fully accounted for.

But the mess hall is, so to speak, the final component in the food service system. What we see on soldiers' and seamen's tables is produced to a considerable extent within the armed forces. Meat and milk, eggs, vegetables and potatoes--that is by no means the full range of output from military sovkhoses. Their role is particularly noteworthy in remote regions. It is gratifying that last year military sovkhoses supplied troops with, for instance, 34 percent more meat than in the 1st year of the 10th 5-year plan. That means that many thousands of tons of this valuable product did not have to be taken out of the national economy's stocks. Hence it is a task of great state importance to continue to increase the capacities of military sovkhoses and make the greatest contribution we can to the resolution of the party's food program.

An important source for supplying personnel with meat, vegetables and greens is also the kitchen (galley) farms of units. They have recently begun developing comprehensively. As well as pigs, they now keep cattle, sheep and goats, poultry and rabbits, hothouses are appearing and arable land and market gardens are increasing. Last year more than 20 kg of meat and as much greens for everyone on the roll was obtained in the units where great attention is devoted to these questions by officers V. Ravlin, A.

Sokolov, N. Ordzhaliyev, R. Shlukov and others. But it is a pity that alongside leading units you often meet with units where kitchen plots are not developing at all. More active use must be made of organizational and other measures and moral incentives in order to overcome this lack of coordination.

The troop's living conditions are an important factor in their high combat readiness. In ensuring the proper standard of living arrangements for servicemen, workers and employees in the army and navy and their families, commanders, political organizers and rear services are called upon to take care to ensure the most rational utilization of available resources and their augmentation. This must be our response to the party's fatherly concern for the people's good and for servicemen in the armed forces.

An all-army conference devoted to the implementation in the armed forces of the tasks set by the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) plenum is soon to be held. The need for such a discussion is dictated by life itself. It is necessary to discover and bring into play all the reserves we have so as to ensure that the participation of army and navy personnel in fulfilling statewide plans is as effective as possible.

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ARMED FORCES

ADMIRAL SOROKIN SUMS UP DISCIPLINE DEBATE

[Editorial Report] PM061053--Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 June 1982 publishes on pages 2-3 under the headline "Strengthening Discipline, Military Order" a 3,150-word article by Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief, Soviet army and navy main political directorate, summarizing a discussion on discipline pursued over the last 4 months in letters to the paper in response to an original letter from guards Capt S. Kapitonov entitled "This Must Not Be Tolerated." Citing D.F. Ustinov's words at the sixth all-army conference of primary party organization secretaries that "...there can be no combat readiness without strong discipline," Sorokin goes on to enumerate the main points of the discussion, namely that discipline can be improved by: good personal example of officers; improved monitoring and verification of performance; good working cooperation between commanders, political workers, party and komsomol organizations; closeness of officers to their men and an active attitude to educating them; good examples from communists and komsomol members; and good use of veterans and socialist competition to inspire servicemen. Sorokin concludes that all must draw the relevant conclusions from the discussion.

No further processing planned.

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ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

PARTY AKTIV MEETING--Red Banner Turkestan Military District--A party aktiv meeting has been held here to discuss the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) plenum results and party organizations' tasks arising from its decisions and the report of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Col Gen Yu. Maksimov, commander of the district's forces, who delivered the report, Lt Gen N. Moiseyev, chief of the district's political directorate and member of the military council, comrades N. Martynyuk, A. Agudov, M. Kakhrimanov and others who spoke in the debate noted the tremendous economic and sociopolitical significance of the documents adopted at the plenum. The district's servicemen, communists said, fervently approve and support the party's course toward further improving the Soviet people's prosperity and strengthening our motherland's economic and defense might. [Excerpt] [PM280925 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 82 p 2]

CSO: 1801/289

GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION: PARTY INFLUENCE ON TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 42-46

[Article by Gds Capt A. Kuznetsov, party committee member: "A Great Force (A Battalion Commander's Notes)"]

[Text] No matter what mission our motorized rifle battalion has to accomplish, I cannot conceive of success without the party organization's spirited, purposeful work of initiative.

It now consists of 14 CPSU members. These people vary in knowledge and experience. Some, such as Gds Capt M. Vagin, Gds Sr Lt A. Fesyuk and Gds Sr Lt A. Suvalov, have substantial periods of Army service. They have both an abundant store of knowledge and extensive work experience with people. But Gds Lt A. Krastin'shin, Gds WO S. Kuzmich and Gds WO A. Teren'kov lack both. All our party members, however, are energetic people of initiative who exert unremitting influence on the training, service and conduct of officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates. They lead the personnel and inspire them to attain new goals of combat perfection and at exemplary performance of patriotic duty to the Motherland.

I recall when I assumed command of the battalion about a year ago. I also did not forget the first party meeting, where a rather important issue was being discussed on the initiative, principle and personal example of party members in training, service and discipline. The conversation was open, keen and direct, in a party manner. The problem was that none of the comrades--neither those who had been here a long while nor those who had just arrived--were satisfied with the results of work or the battalion's indicators in combat and political training as well as in military discipline. The subunit was in last place in the unit based on results of socialist competition.

The comrades who spoke did not conceal their errors or deficiencies and also spoke openly about others' shortcomings. The facts they cited indicated that the party organization's influence on certain aspects of the personnel's life and training had relaxed somewhat. Meanwhile, the meeting expressed the firm assurance and readiness not only to remedy shortcomings, but also take the battalion into the ranks of foremost subunits.

That was the party members' mood. At that time I involuntarily thought about myself and my role in the collective's struggle for implementing the desired changes and fulfilling the higher socialist pledges which had been made. It was necessary above all to make a considerable improvement in organization of the training process, put an end to oversimplification and indulgences in holding classes, and see to it that all privates and NCO's strictly followed the requirements of combined-arms regulations and the rules regulating Army life, while relying on the party and Komsomol organizations. As the commander I had to brief party members and candidate members as well as the Komsomol aktiv promptly about all changes in the battalion's life and about every new task facing it or a certain group of personnel, and ensure that no one remained aloof from the determined struggle to accomplish them.

The battalion received a real baptism of fire in Exercise "Zapad-81," in which we participated. I recall receiving a narrative problem in one of its phases--it was assumed there would be a powerful counterblow by an assault force dropped by the "enemy." The regiment was ordered to take up a defense and prepare to repulse his attacks. We began digging in and already had done much to conceal and cover the combat equipment and personnel, but then came a new, supplementary narrative problem--the battalion was to shift from the right flank to the center of the defense taken up by the regiment.

Signals came in from one, then another company: The people regretted leaving a ready-made position! An order of course is an order. Everyone realized this well, but the doubt did not disappear: Would we have time to create a reliable defense at the new location? We really might not have time were these and other questions the people had to remain unanswered. Any vagueness may give rise to uncertainty, which in turn will cause a drop of enthusiasm in the privates and NCO's. This is why we immediately reacted to the sentiments which arose. Several party members were given the task of explaining to the personnel literally on the move what caused the need for the battalion to change its place in the regimental defensive area. I did this in 5th Company, my political deputy Gds Capt A. Bulatov did so in the 4th Company, and party organization deputy secretary Gds Sr Lt A. Doronin did so in the 6th.

We had occasion to encounter very serious difficulties in performing engineer work at the new defensive line. The extent of this work was so considerable and difficult and the deadline for performing it so short that some people's doubt as to success still made itself known. At that time therefore I recommended that the party organization secretary, Gds Sr Lt Fesyuk, assemble party members for a short time and consult with them as to what should be done to accomplish the mission which had come up. Many judgements were expressed, but all of them reduced to the fact that the party members above all should inspire their colleagues with their own strenuous work and begin competition for best organization of each position and for making it inaccessible to the "enemy." In addition the party members and Komsomol activists also performed extensive explanatory work with the personnel. They told how frontlinesmen literally were able to dig into the ground and turn a foxhole or small trench into a fortress in an hour. During moments of lulls they informed everyone of the situation and read leaflets put out by the party committee. The example and word of people with party cards over their hearts

did the job. The work really hummed. The battalion managed to complete organization of the new line and a decisive rebuff was given to major forces of the attacking side.

These and other examples taught me how important it is to orient party members promptly, target them on accomplishing a concrete task, and together find the most effective ways of accomplishing it. And now I always try to act in this manner.

The fighting spirit of the party collective depends largely on the level of its intraparty life and the party members' activeness, principle and sense of responsibility for an assigned job. The party organization acts properly in showing constant concern above all for turning the meetings into a genuine school for indoctrination of party members and an effective means for increasing their job and political activeness. Agendas and briefers are chosen carefully and all CPSU members and candidate members know ahead of time what the subject of discussion will be at the next meeting and take part in discussing problems which have arisen.

In preparing meetings the secretary and his deputy consult with me not only on what matters to discuss, but also how to analyze them thoroughly, where to direct particular attention and what decision to make. Great importance is attached to preparation of briefings. It is true that we still have not been able to expand significantly the number of party members who give briefings, but we are constantly concerned about the content of this chief presentation at the meeting. Briefings are prepared with my participation, participation of the battalion political worker as well as of party members responsible for solving the problem which will be the subject of thorough analysis at the meeting.

We set for ourselves the rule of avoiding general discussions. People speak in a businesslike manner at meetings, make concrete suggestions and criticize comrades for omissions in service. Resolutions indicate those responsible for execution, deadlines for conducting activities and the measures needed for monitoring accomplishment of what was planned.

It must be noted that a fundamental party discussion at the meetings helped us identify many gaps in combat and political training and then eliminate them. For example, real alarm was expressed at one of the meetings over the fact that some officers had had a drop in weapons training indicators and received unsatisfactory grades in check firing. It is true that there were no party members among those who let down, but there were Komsomol members, some of whom tried to find an excuse. They declared that one was not always lucky or successful. Such hopes set on chance were sharply criticized.

I supported the suggestions party members made at the party meeting as to the advisability of holding an officer meeting as well. The discussion there was about their responsibility for their professional training. But there were comrades who continued to explain gaps in their training as resulting from various reasons which a check showed to have no grounds whatsoever. They were made to understand in no uncertain terms that no evasions would help here. For

example, Gds Lt A. Krilavichus tried to extenuate his guilt by tossing out the rejoinder:

"We were not allowed to fire enough and so those were the results."

"And were we also not permitted to practice?" retorted party member Gds Sr Lt S. Telyatnikov reasonably. "We were! So who are you blaming?"

Party members' exactingness is high toward everyone, but especially toward comrades in the party. For example, we demanded a strict, partylike accounting of Gds Lt V. Davydov. He was late for duties and carried out instructions of senior persons in a slipshod manner. At the meeting party members asked him to explain the reasons for his negligent conduct. CPSU members senior lieutenants G. Mokhov and F. Smaglyuk also were made to give an account at the meetings for their lack of discipline. We give no one an allowance and give a fundamental evaluation of people's acts and the state of affairs in a particular sector. As a commander I carefully heed everything discussed at the meetings and take steps aimed at remedying shortcomings which the party members reveal.

Once during a presentation Gds Sr Lt Fesyuk directed attention to the fact that poor use was being made of training devices in weapons training classes. We checked the warning and it was confirmed: Some young officers were not resorting to the method of graphic effect in training only because they had poor knowledge of the instruments and other equipment in the training facility. I immediately took steps through my channels. First we taught platoon and squad commanders how to use the devices and training equipment and then established control over their use in classes.

I am helped considerably by work as part of the unit party committee in directing the work of the party organization and relying on it more flexibly. Being a member of the unit party committee, I of course take part in discussing and deciding all questions of party life. This is a good school, which makes it possible to learn from the experience of other collectives or individual comrades, adopt all the best and draw conclusions even from mistakes made in some places.

Once the party committee was discussing the role of party members in converting equipment to a fall-winter mode of operation. A representative not of our battalion, but of another battalion, gave a briefing, with many critical remarks, and rather serious ones, expressed. I listened to the criticism of comrades and, honestly speaking, took it as addressed both to me and to our battalion's party organization. As in that battalion, we conducted this work initially chiefly just by the engineers and technicians, with the party organization's attention to it being poor. On returning from the party committee session I immediately briefed the political worker and party organization secretary about the discussion which took place there. Together we planned what had to be done additionally and what measures to take to cope more successfully with the very same task. As a result we avoided those mistakes which our neighbors made and received a high grade for equipment readiness for its new operating conditions.

In this regard I would like to take advantage of the opportunity given me to appear in the pages of the journal on the eve of the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries and ask one question which appears to me to be fundamental. Only after having become a member of the party committee did I sense how much of all that it handles and discusses remains the property of a narrow circle of activists. It is a pity! For both the experience gathered bit by bit by the party committee and the deficiencies it uncovers could teach the commanders, political workers, and party organization secretaries a very great deal. An objection could be raised to this: The fact is that the party committee secretary regularly briefs party members at party meetings about activities which have been conducted. That is true, but how does he do it? As a rule, by naming only the agendas of party committee sessions which have been held and the subjects of evening gatherings, conferences and so on. And we party members hurry the secretary along and hasten to take his information into consideration in order to discuss the main issue faster. "These are just details," is the rejoinder which sometimes stops the secretary's information. But it is apropos to recall that Lenin taught us to delve into the details of a matter and penetrate more thoroughly into the very essence of a question.

And here is still another consideration I took from the party committee sessions. It would appear that we do not always fully activate the mechanism (I will call it that) of party influence on the personnel's life and training. For it is clear that we exercise immediate influence on service personnel through the party and Komsomol organizations of battalions and companies. But let us ask ourselves: Are reports by secretaries of party and Komsomol bureaus and of agitators often heard at party committee sessions? Frankly speaking, they still are rarely heard. Commander-party members are heard, and rather often. It would appear that specifically by reinforcing attention to subunit party organizations and party groups we largely will solve the problem of converting them into a center of daily ideological indoctrination work and into a political nucleus of military collectives.

Management of the Komsomol organization is part, and a very important part, of all party work. Suffice it to say that the majority of our privates and NCO's are Komsomol members, so that speaking about success of all battalion personnel in combat and political training means speaking about the progress and discipline of Komsomol members. That is why both I as the commander and the party organization constantly concern ourselves with seeing that the Komsomol collective lives a full-fledged, creative life. What factors are used in this matter?

Above all we party members came to the assistance of our junior comrades in distributing the Komsomol aktiv's forces. For example, during recent report-election meetings service personnel who were the most active and who had proven themselves both in training, service and discipline as well as in public life were elected secretaries, bureau members and Komsomol group organizers. Among them were many party members and candidate members. The party nucleus in the Komsomol is our reliable support in raising initiative, activity and fighting spirit in Komsomol work.

Komsomol members express many businesslike suggestions and critical remarks which merited attention during the reports and elections. Could they be ignored? Of course not. That is why we discussed the results of reports and elections in Komsomol organizations at one of the party meetings where political worker Gds Capt A. Bulatov gave a briefing. By the way, when such a meeting was being planned voices were heard asking whether or not it was worthwhile conducting. It turned out that it was. And our party secretary acted properly in defending this agenda. An interesting and, most important, necessary discussion took place at the meeting. Not only the party organizations, but I too had to take steps to accomplish everything valuable suggested by the Komsomol members and to remedy the deficiencies in the training process they had uncovered. Even now changes for the better have been seen in the Komsomol organization's work and the overwhelming majority of Komsomol members are holding a vanguard role in service, training and discipline.

As with all the Motherland's armed defenders, personnel of our battalion are gripped by much political and job enthusiasm. They are responding to the CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Foundation" with new efforts aimed at further increases in vigilance and combat readiness and with active participation in socialist competition under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!"

All our organizational and political work now is subordinated to mobilizing the personnel for selfless military work of implementing requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress on our country's soldiers, at creating an atmosphere of high creative intensity and at persistent adoption of foremost experience. It must be said that there already have been many gratifying changes achieved in the battalion's life. The personnel's combat schooling has risen noticeably and discipline has become firmer. Our subunit no longer holds last place in the regiment from results of socialist competition, but first place. And much credit for all this goes to our party organization, which I see as a great force and my constant and reliable support.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT: WINTER TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 5 Apr 82) pp 47-53

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Tkachev: "The Regimental Commander"]

[Text] The winter dawn comes late beyond the 60th parallel. When Gds Lt Col A. Obukhov emerged from the house at 0600 hours the darkness still reigned around him and the snow was falling thickly. Mildly scolding in his heart the "heavenly office," which had been unusually generous with abundant snowfalls in recent days, Anatoliy Yakovlevich automatically had the thought that people again would have to be sent to clear the roads, taking them from classes, and the field exercise of the motorized rifle battalion would be complicated with additional difficulties.

It was a short path from the residential area of the military post to the unit location. While the UAZ [Ul'yanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant] vehicle covered the few but difficult kilometers of snowy, ice-covered road, the regimental commander's thoughts were taken up wholly by the field exercise. There seemingly were no grounds for anxiety. Everything had been thought out, planned and prepared ahead of time. The regimental staff had defined precisely the objectives and missions of the tactical field exercise and they had been understood firmly by the commanders, political workers, and the party and Komsomol aktiv. The people were morally attuned for intensive training and for overcoming difficulties. The commander was sure of this when he listened to the officers' reports on readiness for the exercise and held a group exercise with them. And he was especially sure at the battalion party meeting. He was sincerely pleased by the party members' understanding of their responsibility for productiveness of field training and by their confidence in their ability to ensure success of the matter.

Everyone who went up on the rostrum--battalion commander Gds Capt A. Chukhrov, his political deputy Gds Capt V. Kotov, and the company and platoon commanders--gave assurances that they would cope with the mission. Each one made suggestions on how best to organize training, indoctrination work, competition and routine under field conditions. And when he himself spoke about the need for using every hour with a maximum return, not losing sight for a minute of concern for the people, and observing safety precautions, he sensed that his words fell on fertile soil of the common interest by like-minded party members in the high end result of the upcoming exercise.

Nevertheless the anxiety did not leave the regimental commander in this early morning hour. No matter what is said, the first lengthy field exercise for young privates who have just learned the ABC's of combined-arms training is a serious test. Among them were many southerners unaccustomed to freezing temperatures and who a month ago had put on skis for the first time in their lives. Would they cope with the march of many kilometers with full combat equipment? Weather forecasters were promising a drop in the temperature, and the exercise was oriented on a situation approximating the extreme conditions of combat activities to the maximum. The battalion would go out without tents and without a field kitchen. Using improvised means, the personnel had to erect "chums" [rough shelters] for personnel warming and resting and arrange preparation of hot food from dry rations. The terrain in the area of operational training actions was marshy woodland with a deep cover of snow. Were one of the officers to overlook something, injuries and frostbite were possible... In short, the regimental commander had something to think about, although he was sure of his subordinates.

The battalion formed up in an organized manner at the "Assemble" signal, keeping within the time allocated by the norm. Gds Lt Col Obukhov captiously checked the personnel's gear and assigned the mission in a few words: During the continuous stay in the field, practice squad and platoon actions in the attack and defense and be able to adapt to the inconveniences of life in freezing temperatures and with consideration of the nature of terrain. He also gave a reminder about the collective's obligation to take the battalion into the ranks of outstanding in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation.

One after the other the companies headed for the designated area at the prescribed time interval. The regimental commander already was awaited by other matters, scheduled by hours and minutes since evening.

My acquaintance with Gds Lt Col Obukhov at first was by hearsay. The political directorate of the Leningrad Military District described him as a person who knew and loved his work, who had good volitional, organizational and party qualities and who was able to work with people. They spoke of him as follows: "He is a commander with initiative and persistence in achieving goals and executing decisions. He puts his heart and soul into the regiment's combat readiness. He is able to rely on the party members and make subordinates enthusiastic about the future."

Then came the first meeting with Obukhov. A military vein was seen just from the officer's external appearance. Tall, stately, composed, with a faultless bearing, strict features of a strong-willed person and with the manner of one who behaves openly and freely. On seeing him one automatically thinks: Such a person was destined from birth to be a commander. And it turns out that his genealogy or, more precisely, memory of his father and memory of the war--although he was born in May of '45 when the country was celebrating the victory--really did play a part in choice of a lifetime career. But Yakov Vasil'yevich Obukhov, commander of a rifle battalion, died the death of the brave in fighting for the liberation of Prague in that same May of '45. Earlier starvation had ended the life of Anatoliy's two young sisters in

blockaded Leningrad. And two decades later, when the stormclouds of military danger again began to thicken, he firmly decided to become a professional defender of the Motherland, at that time being a lathe operator in one of the Leningrad plants and a party member.

He could be a good production worker, engineer, foreman or shop chief--such prospects had been intended for him. He could become a Komsomol worker or journalist. There were prerequisites for this: He headed the shop Komsomol organization, was a member of the plant Komsomol committee, had completed the faculty of journalism in the evening Marxism-Leninism university under the party obkom, and his material had appeared in newspapers. But Obukhov found his true calling in military service.

Service went evenly for him, without swift flights, but also without drops, all the while on the rise. And it was always gratifying. It happened that after completion of higher combined-arms command school he, Lt Obukhov, was sent into political work. For three years, as political deputy to a motorized rifle company commander, he mastered the difficult art of indoctrinational work. To this day he recognizes that this practical school came in very handy for him later on the commander's difficult path.

Anatoliy Yakovlevich rose to the high and responsible position of regimental commander after having gone through all the levels preceding it: He was company and battalion commander, chief of staff, and deputy unit commander. At each post success accompanied him because he gave his all to service and was able to see the job through the people and consider how the job was reflected in the people.

Gds Lt Col Obukhov had headed the Leningrad Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Guards Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Leninist Komsomol for the third year. Even before, this regiment was in good repute, but under his aegis much here has changed for the better. The collective received the high awards of the honorary Lenin scroll and the district military council challenge red banner already under Obukhov. By the way, both the regimental commander and his political deputy were awarded an honorary Lenin scroll.

It is understandable that awards are not given for nothing. To this day Anatoliy Yakovlevich remembers the first meeting of the military district party aktiv in his new position, at which during the gathering old comrades in service expressed one and the same complaint, as if having arranged things together and without regard for the fact that he had commanded the regiment for only a few days: You are graduating a majority of squad commanders, gunner-operators and driver-mechanics with outstanding or good grades in their specialty, but as a matter of fact many of them are demonstrating satisfactory knowledge. He did not make excuses nor refer to objective reasons which he had seen without particular difficulty from the first days. And he made no promises to transform everything all at once.

Obukhov realized well that it was possible and necessary to place more rigid requirements on grading criteria of specialist schooling, but they would hardly gain additional knowledge and skills from this all at once. The unit

generally was performing its assigned missions rather well only thanks to the officers' enthusiasm. They were trying to get the maximum possible out of the obsolete, primitive training facility. The personnel's everyday conditions left much to be desired, to put it mildly.

It was clear that the situation had to be changed. The previous commander and regimental political officer had struggled to solve the problems, and not without results: The title list for capital construction in the district provided for future construction of two new barracks in the regiment in place of the old ones that had outlived their time. But how long would it be before it was their turn? In addition, a modern training complex, modern ranges and a good parade field for drill training were needed like fresh air. The regimental commander and his political deputy, Gds Maj A. Denisenko (like their predecessors, but perhaps only more insistently and boldly) knocked at the doors of appropriate officials. They persuaded and tried to prove that it was impossible to wait any longer inasmuch as it was a question of the quality of specialist training and consequently about combat readiness not only of the training regiment. And the ice moved, as they say: Military construction personnel began erecting one new barracks, and then the other. But with regard to the other necessary facilities, it was said without beating around the bush: You are not the only ones in the district and military construction personnel are not the sun that they can warm everyone at once. The money is there and the primary physical assets are present, but there are not enough working hands; if you wish, build them with your own resources.

The question of whether or not the collective was capable of constructing a training building, training ranges and parade field with its own resources was discussed in the regiment initially at an officers' meeting, then at a party committee session and at party and Komsomol meetings. The commander, political worker and party activists told the people frankly that the task was not a simple one. They would have to work in the evenings, sacrifice days off and would have to overcome many difficulties in order to create a unit firing range, a BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] moving target gunnery range and a weapons compound on the swamp by laying corduroy... But the fact was that this was extremely necessary for themselves and for the regiment's combat readiness and the collective unanimously decided that since it was necessary, the difficulties were of no account.

Speaking to the Komsomol members, Gds Lt Col Obukhov suggested: "Shouldn't we announce that your construction of training facilities is a key Komsomol construction site? We have so many such construction sites in the country! Let's have our own in the regiment too. You have a good motto, 'Komsomol concern for the training facility,' and so back it up with real work." And the youth caught fire with the idea of creating something.

It means a great deal to be able to persuade and inspire people. The personnel created a good-quality training facility in record short periods of time. When one sees the large building of the training complex and inspects its spacious, light classrooms in which a battalion can work simultaneously on all combat training subjects, one does not even believe that all this, from foundation to finishing, was done by the motorized riflemen. It is enough to pay

one visit to the weapons compound, the unit firing range or the BMP moving target gunnery range and see how the soldiers initially practice skills of driving and firing on vehicle simulators without using engine time or ammunition and then reinforce them under difficult range conditions with automated target equipment to realize that the work, efforts and energy of the people who created these training complexes were not wasted. The regiment now has everything necessary for preparing full-fledged specialists and it is performing its primary mission more successfully and with higher quality.

"Anatoliy Yakovlevich, obviously the construction with your own resources still hinders the training process to some extent?" I asked the regimental commander.

"In the most minimal amount," responded Obukhov. "At any rate, 75 percent of our graduates last year left for the units with outstanding or good knowledge. And we heard considerably fewer complaints about the level of the others' schooling than before. And then we cannot discount the moral or, if you like, the indoctrinational gain. The cadets were building the complexes, sacrificing their leisure time and knowing full well that they personally would not be taking advantage of the results of their work. Is this really of little importance for the moral development of an individual?"

Gds Lt Col Obukhov views training and indoctrination as a single inseparable process. He persistently implements everything he considers useful and expedient for raising the effectiveness of this process, regardless of whether the creative initiative comes from him personally or others.

The most effective system for organizing training and training its managers was developed through common efforts of regimental headquarters officers and party members. Approved by the commander, it became law. The training facility is used by the subunits in the optimum variant, figured by hours and minutes. Each succeeding topic is preceded on a mandatory basis by an instructional methods demonstration class with officers, warrant officers and NCO's.

I had occasion to attend one such class. Using Gds Lt A. Nesterenko's platoon as an example, the commander of 3d Battalion trained platoon commanders in the weapons compound in the methodology of organizing a shooting practice which they had to conduct with cadets the next day. Faultless drill bearing of the personnel, multiple repetition of each action and each narrative, the precision of commands and reports, the objective competition among crew members for bettering the norms, and the detailed, well-reasoned critique all became a graphic lesson to the young officers on how to get the maximum use out of a training hour.

Before Gds Capt Chukhrov's battalion went into the field the political worker informed the regimental commander that subunit party members were suggesting that a rally be held not in the unit, but after completion of the first phase of the short forced march on skis, near the monument to deceased Leningrad defenders; to lay a wreath; and to give the right to make a three-volley salute in honor of the fallen heroes to the platoon which demonstrated the best schooling.

"A sensible idea," said Obukhov in support. "The emotional charge will be higher and will unquestionably give strength to the tired cadets."

It was as if the party members, political worker and commander had foretold the future. The solemn laying of a wreath which the soldiers made on the spot out of fir branches and with the inscription on the crimson ribbon "To the fallen heroes from the guardsmen"; the emotional speeches at the rally in which words of promise to be worthy of the frontlinesmen's memory and act in the exercise as in combat sounded like an oath; and the salute fired by Gds Sr Lt G. Bayazitov's platoon found a response in the people's hearts. Pvt R. Radzhabov, who had put on skis for the first time in his life and who had made it to the short halt with his last strength, flatly refused to get into the vehicle: "Am I better or weaker than the others?" Privates V. Kurpatin, Yu. Lugovskoy and S. Mashkov wrote petitions to the Komsomol organization requesting that they be accepted as Komsomol members. At the second long halt the Komsomol members unanimously accepted the soldiers into their family.

Later in the field camp Gds Sr Lt A. Safonov, Komsomol committee secretary, went up to the regimental commander to seek advice. He had come up with an idea: Wouldn't it be possible to arrange a ski trip to Razliv to the hut-monument of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin in honor of the 19th Komsomol Congress following the exercise and invite Col (Ret) Aleksey Konstantinovich Baranov (he was the regiment's Komsomol organizer during the war and now headed the unit veterans' council) and other frontlinesmen there for presenting membership cards to those accepted into the Komsomol so that the people would remember this event all their lives?

"Good lad, secretary! We'll do it all," said the commander.

It is correctly said that a person is known from his deeds and acts. During my short stay in the regiment I discovered in Obukhov a number of noteworthy traits confirming the accuracy of descriptions I heard in the district political directorate, based on discussions with the commander, observing him at work, and from officers' stories. He was sincerely concerned for the regiment's combat readiness and honor and was very demanding toward himself and subordinates in everything concerning this. He was trying not simply to prepare good specialists for the units, but fighting men with whom it would be possible to go into battle tomorrow should such a need arise. Hence the concern for the training facility, the intensity and effectiveness of training, indoctrination of subordinates and development of their high moral-combat qualities.

On the first night the cadets of Chukhrov's battalion, after covering tens of kilometers on skis, pitching a field camp of "chums" in a forest clearing by 2300 hours and dropping off into a deep sleep from fatigue, were aroused twice on an alert to repulse an "enemy" attack. After that the squads, platoons and companies made short forced marches from morning until evening, negotiating engineer obstacles and forest obstructions, took fortified hills with a "fight" and assumed a defense. In short, they were learning to fight under difficult conditions and no one complained of hardships. In the evening the commanders would sum up results of competition during the day by the light of

a bonfire and party and Komsomol members in their meetings would analyze results achieved by the personnel, hold discussions and put out leaflets about the distinguished persons.

"The private has to learn, understand and perceive from his own experience that modern combat demands not just knowledge and ability, but also a full output of mental and physical forces," said Gds Lt Col Obukhov. "This is what our officers try to achieve."

But the regimental commander was silent about the fact that his organizational work, exactingness and the personal example of his earnest service plays a large part here. Whether he is conducting a group exercise or short tactical training problem, holding a seminar in a Marxist-Leninist training group or giving a lecture, he always does this equipped with thorough knowledge. And Obukhov also is able to carry people away with the prospects in service. He reasons as follows: An officer without prospects is like a bird without wings. People in the regiment advance rapidly in service. All the present battalion commanders and chiefs of services are yesterday's company and platoon commanders. The party committee secretary and deputy regimental commander for political affairs received advancement. Last fall deputy regimental commander Gds Maj N. Sen'shov, who had taken the path to this position from platoon commander, was sent off for study in the academy. And during the traditional meeting with lieutenants newly arrived in the unit Gds Lt Col Obukhov familiarized them with the glorious combat history of the regiment and then told about Sen'shov, about the battalion commanders and about chiefs of services.

"The very same prospects are open for each of you," he emphasized, "but on one necessary condition: that you give your all to service."

By his nature Anatoliy Yakovlevich is kind, but not a "good old boy." Four officers submitted applications requesting permission to enter the academy this year. According to the rule established by the commander, each application was discussed jointly: he, the political deputy, party committee secretary, and other officers of the regimental headquarters. They decided unanimously to accommodate Gds Capt Chukhrov, whose battalion was foremost in all items. And the commander said firmly to those in whose subunits matters were not yet sparkling: "It's a bit early." And again he was unanimously supported.

I had occasion to hear from one of the officers that Obukhov at times is too strict and stern. And it is well that he is not spineless. As we know, there is no commander without exactingness so long as it does not overstep the bounds of military laws and regulation norms.

The regimental commander does not tolerate negligence or laxity. He gave Gds Capt A. Shangireyev a serious admonition and a severe reprimand for disorder in the subunit. Gds Lt Col Obukhov had an impartial discussion with Gds Sr Lt A. Makarov and Gds Capt Yu. Chulokhin, who received an unsatisfactory grade in weapons training. By the way, the party committee also supported the commander and demanded a strict accounting of these party members.

The regimental commander dropped in on the officers' dormitory (he does this regularly, at least once a month) and saw a mess in Lt S. Khizov and Sr Lt A. Shmara's room. He naturally was indignant and put the young officers to shame: "What have you turned your housing into?"

Obukhov is perhaps rather abrupt at times, but he essentially is right. It is not only the commander's inalienable right, but his duty to demand an accounting for negligence and demand order, just as it is for him to be sensitive, attentive and concerned for people. There is hardly anyone who would reproach Obukhov for a lack of these qualities, and one can see them displayed at every step.

...There was happiness in the family of Gds Lt L. Shipilov, living in temporary quarters, as a son was born. Then, as illluck would have it, the landlords returned and demanded that the housing be vacated. Anatoliy Yakovlevich together with the political deputy found an apartment for the young officer's family. Cadet N. Gutsu's wife and mother became seriously ill. Due to a lack of information the neighbors did not certify the telegram as prescribed. After making rapid inquiries the regimental commander granted the private a short leave.

I had occasion to be an eyewitness to the commander's attention to people, expressed at times seemingly in insignificant facts but facts which in reality tell a great deal. After glancing into the enlisted men's mess to learn whether or not the personnel were satisfied with the quality of food, Obukhov did not fail to ask the cooks whether or not the three traditional cakes would be on time for personnel of the three platoons which had distinguished themselves most in the exercise. He deemed it necessary to remind his deputy for rear services to have precise arrangements made for the people to wash in the bathhouse and change underwear on the battalion's return from the field exercise.

Or take the following meeting. A junior sergeant and two privates were standing near the regimental duty officer's room.

"Can I congratulate you on a safe return?" said the commander to them.

"Yes, sir, Comrade Guards Lieutenant Colonel," responded the junior sergeant for all of them. "We arrived from short leave without admonitions."

"How was your rest, comrades? How is your son growing, Mikhalev? What's new in the home area?"

"Thank you, Comrade Commander," Jr Sgt S. Mikhalev again responded. "My son is a hero to me. And it's possible to talk a long while about changes in Lipetsk, as it is for Alekseyev in Kishinev and for Putintsev in Krasnyy Luch."

"What do you say, Aleksandr Viktorovich," said Obukhov, turning to the party committee secretary standing nearby, "if there are so many changes in their areas, perhaps it makes sense to give them an opportunity share their impressions with the comrades?"

Through the commander's efforts a new club and new mess hall are being built for the regiment. As already stated, the cadets have a superb training facility and live in modern, spacious new barracks where saying that they are comfortable means saying nothing. The conditions of one's own home are sensed in them from the conveniences and good conditions of finishing. I have had occasion to see many reading rooms and everyday services rooms, but I will admit that it is the first time I have encountered such--and I am not afraid to use a high-flown word--remarkable ones as the regiment's companies have. Take the "self-service store" in each company. A complete assortment of soldiers' everyday articles with the prices marked is laid out on shelves in handsome glassed-in cabinets. If you need something, go up, put down your money and take it. "Everyday conditions have to indoctrinate," says Obukhov, and as a matter of fact it is impossible not to agree with him.

"Where does all this come from? Texts of the military oath and the moral code of a builder of communism in carved letters, displays made from plastic of the best coloring, vases with flowers, engraving, applique work, and inlaid wood?" I asked.

"From soldiers' talent and hands," responded Obukhov. "And sponsors helped with the supplies. If measured by the old customs, it would not be enough for the entire regiment to bow from the waist to pay homage to our sponsors, the famous Kirovskiy Plant Production Association, or according to present-day custom, a triple 'Hurrah!'"

In giving high esteem above all to the great indoctrinational return of sponsorship ties, the regimental commander does much on his own to reinforce and develop them, and he fervently supports any initiative of the political deputy, party committee and Komsomol committee in this matter as, by the way, in all ideological indoctrination work. An exchange of delegations of competition leaders in the unit and plant, an exchange of amateur concerts, and joint evenings of friendship permit the personnel to gain a keener feeling of their blood ties with the people and of their responsibility to them.

Regimental personnel are working with great enthusiasm and inspiration and are confidently achieving the goals of military proficiency outlined in the competition for a worthy greeting to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation. Credit for this above all goes to the regimental commander, a person with a high sense of duty, a party member who gives all his strength, knowledge and energy to preparing military personnel for reliable protection of the Motherland.

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NAVAL FORCES

AVIATION TACTICS AGAINST SHIPS AT SEA

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 4, Apr 61 pp 31-37

[Article by Maj-Gen Avn A. N. Sukhanov: "The Influence of the Development of Equipment and Weapons on Aviation Tactics During Operations Against Ships at Sea"]

[Text] To be convinced of the decisive influence of military equipment and weapons on aviation tactics during operations against ships at sea, one must trace closely the development of the means of destruction, qualitative changes in the flight-engineering data of aircraft, the characteristics of moving sea targets, and the capabilities of the air defense forces and equipment.

During World War I the basic means that aircraft employed to destroy ships were aerial bombs, that is, the same means that were used in operations against various ground targets. However, the use of aerial bombs in strikes against ships required the development of appropriate tactics that were peculiar to this weapon and the nature of the targets.

For example, bomber operations methods were determined primarily by the fact that ships at sea are individual targets of small size that are, moreover, maneuvering and are capable of evading not only aircraft flying bombing runs but also the bombs that they drop.

Usually, bombs are dropped on ships from horizontal flight and are aimed in accordance with previously computed data, because of which the aircraft, as a rule, must fly over the target, the slightest deviation from the prescribed (or calculated) altitude and speed of flight at the moment of bomb drop or the existence of errors in determining wind speed and direction leading to misses and, consequently, to nonfulfillment of the mission. It is also pertinent to note here that the ship is destroyed only by a direct hit by the bomb. All this, it goes without saying, affected the effectiveness of strikes, and attacks by lone aircraft proved in most cases to be futile. In order to increase the success of aerial operations against ships, it was required that a group of aircraft strike simultaneously in flights in a definite combat formation, the number of aircraft in the group being determined by the bombing altitude and the number of bombs dropped from each aircraft. It must be noted that, even during World War I, work was started on the creation of special models of torpedoes for aircraft and repeated attempts were made to strike torpedo blows on ships by lone aircraft.

The rapid development of aviation equipment and weapons before World War II and, especially, during the war, enabled aerial tactics for antiship operations to be

greatly improved. In particular, along with bombing from horizontal flights, dive bombing was used widely.

Reduction of the dispersion of bombs during dive bombing increased severalfold the probability of their hitting the target and, consequently, bomber strike effectiveness grew. However, despite this positive aspect of dive bombing, this method of operation still could not completely replace horizontal bombing. This was explained by a number of factors, chief of which were the following two.

First, a diving attack could be made only by special dive bombers that had the required bombing equipment and the appropriate aiming apparatus. Second, crew training for dive bombing involved relatively lengthy work on the ground and in the air under a special training program, which, naturally, caused definite difficulties during wartime.

The effectiveness of bomber strikes against ships depended not only upon the bombs hitting the ships but also upon what destructive action these bombs could produce if they fell on the target. Since ships are not identical in dimensions and strength, the destructive effect of the bombs dropped on them was extremely varied.

Especially survivable were large combat ships that had thick armored decks. Frequently the deck armor proved so strong that even the explosion of a bomb weighing several tons did not cause them serious destruction.

Because of this, various countries armed their naval aviation intensively with torpedoes. Incidentally, experience in the use of ship-launched torpedoes helped here, it goes without saying.

The basic advantage of the torpedo over the aerial bomb was the fact that it struck the underwater--the weaker--part of the hull. Moreover, when the torpedo hit the underwater portion of the ship, a large amount of water entered the hole instantaneously, accelerating the incapacitation and destruction of the ship.

In a comparatively short time various countries created several types of airborne torpedoes. There appeared several types of aerial torpedoes for low-altitude torpedo attack that were dropped while the aircraft was flying at altitudes of 20-150 meters, and several types of high-altitude torpedoes that were dropped from heights of more than 500 meters. The high-altitude torpedoes, after dropping from the aircraft, usually descended by means of a parachute system. The torpedo's motion in the water could form a straight line or it could follow a prescribed program.

The aerial use of torpedoes required that operating methods be developed that were completely different from making bomb strikes. For example, in order to destroy a ship with low-altitude torpedoes, the torpedo-carrying aircraft had to fly the combat run at low altitude and it was mandatory that it attack from a course angle that would enable the torpedo to hit the ship's side. In order to assure the greatest probability of a hit by a high-altitude gyrating torpedo, the torpedo-carrying aircraft had to make the attack from a bow or stern course angle.

Aerial bombs and torpedoes were the basic weapons for aircraft to destroy ships during World War II. Despite the complexity of using these weapons and their inadequate effectiveness, aviation inflicted substantial losses on ships of all classes.

Suffice it to say that out of 41 aircraft carriers destroyed during World War II, 15 were sunk independently by aircraft (or 36.6 percent). Several aircraft carriers were sunk by aviation jointly with submarines and surface ships. Aviation, moreover, destroyed a large number of transport ships of various types and submarines.

It is completely understandable that, as the combat effectiveness of aviation increased, defending forces and means for air defense of ships grew. With a view to strengthening the protection of transports at sea from air attack, combat ships armed with powerful antiaircraft artillery and aircraft carriers with fighter aviation began to escort them.

The wide introduction of radar into the air-defense system played a major role in increasing the capabilities of antiaircraft artillery and of the fighters that provided cover for ships in convoys at sea. The use of radar sharply reduced the possibility of inflicting surprise air strikes on ships, since it enabled air defense forces and equipment to be brought into readiness in timely fashion, the vectoring of fighters toward the attacking aircraft and the control of antiaircraft artillery in repulsing raids. This, in turn, required strike aviation to change tactics. In particular, two trends in operations against ships at sea were distinctly noted: on the one hand, a striving to strike from high altitudes and at maximum flight speeds, and, on the other, to use widely the advantages of flight at low altitude.

However, attempts to reduce air defense countermeasures by raising flight altitudes and speeds with piston-engined bombers and torpedo carriers did not yield the expected results. This is explained mainly by the fact that at the end of the last war fighters surpassed bombers in speed and altitude capabilities 1½-fold, and, therefore, overtook them at all altitudes. The capabilities of antiaircraft artillery also provided for the destruction of piston-engined aircraft at all their flight altitudes. The striving to use the advantages of surprise actions against ships from low altitude led to so-called masthead bombing. The essence of this method of bombing consists in the aircraft approaching the target at altitudes of 20-50 meters and dropping its bomb far short of the ship. When the bomb hits the water surface it ricochets and then hits the side of the target.

One of the factors that speeded up the reequipping of strike aviation with jet-powered aircraft was the striving to enable operation from great altitudes and from the stratosphere at supersonic speeds and, thereby, to reduce at least to some extent the effectiveness of the countermeasures of the air defense forces and equipment.

However, as aircraft speeds and altitudes increased, the dispersion of bombs and torpedoes increased extremely greatly: errors in aircraft steering (including those made during bomb and torpedo dropping), which sharply reduced the effectiveness of aircraft operations, increased. Moreover, increased aircraft flight speeds cut the time the crew spent on aiming. All this led to the need for a sharp increase in the number of aircraft sent to destroy various targets. For example, in strikes made from an altitude of 2,000-3,000 meters at a speed of 400-500 km/hr, a relatively small group of aircraft sufficed to sink a ship, but in operations at altitudes of 10,000-12,000 meters and speeds of 1,000 km/hr, this mission could be performed only by a soyedineniye [large unit] of bombers or torpedo carriers.

Because of the conditions that had been created, the development of new tactical methods for making strikes on ships was required.

At one time it was considered that aircraft antiship operations could be made more effective by using large units of bombers or torpedo carriers in close battle formations. However, this solution to the problem was repudiated by experience. The difficulties that arose in assembling and forming large groups of aircraft into a common battle formation and the distances and intervals between the aircraft in the formation, which increased because of the growth in flight speeds and altitudes, caused changes in the parameters of the combat formation: the overall depth increased, and the aircraft were broken down into smaller groups.

As jet aircraft continued to improve and develop, the impossibility of flight at high altitudes in combat formations that had been suitable for piston-engined aircraft became increasingly clear.

The appearance of nuclear missiles as means of destruction and, in particular, the detonation of nuclear bombs in the Bikini atoll area, led at first to some foreign military specialists forming the opinion that apparently this was the beginning of the end of the existence of navies, and, with the appearance of the nuclear bomb, aviation would prevail completely at sea. Abroad, the press that is inclined to sensationalism even argued about whether it is better to have the battleship or the airplane. But the development of navies was not curtailed--it traveled a new path.

Foreign military specialists consider that dispersed combat formations in large units of combat ships and in convoys will suffice, since they will reduce substantially the effectiveness of the nuclear weapons on them. For example, calculations published in the foreign press proved that the dispositions that are being developed at present in the navies of some countries that operate AUS's [carrier-based strike forces] will let one nuclear bomb sink no more than one ship.

Such distances and intervals are also established between transports in convoy that will allow an explosion of one nuclear bomb that has a TNT equivalent of several kilotons to sink no more than one or two transports.

But still, arming strike aviation that operates against ships with nuclear bombs is of extremely great significance. The great radius of destruction of ships by the air or underwater burst of a nuclear bomb has enabled the number of aircraft needed to perform combat missions to be cut sharply. While, for example, the assignment of at least a large formation of aircraft was required to insure hitting a ship with one high-explosive bomb or one aerial torpedo from an altitude of 12,000-13,000 meters, one aircraft can, under known conditions, destroy a ship of any class with nuclear bombs.

It is natural that, because of the rapid development of strike aviation and its weapons, the air defense of ships would be intensified. Radars have been built that enable the detection range for aircraft in flight to be sharply increased. The modern system of electronic air surveillance enables aircraft flying at high altitudes to be located at great distances.

By detecting aircraft on distant approaches, an opponent can in timely fashion put into action all the available air defense forces and equipment of a task force of

combat ships or a convoy and take measures that will reduce effectiveness in the destruction of ships by airborne weapons, including nuclear bombs. The potential of the air defense forces has grown, especially with the adoption of guided anti-aircraft missile with ordinary warheads as armament, and, even more so, those with nuclear warheads.

In the opinion of foreign specialists, guided antiaircraft missiles, which possess a high probability of target destruction, will enable, in interaction with interceptors, a strong shield to be organized against attacking aircraft on their approaches to the target of the strike, especially during flight on the target run.

An attempt to reduce the potential of fighter-aircraft opposition by increased escorting of strike aircraft with fighters did not yield results. This is explained by a number of reasons, of which the most important, probably is the great dependence of the fighters on shore-based electronic control. When the fighters left the operating area of this equipment, they could not control the air space in the area of the escorted strike aviation independently and were compelled to discontinue mission fulfillment. As a result of these factors, aircraft that carried nuclear bombs, torpedo carriers and bombers that used conventional weapons were forced, where there was fighter opposition, to operate independently without cover by their own fighters, a fact that increased their losses considerably.

All this could sharply reduce the effectiveness of operations against ships by bomber, minelaying and torpedo-carrying aircraft, including aircraft that carry nuclear weapons.

This stage of development, which was very complicated for strike aviation, was ended, as is known, by the creation of a new type of weapon that permits ships to be destroyed at sea with adequate effectiveness.

It should be noted that by the time guided airborne weapons had been created, shore and ship missiles with great radius of action and capable of carrying powerful warheads already existed. Because of this, military specialists of certain technically developed countries were of the opinion that, with the development of missiles, aviation would lose its significance in the near future because all its missions would be performed by missiles.

However, it is sufficient to be acquainted with works published recently in the foreign press and to analyze what is said about the conditions and possibilities for coping with moving targets, particularly with maneuvering ships, to see that the conclusion suggests itself that aviation, especially that armed with guided means of destruction, is assigned the leading role in this struggle.

Precisely because of this, some technically developed countries adopted as armament several types of airborne guided weapons which, incidentally, could be used not only against ships but also against shore facilities. The basic tactical and technical data of these means of destruction are shown in the table.

The main advantage of airborne guided missiles over all other types of airborne weapons is the fact that these weapons, after launch from the aircraft, can fly a given trajectory and be guided to the target regardless of its optical visibility.

Basic Tactical and Technical Data
on Certain Airborne Air-to-Ship Guided Weapons

Name of the weapon	Country	Propulsion system (type of engine)	Launch Weight (kg)	Maximum Range (km)	Type of charge
Blue Steel	England	Liquid-fuel engine	6,800	160(640)	Nuclear
Rascal	USA	Liquid-fuel engine	5,600	160	Nuclear
Petrel	USA	Solid-fuel engine	1,720	36	Conventional
Bullpup	USA	Powder-rocket engine	260	3-5	Conventional
Hound Dog	USA	Solid-fuel engine	4,500	800	Nuclear
Crossbow	USA	Solid-fuel engine	800	320	Conventional
Robot-304	Sweden	Powder-rocket engine	540	-	Conventional
V. V. 10	France	Powder-rocket engine	400	-	Conventional

The presence of an engine on the weapon allows the carrying aircraft to launch it from great distances, without itself entering the fire zone of the ships' antiaircraft missiles and antiaircraft artillery. Certain types of controlled weapons--Hound Dog, for example, and others--possess such a range of independent flight that they can, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, attack targets at distances that exceed the combat radius of certain types of shipboard fighters, and the great flight speed of the weapons on their trajectory enables them to break through the air defense system of large units of ships or of a convoy almost without loss.

Airborne guided missile weapons equipped with a nuclear warhead are of still greater significance in antiship operations.

Thus the potential of aviation has risen sharply with the adoption of guided missiles as aircraft armament.

The use of guided means of destruction from aircraft against ships required the development of new aviation tactics. Thus, mounting strikes is, in their opinion, reduced to the operations of small groups or lone aircraft that will proceed independently to the target from one of several directions after the combat deployment. In the general case, antiship attacks will consist of aiming (in so doing, it will not always be necessary to come close to the ship), launch (drop) of the weapons, and control thereof over the flight trajectory.

Since each system for weapons control (by radar beam, radio control, active target-seeking and others) correspond to certain potentials for maneuvering, then, after weapons launch, the carrying aircraft can make the appropriate changes in the heading, altitude and speed at a great distance from the target of attack.

In other words, depending upon the weapon-control system, the carrier can remain in the weapons launch area (in some cases beyond the ship's radar coverage) beyond the firing range of the ship's antiaircraft missiles, or, at worst, it will be compelled to come close enough to the target to convert the weapon to a target-seeking regime.

Arming aircraft with guided missiles as the means of destruction has caused, as was indicated above, not only a quantitative change in the makeup of tactical strike groups, but it has also occasioned a review of the norms for the aircraft that make up the support group.

Thus, while during World War II substantially fewer forces were assigned to the group that supported the strike groups than were assigned to the latter, under modern conditions this ratio has changed in the direction of an increase in the forces that support the strikes.

This phenomenon is explained mainly by the fact that the PVO [air defense forces] system uses shipboard air-surveillance radars that are more perfected than those used in the last war and that the wide introduction of electronic equipment for vectoring for various purposes has necessitated the conduct of a number of anti-radar measures for creating interference, with a view to supporting the successful penetration by the aircraft to the strike targets.

In touching upon aircraft tactics in attacks on ships in the modern era, it should be emphasized that the requirements for the means of control and for the organization of command have now been raised substantially. In the very near future, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, we may prove to be witnesses to the phenomena of new air defense means that will prove to be capable of destroying air-borne guided missiles during the flight trajectory to the target with the same effectiveness that jet aircraft can be destroyed within the radius of the anti-aircraft equipment.

In order to counter these means of air defense, new efforts will be required to create still more improved means for destroying ships. Consequently, the struggle between the means for hitting ships and for defending ships from strikes from the air will continue and will be a stimulus to the development of aviation tactics in operations against surface ships at sea.

And so, even after a far-from-complete review of the influence of the development of equipment and weapons on aviation tactics, it is evident that substantial changes have occurred therein and the process of improvement will go on practically continuously.

Tactics correctly used in accordance with the situation will enable effective results to be achieved. To select one tactical means or another and successfully carry it out--this is the craft of the commander, who directly organizes the strike, and of the whole air complement that carries out the combat mission.

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NAVAL FORCES

SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 10, Oct 65 pp 16-22

[Article by Capt-1st Rank I. V. Firsov: "Reconnaissance by Submarines." Passages in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines].

[Text] Submarines, which possess great secrecy, self-sufficiency and cruising radius, have long been a generally recognized means for reconnaissance at sea. For purposes of performing these specific missions they are furnished diverse instruments for observation: sonar and radar systems, equipment for electronic intercept and electronic direction-finding, photographic equipment and instruments for visual observation. Moreover, submarines have proved to be suitable ships for putting reconnaissance groups ashore and for rescuing persons stranded on sinking ships or downed aircraft.

And, finally, it is important to note that still another quality of submarines that distinguishes them to advantage from other forces and means of reconnaissance is the potential for change in the ship's basic mission at any moment--to make a strike submarine into a reconnaissance submarine and vice versa. This characteristic of submarines has been used repeatedly in past wars where the performance of various operational or tactical missions were vested completely in the submarines.

Of course, all the enumerated qualities of submarines as forces and means for reconnaissance have been displayed many times.

Originally, visual observation alone was the source for collecting information about an enemy. But even during World War I sonar began to be applied, and during World War II this was true for radio-electronic means for intercepting enemy transmissions, finding the direction of ship radio transmitters, and detecting the operation of active means for observation.

One of the oldest missions performed by submarines has been that of reconnaissance of ocean and sea lanes./ During recent wars, submarines were used to find out the areas and times of the forming and disbanding of convoys, their composition, routes, details of movement, systems of defense, tactics of the supporting forces, and the effects of combat on sea and ocean hauling.

Basic sea-lane reconnaissance, as the experience of combat operations of foreign fleets indicates, is the monitoring of shipping at places where routes intersect, at narrows, and in zones next to ports. Reconnaissance was conducted here, as a rule, by single submarines. On observing a convoy, they followed it, informing the

command about its position, course and speed. In the vast regions of the oceans, the most effective form of reconnaissance was group search for convoys with screens of submarines on hypothetical and discovered routes of transport movements. The interval maintained between submarines during search was something less than double the distance for detecting convoys by the submarine's technical means for observation. This expanded the search front and enabled simultaneous reconnaissance over vast areas. However, in order to succeed, the deployment alone of even a substantial number of submarines did not prove to be adequate. The appropriate means for observation and reconnaissance were also required. When such means were obtained, particularly special receivers for eavesdropping on the enemy's radio conversations and search-radar receivers for observing the work of radar sets, the potential of submarines for detecting convoys and obtaining information about them increased substantially. With their help, the submarines detected the enemy at great distances and followed them in secret for a long time, proceeding outside the coverage of the enemy's active electronic means for observation.

A combining of the reconnaissance activity of submarines with the acquisition of information about the enemy from other sources exerted a great influence on success in reconnaissance. As war experience has indicated, in order to support the struggle for the sea lanes, the situation in the theater had to be studied extremely carefully, and the data from all types of intelligence analyzed. For example, in World War II, the German fleet, in order to choose areas for concentrating submarines, used widely information obtained from intercepted and deciphered radiograms. In particular, in September 1940, Hitler's intelligence deciphered an intercepted radiogram and found out, 4 days prior to the designated date, the rendezvous point of a convoy that was leaving the USA, with British ships for protection. Based upon the data obtained, the German Navy vectored to the convoy four submarines that sank five ships in one day.*

Careful observation of the navigation regime in the affected area preceded the first strike of large Fascist submarines on the sea lanes of the USA's East Coast (January 1942). Based upon an analysis of the information obtained, one submarine alone, the U-126, sank 9 ships in 14 days between the Windward and the Old Bahama Passages.#

Often the command of some fleet did not have enough of the information needed for organizing submarine combat activity. Then the acquisition of information about the enemy was vested directly in the submarines themselves--they reconnoitered first, and only after that did they use their weapons. For example, at the end of 1942, the USA Navy command, possessing only extremely general information about the nature of Japanese coastal navigation, obtained more precise information about the situation with the help of the submarines "Veil" and "Trigger" and organized the laying of minefields on the sea lanes for shipping.

In addition to reconnaissance for shipping, submarines in past wars have also been used in /the finding of combat ships./ It is natural that in accomplishing such missions the peculiarities of the combat characteristics of the facilities being reconnoitered were considered. Submarines were usually deployed within previously

*Donitz, K. "Nemetskiye podvodnyye lodki vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [German Submarines During World War II]. Brief translations from it. Voenizdat, 1964, pages 123-124.

#Donitz, page 238.

selected boundaries, enabling the enemy's movements to be monitored on the most probable routes.

Operating at a distance that exceeded the deployment capabilities of reconnaissance aviation, the submarines increased the depth of observation. When operating in some areas with aviation, they greatly increased the reliability and authenticity of the reconnaissance, especially during bad weather, which restricted reconnaissance aviation activity.

Here, as in the case also of reconnoitering for convoys, especially great attention was paid to the use of observation means, which enabled the submarines to detect ships at great distances and to follow them and maneuver for the delivery of a strike. Thus, at the end of December 1941 the Japanese submarine J-25, which had been taking bearings on the operation of American ships' radios, closed to visual contact with an aircraft carrier, which was conducive to its attack later on.

In the modern era, with the development of nuclear-powered submarines, the accomplishment of missions to observe enemy ships and to track them is eased substantially, but in some cases these missions could also be carried out by diesel submarines. In particular, it is considered possible to use them to reconnoiter already discovered regions of operation of enemy ships. During World War II diesel submarines that reconnoitered in such regions were, as a rule, also the lead element of groups that had been created for combat. They were required to detect the enemy quickly, to determine his composition and details of movement, and to report about this to the command. After reporting, in some cases the submarines were ordered to make their own strikes, to weaken the enemy that had been detected.

In order to carry out the indicated missions, submarines were deployed within a probable area of the enemy's movements and at a distance from the proposed area of its operations that would give the command timely warning about the appearance of enemy forces. In so doing, naturally the readiness of the strike forces and the authenticity of the information were considered. For example, during the Malacca landing operation in December 1941, a screen of Japanese reconnaissance submarines was deployed in a semicircle about 300 miles from Singapore. And the Americans, before the battle of Midway (June 1942) deployed 19 submarines--12 of them to a distance of about 150 miles west of the island, 3 to the east of it, and 4 of them 300 miles to the north of the island of Oahu. Moreover, it was proposed that 6 submarines that were returning from other combat operations areas be used to intercept withdrawing Japanese ships.* In both cases the submarines were given the mission of observing the enemy's ships and reporting about them, and only after that of attacking them.

In the battle at Midway the Japanese also used submarines for reconnaissance, deploying them ahead of their surface-ship groups. The submarines were to find out the situation west of Pearl Harbor and to intercept American forces. However, they failed to do this, since the American ships had approached Midway Island before the Japanese ships did.

Despite substantial organizational and technical difficulties, submarines were used widely during World War II for the conduct of reconnaissance in the support of

*T. Roscoe. "Boyevyeye deystviya podvodnykh lodok SShA vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Combat Operations of U. S. Submarines During World War II]. Translated from the English. Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury. 1957, page 82.

other naval operations./ Thus, 10 Japanese submarines that were deployed to the South China Sea in support of the above-mentioned Malacca landing operation detected the British squadron (the battleship "Prince of Wales," the battle cruiser "Repulse" and several escort ships) proceeding from Singapore for a strike against the landing. Information about the squadron's position, course and speed obtained from the submarines helped to destroy it.

The Americans also used submarines to reconnoiter supporting operations. For example, during the invasion of the Marianas in June 1944 they deployed 28 submarines to the movement routes of the Japanese forces. This enabled them to detect the Japanese fleet's strike forces (6 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, 12 cruisers and a large number of other ships) in timely fashion on departure from their base, to follow their movements and operations, and, after discovering the enemy's intentions, to strike them at a convenient time, providing for success of the whole operation.*

Let us note, in passing, that adequately effective ways for using submarines to reconnoiter in an area of combat operations of surface ships and aviation were not found. Foreign specialists see the difficulties of recognizing submarines and the inadequate development of observation means on the submarines and of means for communicating with them as the main reasons for this. In particular, during the battle at Midway, American submarines, because of poorly effective search means (especially at night and in poor daytime visibility) and inadequate training of personnel in ship identification, detected and attacked Japanese ships only in rare cases. Diesel submarines of that period, moreover, were low in speed and in underwater navigating time, because of which they could not pursue the ships detected over long periods or come close to them for attack or for the vectoring of other forces.

The potential for identification has been increased, enabling submarines (especially nuclear) to accomplish combat missions in the operating areas of other forces more successfully. It is known from the foreign press, for example, that the Americans are perfecting the detection and lengthy escort of forces of ships by nuclear submarines and also the cruising of nuclear submarines within combat and cruising formations of surface ships.

During World War II submarines were often used /for reconnoitering enemy submarines./ Thus, out of 160 Japanese submarines lost, 22 were shadowed and destroyed by American submarines.#

In the modern era, when the role of submarines as fleet strike forces has risen sharply, the importance of the struggle against them also has grown, in the opinion of foreign specialists, the main burden for it (especially the struggle with nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines) resting precisely on submarines. It is considered most desirable to use them to detect missile submarines and to track and destroy them.

A special type of reconnaissance charged to submarines is /reconnaissance of the enemy's shore,/ that is, of learning about the defense system of the coastal strip

*T. Roscoe. Pages 309-311.

#T. Roscoe, page 13; and M. Hashimoto, "Potoplennyye" [The Sunken]. Translated from the English. Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1955, pp 212-229.

and of naval bases: blockade minefields, the navigational situation, the composition of the forces that are based at defined points, measures for the defense of the bases from the sea, air and land that affect shipways and the intensity of the traffic along them, the results of strikes on bases and other targets, and so on.

Foreign military specialists (especially American, Italian and Japanese), in generalizing the experience of World War II, consider that only submarines, thanks to their concealment, can perform this mission, operating in waters controlled by the enemy, without the support of other forces. And actually, for example, American submarines made about 100 cruises for this purpose. /Reconnaissance in the support of carrier strike force operations/ against shore facilities occupies an important place among them. Thus, based upon data obtained by submarines in February 1942, operating forces of American aircraft carriers struck shore fortifications and air and naval bases in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Wake Island and Marcus Island.

Shore reconnaissance by submarines actually also preceded all landings. In order to obtain needed information, during World War II the Americans used photography through periscopes widely for this purpose, obtaining documentary information that contained a multitude of detail about the relief of and equipment on the shore.

Photoreconnaissance was organized as follows. Two photographers temporarily assigned to the submarine crew performed all the operations. The film was developed right after the picture-taking (to check on the quality of the pictures) in a sonarmen's room that was adapted for this purpose. Pictures were taken with a 50-percent overlap of adjacent frames, to preclude skipping of sections. In order to provide for secrecy, no more than 12 pictures were taken during each raising of the periscope. Usually 1,000-2,000 pictures were made per voyage. On return to base the negatives, together with the corresponding charts, were sent to the joint reconnaissance center for processing, analysis and preparation of copies.

Reconnaissance of the enemy's shore was also conducted by landing special reconnaissance groups from submarines. The American press in particular has described "diversionary raids" by the submarines "Nautilus" and "Argonaut." In 1942 they were charged with obtaining data about the situation in the Gilbert Islands. Early in the morning the submarines reconnoitered the approaches to Makin Island and the shore defense system. With the onset of darkness they approached the shore and landed a group, which reconnoitered the main facilities on the island and in the harbor. The next night the submarine took the reconnoiterers from the island and they left for Pearl Harbor.

Reconnaissance groups landed by submarine in the Solomon and Bismarck Islands successfully gathered and transmitted information about Japanese ship movements. Reconnaissance groups of single reconnoiterers were landed by submarines both on independent missions and on missions incidental to other missions (for example, in operations against the sea lanes). The basis for success in this type of reconnaissance was secrecy of preparation for carrying out the mission.

Aside from the indicated methods, the Japanese, for example, actively reconnoitered points in distant areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans by means of aircraft based on submarines. It is by this means that they obtained much valuable information about Pearl Harbor (January 1941, February 1942 and October 1943), Australian and New Zealand bases (February-April 1942), and other places.

Naturally, as ASW and air defenses on shore intensified, this type of reconnaissance became increasingly difficult to conduct, and finally it ceased. However, under modern conditions, more resistant means of reconnaissance by aircraft launched from submarines can be created, based, for example, on pilotless aircraft that now exist in the armament of or are being developed for foreign fleets.

Submarines also have been used /for hydrometeorological reconnaissance./ During World War II, for example, American submarines, in support of landing operations, systematically measured the depth, speed and direction of the currents, winds and so on in areas that interested the command. German submarines similarly supported their air operations against Britain.

Submarines were used no less actively /for determining the navigational situation,/ for which purpose observations were made of ship navigation, the operation of navigational seamarks, and so on.

In the modern era, the resources and methods used for obtaining information have become substantially greater. The number of facilities for reconnaissance also have increased. Thus, the foreign press points out that, with the discovery by submarines of a system of shore defense and of naval bases, the targets of reconnaissance are sites of the deployment of command centers, missile and artillery installations, troop units, electronic observation posts, control and communications centers, the disposition of ships, the equipment of the anchorage and shelters, and so on. Therefore, great attention is being paid to equipping submarines with technical means for observation and reconnaissance that have substantial ranges of coverage. In reconnoitering bases, American specialists consider it desirable to use mainly nuclear submarines, which, thanks to high maneuverability, are able to overcome the area's ASW defense system.

Reconnaissance activity by submarines in the enemy's coastal waters involves the wide use of information obtained by other forces and means. In striving to facilitate difficult submarine missions, American reconnaissance centers during World War II, for example, prepared especially for them handbook data about the enemy's ASW forces and equipment, the system of shore observation, prominent features, the area's navigational equipment, and bays and currents. Often the submarines were issued special charts of the regions of a forthcoming reconnaissance. This prevented excessive efforts to collect information already obtained or not of practical value.

* * *

The basis of the success of reconnaissance operations by submarines, as World War II experience and postwar combat training indicates, are and will remain secrecy of observation and timeliness of the transmission of the information obtained to the interested authorities.

Secrecy of observation depends greatly upon the tactical and technical characteristics of the means of reconnaissance included in the submarines' equipment. Because of this, special attention is being paid abroad to the creation and development of means that will enable submerged submarines to observe enemy targets at great distances.

Skill in processing the data observed is determined basically by the level of training of the personnel, competence in the use of reconnaissance equipment, a

knowledge of the characteristics and potential of the enemy's forces and resources (including ASW forces), skill in recognizing targets, and so on.

The capability of submarines to overcome the enemy's counteractions, including deeply deployed ASW barriers and the system for ASW defense of ships during sea crossings, strongly affects the success of reconnaissance operations. Therefore, it now follows from information from the foreign press that the acquisition by submarine personnel of skills in the timely detection of ASW defense forces and equipment and in secrecy in overcoming them are recognized as the most important prerequisites that influence the success of conducting reconnaissance.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL CAMOUFLAGE: USE OF FALSE TARGETS DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 5, May 66 pp 39-42

[Article by Capt-1st Rank (Res) N. P. Gordeyev: "False Targets as an Element of Naval Camouflage"]

[Text] In past wars, the warring sides often used so-called false targets to distort a situation observable by the enemy. By this means it has repeatedly been possible to conceal the actual deployment, locations and magnitude of the forces and resources of a fleet at specific places, in specific regions, and even in a theater.

False targets, which are designed to be detected by means of observation and reconnaissance that the enemy has its disposal, were executed (were made, that is) in the form of dummies and other imitators of fleet facilities. They were used both independently and within a system of measures for disinforming the enemy. Some foreign specialists consider that the use of false targets imparts to these measures a more active nature and greatly increases their effectiveness. Thus, during World War I, the British created a "ghost squadron"* which for a long time led the German command into error about the actual location of the enemy fleet's forces. An attack by the German cruiser "Gazelle" on false periscopes that were scattered about a mine field by the cruiser "Rossiya" ended with the blowing up of the German ship. Models of tripod masts that were raised above the drydocks on the island of Malta gave German reconnaissance reason to believe that British battle cruisers were under repair, at a time when they had previously been sent to the South Atlantic for battle with a detachment of ships under Admiral Spee.

During World War I aviation was still weak, so false targets were intended mainly to deceive the enemy's reconnaissance, which was conducted by visual means on ships and at shore posts. False targets were used sporadically in combat actions at sea, but their fabrication was technically imperfect and extremely expensive. Moreover, the use of large numbers of people for the work violated secrecy and reduced the effectiveness of the deception.

World War II introduced something new also into the technique of fabricating false targets and in the methods for using them. In particular, false targets appeared that were capable of disorienting reconnaissance, which was conducted not only visually but also with the help of technical equipment. An increase in the combat

*This "squadron" included 14 obsolete transports that were transformed externally into battleships and cruisers.

capabilities of aviation and submarine forces occasioned the creation and perfecting of false targets that were designed to deceive these forces. Amateurish and expensive fabrication of models and other material units was replaced by less expensive, large-scale industrial methods (in accordance with standard designs).

The scale of use of false targets also changed greatly: instead of individual cases of imitation, primarily of single ships and of other fleet facilities, forces right up to groupings began to appear. Thus, during preparation for the Normandy landing operations, a false invasion fleet that consisted of multitudes of transportable, inflatable rubber models of landing ships, tanks, motor vehicles and other military equipment was created, which outwardly were not distinguishable from real combat materiel, these models being introduced not only to deceive the visual observer but also German radar reconnaissance. For example, large surface ships at sea were imitated by means of corner reflectors that were installed on small ships. The German operators of radar stations accepted the signals from such targets as signals from aircraft carriers and battleships. And this compelled the Fascist command to allocate and use his forces, especially aviation, in a way that was suitable to the Americans and the British. Thus, the imitation of large units of landing ships and army equipment played its role in the overall plan for concealing operations.

The Germans also used false targets. For example, at Brest, after concealing the battleships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" under port structures, they set up models of the ships at a safe distance from the originals. The models were armed with anti-aircraft weapons that actually fired at enemy aircraft. British aviation often bombed these models and for a long time did not inflict special damage on the real ships.

An increase in the capabilities of ASW forces and equipment, thanks to the appearance of new instruments for sonar observation, stimulated responding measures to improve the concealment of submarines: a decrease in the noise level, the use of coatings that absorb radar and sonar pulses, the use of false underwater targets, and so on. In practice, false underwater targets ordinarily were created by cylinders that were filled with substances capable of giving off large amounts of carbon dioxide gas. When they got into the water they created in it the appearance of a gas screen. The echoed signal of an echo-ranging sonar received from such a screen resembled the echo from a submarine. This misled the sonarmen and enabled the submarine to break off from the pursuing ship.

When submarines were armed with acoustic homing torpedoes, false targets appeared as countermeasures for them. Towed by surface ships, they created noise on the same frequency as the basic target but were more powerful, which attracted torpedoes to them.

False targets were also used in aviation, along with camouflage. Thus, at airfields, instead of separate dummy airplanes, whole groups of them were set up, and even false airfields were "constructed," at which all symptoms of airfield activity were reproduced. Cases are known where false parachute landings were staged. For example, mannequins that the British threw over poorly-defended parts of France on the eve of the Normandy landing weakened the Germans' vigilance and helped the staging of the real landing in the Cherbourg area to succeed. Moreover, in order to create false radar targets in the air, British aviation threw out bundles of aluminum foil. One bundle, which weighed 50-60 grams, caused

the same radar effect as a bomber would. The large-scale use by British and American aviation of such reflectors, in combination with active jamming, often led to disorientation of the German air defense forces and to useless strain on the forces and expenditure of resources.

Soyedineniya [large units] of coastal and antiaircraft artillery, in order to disinform the enemy about numbers and combat formations, practiced widely the display of false batteries and imitation of their activity. Sometimes there were two or three false batteries for each real camouflaged battery.

The simulation of large logistics facilities designed to deceive aerial reconnaissance, which was conducted in daylight by visual means, was used comparatively rarely in World War II, since it required substantial expenditure of material resources and time. Moreover, the creation of false targets was considered desirable only when the actual facility could be concealed by camouflage and the model was located at a distance that was safe for the facility.

Facilities of smaller size were imitated much more often, and then mainly during a dark time of the day or at night and in combination with the laying of a smoke-screen. In these cases no complicated structures were erected; there were only a "poor obscuring of the target" and a corresponding spotting of corner reflectors, that is, a simultaneous disorientation of the enemy's optical and radar reconnaissance. British specialists consider that manipulation of illumination sources and imitation of fires reduced considerably the effectiveness of bomb strikes on London and the ports of Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow and Plymouth.

During the last war there were also cases of deceiving the enemy about the system of the hydrographic navigational equipment of the theaters by relocating buoys and signs, the installation of false beacons and channel markers, and changes in the characteristics of light, sound and radio signals, and the appearance of the locality was distorted on radar screens by means of corner reflectors (concealing inlets, bays, lakes, locks, dams and so on). As a result, the navigational safety of enemy ships was reduced, the precision of flights of his aircraft was lessened, and the effectiveness of strikes on the real facilities proved to be slight.

It is apparent from what has been said that the use of false targets during World War II was an important factor not only in the security of forces but also in operational support. Measures for disinformation were more perfected than during World War I and they were combined better with other measures for counteracting enemy reconnaissance.

The revolution in military affairs that has been occurring since World War II has given a new push to the development of means and methods for disinformation. In particular, abroad, means and methods for imitating surface launch areas, the launch of ballistic missiles, the separation of missile warheads from nose cones, concealment of the warhead among simultaneously separating false targets, and the hampering of intercept thereof by antimissile defenses are being developed.

American submarines are armed with imitators that are detected by sonar, that operate in regimes for active search and for the directing-finding of noise. Along with these models are improved variants of bubble targets (they were used by German submarines during World War II), and self-propelled targets that emit noises similar to those from the operation of propellers and submarine mechanisms and which reflect sonar impulses have also been created.

Inflatable rubber models supplied with radar reflectors retain their previous value as imitators of surface ships. As indicated in foreign literature, there now exist false heat targets capable of attracting missiles with infrared-seeking systems from ships.

In aviation, in order to imitate targets that are detectable by radar, rockets that move with the speed of aircraft have appeared, to supplement dipole reflectors. Some of them have apparatus for creating interference with the enemy's technical means of observation (radar, infrared and others). Moreover, aircraft armament also includes other means--a missile with corner reflectors that can attract guided antiaircraft missiles and enemy fighters to itself, special missiles and bombs for creating false targets with heat radiation, and so on.

There is still no unified opinion abroad yet about the desirability of imitating large fixed navy facilities in the modern era. Nevertheless, technical means (lightweight collapsible structures, radar reflectors, inflatable models and others) that the fleets of some countries have will enable large false targets to be created in a short time.

The foreign press reports about the possibility of sending false targets into space, to hamper the observation of military objects in space.

From what has been said, the conclusion can be drawn that in the modern era, false targets have not lost their significance as an element of deception, and it is useful for Soviet Army and Navy officers to follow attentively the development of this type of military equipment and of methods for using it in military operations at sea.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

Figure 1. Plan-View Aerial Photograph of Hamburg. In the middle portion a false bridge can be seen; below it is the real one, concealed in the surrounding space (false construction, which covers part of the lake).

Figure 2. Perspective-View Aerial Photograph of False Structure in Hamburg, Which Covers Part of the Lake. A false bridge can be seen in the right portion.

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NAVAL FORCES

CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT OF SUBMARINES DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 6, Jun 66 pp 27-33

[Article by Capt-1st Rank I. P. Firsov: "The Camouflage and Concealment [maskirovka] of Submarines." Passages printed in boldface or in italics are enclosed in slantlines (if in italics, [it.] will precede closing slantline)]

[Text] The camouflage and concealment of submarines constitute a set of measures for assuring their secrecy while at base or at sea. Experience shows that the forms and methods of concealment change primarily as a function of the development of ASW forces and equipment.

The so-called "small-profile" method, for example, was used during World War I to conceal submarines from surface ships. It was most appropriate to the situation and the potential of the visual means for observation that existed then. Submarines that adopted a blockading position became less noticeable and could detect the ASW ships first.

During World War II, especially during its second half, when aircraft, ships and shore observation posts had received radars and electronic-intelligence equipment, the need to seek other, more effective means and methods for concealing submarines appeared.

Since then, right up to our day, the problem of submarine concealment has become especially severe because of the appearance of increasingly newer means for detecting submarines that respond fairly accurately to the most varied physical fields.

The requirements for deception, as one of the measures that will provide for secrecy, and, consequently, also for the success of submarine operations, are increasing, especially now, since submarines, having received missiles and torpedoes with nuclear charges, are increasingly becoming a factor of strategic and operational significance. Foreign military specialists consider that the following are subject to concealment: tactical and technical data on submarines and their armament, plans and methods for using them, the composition of groups and the areas and dates of their concentration and of strikes, and the tactics of submarines, as well as the results of the combat effects of ASW forces on them.* Moreover, they

*T. Roscoe. "Boyevyye deystviya podvodnykh lodok SShA vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Combat Operations of U. S. Submarines During World War II]. Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1957, page 151.

assume that information about the maximum depth of submergence of submarines, their technical equipment, and the directions and results of research associated with the development of submarine forces also should be kept secret.*

World War II experience confirms that methods for supporting secrecy yield proper effect only when there is dedication to executing them. And, for this purpose, a consideration of the nature of submarine combat activity, the characteristics of the combat-operations regions, and the situation and potential of the forces and means of the enemy's reconnaissance and ASW forces is required. Naturally, during the postwar years, support for secrecy was further developed, it included disinformation, and it became more active. The British press, for example, states directly that the main task of deception right now is not "to hide from the enemy... the most powerful types of weapons but rather to induce him to believe that the opposing side has more powerful and effective weapons."#

Thus the press is paying definite attention to the various aspects of deception, including the concealment of submarine operations. In particular, it is noted that its benefit is gained by the conduct of special mutually related organizational, operational and technical measures.

Let us examine how these questions are being treated in the world press.

/Organizational measures/ for deception are being developed and implemented by command at various levels. Their purpose, as various researchers note, is to take steps to facilitate secrecy of the system for basing submarines, the fact of their entry to the base and their departure for sea, the nature and trend of combat training, concepts and plans for utilization, and the creation of new types of weapons, and scientific and technical achievements that will increase the combat capabilities of the forces.

In the foreign press one can encounter expressions that now, because of the high effectiveness of existing means for reconnaissance, particularly space reconnaissance, it is practically impossible to conceal from the enemy any more the presence of naval forces at permanent bases. In order to reduce the effectiveness of reconnaissance and to reduce possible losses of submarines from nuclear-missile strikes, foreign navies, while creating a system for dispersing bases, is also organizing mobile basing.

Naval bases have always attracted an enemy's attention, since it was comparatively easy to detect and attack submarines in adjacent areas and to observe their activity at combat-training target ranges and during deployment. Because of this, the commands of, for example, the German, Japanese and American navies used to take steps to conceal from the enemy the departure from and return to base of submarines, the shipways that they used, the areas for working out combat training missions, and also the routings for deployment into the ocean and the routes of return. In order to achieve secrecy of navigation close to the bases, submarines made passages, as a rule, in the underwater mode. Cruising on the surface was permitted only at night or in bad visibility. Such a procedure produced a definite benefit, since aviation, which used mainly visual and radar means for

*T. Roscoe, page 152.

#E. Kingston-MacClory. "Voyennaya politika i strategiya" [Military Policy and Strategy]. Voenizdat, 1963, page 93.

observation was, at that time, the main threat to submarines. It is considered that in the modern era, ASW nuclear submarines armed with a variety of means for observation and capable of long on-station times in the area, have become more dangerous for submarines at bases. Therefore, establishment of the regimes for submarine cruising in bases areas is usually combined with the conduct of special measures for security of the forces.

The most important prerequisites for attaining submarine secrecy at sea are considered to be constant submergence to greater-than-periscope depth and competent use of radio communications and electronic-observation equipment, since radio transmissions are a serious tell-tale sign. Errors in the use of radio communications during World War II often led to nonfulfillment of combat missions by submarines and to losses thereof. For example, in 1943 the German submarine U-615 patrolled in the Caribbean Sea for about 2 weeks without being detected. However, on 27 July, while transmitting radio reports about the sinking of the first transport, bearings were taken on it, and then it was tracked and attacked. Badly damaged, it was sunk by the crew.

Because of poor secrecy of radio and electronic-equipment emissions, their use on submarines requires consideration of the specific situation. Therefore, during World War II, use of this equipment was strictly restricted in many navies in order to avoid the exposure of submarines. For example, Japanese submarines were authorized to switch radars on only at night and during poor visibility, for short-term operation. The U.S. Pacific Fleet also issued an order that restricted submarine radar operations, since it was considered that Japanese shore and shipboard direction finders could detect and take bearings on them at distances of up to 150 miles.

A somewhat different approach was taken during the war to the use of active sonar. The American press noted that "transmitting equipment" on submarines was useful, since one or two signals found the range to the target but the enemy could not detect the emissions or determine direction on the basis of it. At the same time, it is noted that now, when ships are supplied with special equipment for detecting sonar emissions, the use of sonar echo-rangers can lead to detection of the submarine at distances that exceed the sonar's operating range.

However, it should be considered that no clever dodges of any kind with equipment will, in and of themselves, insure submarine concealment. This is achieved only by a correct combining of hardware and tactics. This is why, during submarine crew training, much attention is paid to mastering secrecy methods. In the German navy, for example, commanders had to "catch on" to the skills of determining, and even "feeling," whether the submarine had been detected by the enemy or not. For this purpose, exercises were held under conditions that approached combat to the maximum and took into account the latest information about the enemy's ASW measures. Reconnaissance data, including data obtained by submarine crews on combat cruises, were used for this purpose. In the German navy, in particular, a procedure for regular reports was instituted, in accordance with which all ships at sea were required to report on the enemy's ASW forces.

Many of the theoretical works published in the press emphasize that disinformation is of no little importance in concealing the activity, level of development, plans for use, and quantitative characteristics of submarine weapons. Here is what foreign specialists write about this: "In Britain we consider that free publicity through press and radio that is not officially inspired and published

speeches of speakers or articles in technical publications mislead the enemy much more than information inspired by the government....The United States sometimes adopts, it is true, with varying degrees of success, the publication of reports inspired by official organs."* Various competent officials point out directly that, in the modern era, military disinformation must be conducted in both peace and war, this being done by various methods, depending upon the importance and nature of the various problems. In order to conceal true policies, plans and actions, new types of weapons, and scientific and technical achievements, it is necessary to have appropriate plans for disinformation and to conduct "distracting" actions and fictitious operations in the area of armaments. "The transmission of false reports by radio and in the press, the release of false photographs for circulation and so on, can be practiced."#

Submarine commanders' knowledge of the areas of sailing and of navigational and hydrometeorological peculiarities (the presence of an oozy bottom, the degree of transparency of the water, the location of sound paths, depths, the nature of the weather, and so on) become of great importance in achieving secrecy. It is presumed that such information can help the commander to choose the most secretive mode of sailing and use of operating means.

That is why, in order to study the sea theaters, particularly foreign naval bases, ports and coasts, even before World War II German and Japanese submarine commanders went on cruises as captains of merchant ships.

/Operational measures/ for deception are intended to conceal preparations and the dates and regions of combat use of submarines, that is, in order to keep secret the plans for their combat operations and the fact of deployment from and return to base.

Despite the fact that the main thing in the struggle against submarines is considered to be timely detection thereof, the existence even of general information about the areas and dates of their operations simplifies the task considerably. Because of this, great importance is attributed to secrecy in planning combat cruises. In foreign navies, during World War II the number of persons involved in the indicated process was severely restricted. And, during the organization of especially important submarine combat operations, where the success of achieving the purpose depended exclusively upon secrecy, the assignment of missions and the submarine commander's decisions were not formalized in writing. This was how it was during preparation for the breaching of Scapa Flow (October 1939) by the German submarine U-47: the plan for its operation was approved by the CinC of the navy in accordance with the oral report of the commander of the underwater forces.** As is known, the submarine penetrated the British base and sank the "Repulse" [as published] and "Royal Oak" there.

No less attention was given to insuring secrecy of the deployment of submarines with a view to making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate ASW forces and resources on the routes of movement. The Japanese and the Americans, for example, chose crossing routes for their submarines that were intended to bypass the

*E. Kingston-MacClory, page 90.

#E. Kingston-MacClory, page 91.

**K. Donitz. "Nemetskiye podvodnyye lodki vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [German Submarines During World War II], Voenizdat, 1964, pages 85-86.

operating zones of the enemy's ASW forces. If it was impossible to bypass the indicated zones, the submarines were forced to cross them in the submerged mode.

It has become more difficult in the modern era to keep secret the location of submarines at sea. And this is explained mainly by the considerable increase in the capabilities of ASW forces and equipment. We shall demonstrate this concretely.

/ASW aircraft and helicopters [it.]/ are, in practice, the bearers of all types of means for detecting submarines, aircraft being able to use them more effectively than surface ships, since they do not create such strong interference of their own, and helicopters can, moreover, by "hovering," drop sonar equipment to a great depth. The authors of numerous articles and comments on this subject call attention to the fact that, despite the relatively short operating range of airborne equipment, airplanes and helicopters are a great danger to submarines because of the suddenness of appearance and the capability for spending a long time tracking submarines and making repeated attacks.

While previously land-based patrol aircraft operated at distances of 400-900 miles from their bases, their capabilities have since increased 2-fold to 3-fold. Moreover, carrier-based airplanes are used to perform missions for the long-range ASW defense of operating forces and convoys, while helicopters screen ships in close-in defense.

All this increases by far, in comparison with the World War II period, the threat to submarines from the air. Now they can no longer feel completely safe, even at a great distance from shore.

/The characteristics of observation means and of the ASW armament of surface ships [it.]/ have greatly improved. In particular, ships of the USA and other countries are supplied with towed sonars and also with equipment for detecting submarine sonar operation. Because of this, the role of surface ships in the ASW defense system has increased appreciably. But some theoreticians abroad advance them to first place in the struggle against submarines, despite the fact that the submarines can detect surface ships ahead of time, and, maneuvering in depth and speed, evade detection.

/ASW submarines [it.]/ whose means for observation have been greatly developed, are creating an ever-increasing danger for submarines.* Many foreign specialists suppose that nuclear submarines can be used widely for the ASW defense of high-speed operating forces of surface ships and missile submarines, for operations at ASW barriers, and so on. It is considered also that small ASW submarines, which possess good maneuverability, can create a major threat to strike submarines.

/Fixed ASW equipment for long-range operation [it.]/ are being used to detect submarines at coastal approaches. USA coasts, for example, have been amalgamated into systems called "Caesar" and "Artemis."

The development of means for detecting submarines is going on especially vigorously right now. The press reports, for example, about work on the creation of underwater radars and the application of underwater television and lasers.

*In some countries, the USA for example, this function has been vested in multi-purpose submarines.

However, foreign specialists acknowledge that existing forces and means still are not adequate for the universal organization of an effective ASW defense. Because of this, the skillful choice of areas for combat operations has not lost its importance, even in the modern era. During the last war, in order to increase secrecy and success in performing missions by submarines, an effort was made to choose for their combat operations zones other than those with the greatest activity of ASW forces. For a similar purpose, the Germans, for example, often changed areas of concentration of their submarines in the Atlantic, thereby withdrawing them from zones being monitored by enemy airplanes and ships.

In dividing up locations for submarines, it was considered necessary to deploy them in such a way that the discovery of one submarine would not lead to the detection of the others. Nonfulfillment of this rule usually led to dire consequences. Thus in May 1944, nine Japanese submarines were deployed north of the Admiralty Islands. The Americans, after observing one of them, subsequently discovered others. As a result of several attacks, five of them were sunk. Two others (Ro-109 and Ro-108) that were operating independently of the group avoided detection.

In insuring the secrecy of submarines at sea, the knowledge of submarine commanders and officers of the central administration for underseas forces of the situation in the theater has become of great importance. This is achieved by the constant procurement of reconnaissance information, both by the submarines themselves and by other navy forces and resources, and the timely processing of information and its transmission to submarines at sea. For example, in February 1943 the German submarine forces command received from electronic-intelligence collection in Paris a report about the detection of an airplane accompanying a convoy that had left Britain. As the result of two days of observation, the convoy's course, traveling speed and the system for its defense were determined. Based on these data, the command secretly sent to the convoy submarines that sank 14 transports.

/Technical measures/ for concealment have been aimed at reducing the noise level and observability of submarines, reducing tell-tale evidence of their use of observing and communications equipment and weapons.

The struggle with submarine noisiness, in the opinion of most foreign specialists, is one of the most important elements for insuring their secrecy. This is occasioned by the fact that modern sonar detects noise-making objects in a direction-finding regime that has much greater range than the locating regime. Noise levels are reduced mainly by reducing the weight of moving parts, improving the quality of the machining of geared transmissions, avoidance of the use of rigid connections of mechanisms with the hull, improvement of the submarine's hull lines, and so on. Submarine noisiness can be greatly reduced by correct choice of speed.

Remaining at great depths is considered to be one of the ways for reducing the observability of submarines. Escape to depth is a basic method for a submarine to break off from pursuing ships and airplanes. The foreign press indicates that the submergence depths of modern submarines have been greatly increased. For example, they reach 400 meters for submarines of the "Thrasher" and "Ethan Allen" types.*

*Journal de la Marine Merch, 1963, May.

Cases are known where submarines could not escape to the depths because of the nature of the missions being performed, fearing loss of contact with the enemy. Then they shadowed the target, staying beyond the range of its means of observation. For example, German submarines often maintained contact with convoys visually, observing the smoke or listening with search-radar receivers to the operation of their radars.

The painting of the hull and superstructure also causes reduction in the detectability of a submarine when at a shallow depth or when on the surface. Even before World War II many of the world's navies had started to look for appropriate colors for camouflaging submarines. In the American navy in particular, a special gray paint was created. A periscope head and standard painted with it became unnoticeable during moonlight. This work also enabled an appropriate tint to be found for submarine hulls, depending upon the color and transparency of the water.

In order to reduce the vulnerability to tracking of a submarine that is proceeding at periscope depth, the moving parts incorporated streamlining.

Submarine secrecy is also provided by timely passive detection of the enemy. These include the taking of bearings on noise for the detection of echo-ranging sonars, electronic-reconnaissance equipment, equipment for detecting radar operation, and so on.

Special methods are being developed to improve secrecy of the use of active means of observation. Thus, radars and sonars are now using nondirectional emitters, with complete panoramic scanning, which, according to American data, reduces the time required for investigating the whole horizon 60-fold.

Submarines have also been equipped with sonar countermeasures equipment, which not only detect the enemy's sonar signals but also interfere with their operation with imitative or deceptive signals. Submarines are being equipped with imitation patterns (they form a screen of gas bubbles, which yield to sonar emissions a steady echo, similar to the reflection from a ship's hull), reflectors (they prevent the enemy from effectively using equipment for target acquisition and observation), noisemaking buoys (they imitate the noises of submarine propellers and create false targets for direction-listening sonar systems), and so on.

It is clear from what has been said that submarine secrecy is achieved by a great complex of diverse measures aimed at denying discovery by the enemy's intelligence gathering resources of the actual location and status and activity, either of the submarine forces as a whole or of individual combat units. At the same time, the military press emphasizes that assuming the effectiveness of these measures alone is a matter that is not without risk. Their efficacy often remains unknown until the end of the war.

In order to be freed to some extent of uncertainty, the German navy, for example, along with deception, continually monitored its success, in particular by checking on the resistance of codes that are used to control forces at sea. Simultaneously, radio-intelligence gathering followed up on changes in British codes and ciphers, and it intercepted private transmissions with convoys. In analyzing British intelligence-collection summaries, the German command discovered the channels over which the British were receiving information about German submarines.

* * *

A study of the measures for concealing and camouflaging submarines in past wars, especially the experience of foreign navies, requires a critical approach and thorough analysis, the more so now that disinformation has become a most important means for propaganda of the military might of capitalist countries.

Knowledge about and skill in carrying out the most diverse operations aimed at achieving the secrecy of submarines by officers of our navy will help in the successful concealment of missions for the protection of our motherland's sea frontiers.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL WARFARE: BASIC FEATURES DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 6, Jun 69 pp 26-32

[Article by Vice Adm (Ret) V. I. Surabekov: "The Basic Features of Contemporary Warfare at Sea"]

[Text] "The deepening of capitalism's general crisis and the sharpening of its contradictions are intensifying the adventurism of imperialism and its danger for peoples and for the affairs of peace and social progress. Imperialism is trying increasingly frequently to seek a way out in military provocations and various types of conspiracies and direct military interventions."* This is why the basic problem of our days is the problem of peace, a positive solution of which will save the lives of hundreds of millions of people and man's civilization, which is many centuries old.

In considering the concrete international situation, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have in recent years been taking the greatest measures, which have radically changed our Armed Forces and thereby placed them on the plane of the highest requirements for the conduct of modern war, if the imperialists unleash it.

The scientific and technical revolution has brought about a basically new nature for warfare. F. Engels wrote back in "Anti-Duehring": "...the successes of technology had barely become applicable and actually applied to military purposes when immediately--almost mandatorily, and frequently, moreover, against the will of the military command--they caused changes and even revolutions in the ways of waging battle."#

This classical conclusion exhaustively characterizes also the modern revolution in methods for waging a battle, an operation, or an entire war as a whole, including operations in the seas and oceans. As a result of this revolution, modern armed struggle at sea has taken on new outlines. We shall dwell on certain of them in a brief review.

NAVY WEAPONS. The great destructive capacity and versatility of purpose of modern weapons have promoted them within navies (as in other branches of the armed forces) to the category of the basic means for destroying moving and fixed targets

*"Materialy XXIII s'yezda KPSS" [Papers of the 23d CPSU Congress]. Politizdat, 1966, page 186.

#F. Engels. "Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Military Works], Voenizdat, 1957, page 16.

of the enemy, both at sea and on land, including land deep within his territory. These weapons are intended primarily for solving the chief missions of the naval forces of the leading naval powers.

The high effectiveness of modern weaponry permits the fleet to achieve the most decisive aims in a battle or an operation in a short time, and with the fewest forces. While in past wars, in order to achieve one operational aim or other, usually several battles had to be fought at sea, and in order to achieve a strategic aim--one or several sea operations in which various branches of the navy's forces participated, now operational and even strategic aims can, given the appropriate support, be achieved by single types of naval forces that are restricted in composition within a time period numbered in tens of minutes, from the moment the order to strike the blow is received. For example, an American nuclear missile-armed submarine can launch its first ballistic missile in 15 minutes after receiving the order, and the next ones at intervals of 1 minute. Thus, just about 30 minutes are required for the release of all its 16 missiles with nuclear warheads.

The threat of the use of nuclear weaponry has brought to life a new and fairly complicated type of security of forces--nuclear defense, which is getting extremely serious attention in all the world's navies.

Despite the fact that the main weaponry for solving the main tasks at sea are nuclear, none of the navies has dispensed with ordinary means of destruction, since it is considered that they have not lost their importance, and they have been called upon to play a completely definite role also in the modern era.

Nuclear missile weapons, which possess exceptional range and colossal destructive force, have transformed the strike forces of modern navies, having increased and widened their combat potential severalfold.

THE MAIN STRIKE FORCES OF NAVIES. Submarines. Soon after the end of World War II a nuclear propulsion plant for submarines was developed. This opened up a basically new path for creating ships with very high maneuvering characteristics. Nuclear submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles that have nuclear warheads began to arrive in the navies of the countries that were more developed from a technical standpoint. The good tactical and technical characteristics of these ships greatly expanded and increased their potential, which defined the leading role of submarines among the arms of the fleets' forces. Nuclear submarines have been transformed into the main strike force of the modern navies of the world powers, having relegated strike aircraft carriers to second priority.* They can destroy targets large in area on the enemy's territory, annihilate submarines, surface ships and transports, reconnoiter, secure the operations of naval forces and perform other missions.

Aircraft Carriers. After World War II, with the introduction of new weapons into navies, aircraft carriers lost their leading role in armed conflict at sea. Despite the high flexibility and dispersibility of cruising and combat formations and ASW and air defense forces that are strong and deeply disposed, they, as the experience of postwar exercises has indicated, have become extremely vulnerable,

*"Yadernyy vek i voyna" [The Nuclear Century and War]. Izd. Izvestiya, 1964, page 61.

a fact that deprives them of the potential for performing successfully the main tasks in the conflict at sea. Because of this, for example, U. S. Navy strike aircraft carriers have been converted to the general-purpose forces category.

True, in local wars, which the USA is still conducting, the former role of aircraft carriers is still retained. Moreover, the naval command of the United States views aircraft carriers as part of their strategic reserve forces, in case World War III is unleashed. It follows from this that aircraft carriers still have not lost completely their value as naval ships in our time, so not all sea powers have given them up. In the USA, for example, a second nuclear-strike aircraft carrier--the "Nimitz"--is being built.

Naval Aviation. Even during World War II aircraft builders faced the problem of overcoming the sonic barrier, since propeller airplanes had approached the upper limit of their technical capabilities. At the same time, air defense forces and equipment continued to be developed, reducing the effectiveness of aviation combat operations.

The military-technical revolution also embraced naval aviation: the piston engine relinquished its place to the jet engine (the sonic barrier was overcome), new missiles and torpedoes were adopted as armament, and electronic equipment was introduced.

All this transformed naval aviation into a supersonic missile-armed force that has expanded considerably its combat-operations capabilities with the delivery of strikes against both sea targets and ground facilities--on the coast or in the depths of the enemy's territory. Naval aviation is now an active, highly flexible strike force, capable of successfully performing the combat missions characteristic of it.

Surface Ships. Surface ships that carry cruise and ballistic missiles have now come to replace heavy surface ships with large-caliber, long-barrel artillery. A basically new class of combat ships has appeared. They have much less displacement than earlier ones--surface missile carriers that can deliver strikes against not only naval targets but also enemy ground targets. Navies are paying great attention to these new combat ships, as is confirmed by the high rate of their construction and introduction into strike forces.

Thus, the surface forces, which have lost their top priority, are, nevertheless, an extremely necessary and important type of naval force, which are charged with performing many missions that are fairly diverse in nature but are inherent only in them.

CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE MISSIONS OF NAVIES. The qualitative leap in the development of fleet strike forces has enlarged drastically their combat capabilities. As a result, both the volume and the number of missions charged to navies have increased, and the nature of the missions has changed. Abroad, the chief and first priority mission of navies is considered to be the annihilation (destruction) with nuclear missiles of the enemy's most important facilities, not only on the coast but also deep in his territory.* It is assumed that the main naval forces for performing this mission will be nuclear underwater missile

*"Yadernyy vek i voyna," pages 36 and 62-63.

carriers that can destroy a number of industrial or administrative-political centers or other targets of strategic importance with ballistic missiles.

In the opinion of foreign authors, a second but no less important mission will be the fight against the strike forces of the enemy's fleet--against its submarines, aircraft and surface ships--carriers of nuclear weapons, but primarily against nuclear missile-armed submarines.*

However, while formerly the performance of these tasks only helped to achieve strategic and operational objectives in the armed struggle at sea, now they can achieve these objectives directly.

The fight against nuclear submarines, particularly missile carriers, is more complicated and laborious. This is occasioned by their high underwater maneuvering and combat capabilities. When one considers the colossal spaces and depths of ocean theaters of combat operations, as well as the capabilities of modern ASW forces and equipment, the difficulties that arise in this struggle become completely comprehensible. The inevitability and necessity for opposing the strike forces of the opposing side's navy from the first minutes and hours of the war imparts to this process the nature of meeting engagements, with all their decisiveness, bitterness and consequences.

Aside from the basic missions pointed out, navies can also perform other missions posed by tradition, the degree of whose importance is determined by the concrete operational or strategic situation in a given oceanic theater of operations. Such missions include: breach of the enemy's sea lanes, defense of one's own sea lanes, assistance to troops in the coastal area, the landing of troops, the protection of one's own coast, and so on. However, it is also considered that in such cases modern weapons and qualitatively new naval forces will exert a considerable influence on the nature of the various operations.

THE ROLE OF NAVIES. The new, better perfected technical base and level of production potential of the leading countries that oppose the peace coalition have enabled the construction of strike forces with high tactical and technical characteristics, which is a basic factor in determining the role of navies in the modern era.

This role is characterized by the growing combat capabilities of naval forces, which we also review briefly, using information published in the Soviet and foreign press. Primarily it must be borne in mind that the destructive might and range of action of the munitions that are available to navies have risen exceptionally.

The speeds of modern ships and aircraft have increased sharply. It is reported that American nuclear submarines, for example, can travel underwater at a speed of up to 35 knots (65 km/hr). Their power plants provide for the maintenance of such a speed for not hours, but days or weeks.

Jet aircraft have crossed the sound barrier. The flight speeds of carrier-based attack aircraft, for example, have reached 2,000-2,200 km/hr, carrier-based interceptors--2,500 km/hr. Shore-based missile carrying aircraft also fly at supersonic speeds.

*R. Belo. "Rol' morya v budushchey voyne" [The Role of the Sea in Future Warfare]. Voenizdat, 1961, page 191.

Cruising and flight distances also have increased. The foreign press notes, for example, that the cruising range of nuclear submarines reaches 60,000-120,000 miles (110,000-220,000 km) and the flight range of carrier-based attack aircraft is 5,000-6,000 km. These determine also the radius of action of the navies' main strike forces.

The growing cruising (and flight) speeds and cruising (and flight) ranges have greatly expanded the fire areas and the effectiveness of combat operations against enemy targets, reduced the time taken to maneuver and regroup forces, and decreased by far the enemy's capabilities for repulsing or evading a strike that has been readied.

The depth of submergence of submarines has increased considerably, as have the altitudes of airplane flights. These have complicated the fight against them very much. For example, modern submarines can navigate at a depth of 350-400 meters, and the service ceiling of carrier-based attack aircraft reaches 15,000-17,000 meters, of interceptors 20,000-22,000 meters. And these characteristics have a tendency to increase still more.

The underwater navigation time of nuclear submarines reaches 70 days,* transforming them in the full sense of the word into underwater combat ships that do not need a lengthy stay above water.

A sharp change in the qualitative makeup of navies and their weapons, which increases their potential, is the capability for joint and independent operations in remote portions of the World Ocean and for a considerable complication of tasks. All this testifies to a substantial growth, compared with past wars, in the share of armed struggle at sea, and also, therefore, of the role of navies in the system of the armed forces.

Navies are now fully capable during war of carrying out missions that are diverse in nature and content (from strategic to tactical), and, moreover, in the most varied areas of the World Ocean, that is, in the most varied climatic, hydrological and meteorological conditions, which, it goes without saying, will lead to the emergence of specific singularities in the use of naval forces.

The high mobility of navies, the gigantic radii of their operations, the capability to perform missions with forces of limited makeup, the slight vulnerability and great operating autonomy, as well as the long range and great destructiveness of modern weapons and the capability for surprise operations--all these permit the assertion that there are, in essence, no places on the globe (on water or on land) that are beyond the range of naval weapons. While in past wars navies performed combat operations mainly in comparatively restricted areas of seas and oceans, in a future war the arena of their fighting can be the whole World Ocean, including its depths and the airspace above it.

The oceans, which separate the main states of two world systems, also determine the role of the navy, particularly of nuclear submarines in modern war. Recently published works of foreign authors emphasize that the modern navy is capable of using the oceans and their depths for shelter and protection for their main strike

*V. F. Droblenkov and V. N. Gerasimov. "Ugroza iz glubiny" [The Threat from the Depths], page 248.

forces, especially at the start of a war. Extremely important also is the fact that the modern navy can effectively wage combat operations not only with new weapons but also with ordinary means of destruction, which is confirmed by the experience of the use of sea forces in local aggressive wars, for example, in Korea and Vietnam.

All this testifies to a considerable rise in the role of naval forces in the modern era. Abroad, it is considered that this is why the navy, primarily its submarine missile carriers, are included in the main strategic forces.

THE PACE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS. The use of new weapons and basically different naval strike forces has occasioned a sharp rise in the pace of waging battles and conducting operations, and this, naturally, results in rapid changes in the situation. It is clear that it is just as necessary to react quickly to these changes.

Thus, all command echelons have been faced in the modern era with the necessity to make decisions in the shortest possible time and to transmit them in timely fashion to forces deployed in the ocean. It is clear that the rapid pace and dynamicity of combat actions at sea will complicate control of naval forces, especially with wide enemy use of radio countermeasures. Therefore, all command echelons, organs and control facilities of the navy's forces now face new and increased demands. The essence of them is that, figuratively speaking, the hand of the commander-in-chief (and the commander) must always be on the pulse of combat events, including those that are transpiring in the ocean far from the command center, in order that subordinate forces may be supervised purposefully and in well-grounded and timely fashion. For this purpose, the situation must be known well, the elucidation of which, as formerly, is the basic mission of reconnaissance.

RECONNAISSANCE. Reconnaissance is called upon to discover the composition of the forces and means of the enemy's navy, their location and nature, the main area of operations, and so on. It has always played an important role, since the outcome of the operation or battle depends to a great extent upon its successfulness. However, in the modern era, the value of reconnaissance, as one of the most important types of support of combat and operational activity of navies, has grown immeasurably, and, to an even greater extent than previously, it has begun to condition the outcome of an operation or battle, especially at the start of a war.

Surprise has always given definite advantages to those who have the initiative. Now the role of surprise in the case also of armed conflict at sea has grown especially. The absence or untimely receipt of information about the enemy, where means of mass destruction are being applied, are fraught with extremely grave and irreparable consequences. It is clear that a rise in the role of surprise involves also a strengthening of the significance of reconnaissance. The changed conditions for waging war have required that the operating methods of the fleet's reconnaissance organs and forces be more perfected than heretofore. This is apparent from the fact alone that already in peacetime special reconnaissance units are being formed, one of which, for example, has been created by the NATO command, in the Mediterranean Sea.*

*ZA RUBEZHOM, No 49, 1968, pages 14-15.

ANTISUBMARINE, AIR AND OTHER TYPES OF DEFENSE. These activities, while they are still types of defense of ships, forces, or sea or shore areas, have now stepped beyond the interests of protecting the activity just of fleet forces. Many of these types of forces have an organic connection with the interests of defense of the country as a whole.

The significance of PVO [air defense], for example, in armed conflict at sea is clear from the fact that nonfulfillment of even one of the requirements of this type of defense can involve extremely grave consequences. Foreign specialists consider that previously, in a war involving the use of ordinary means of destruction, it would be completely adequate to intercept 95 percent of all the enemy's combat aircraft that participate in a given attack in order to guarantee a minimum of losses. In the modern era, this is not enough,* since the breakthrough of even one carrier of means of mass destruction can cause extremely grave material damage. This circumstance imposes a definite imprint on the nature of defensive operations, has brought to life new forces and means for conflict, and has forced the deep echeloning of the antisubmarine and antiair defense of, for example, carrier strike forces.

INTERACTION (VZAIMODEYSTVIYE). The revolution that is occurring in military affairs, which is immense in importance and scale, has not, nonetheless, brought forth and, moreover, it cannot bring forth the creation of an "absolute" weapon of any kind, and it has not brought forth an "absolute" branch of the naval forces (or branch of the armed forces) of any kind that could independently, without the participation and help of other forces, achieve a decisive victory over the enemy. Now, in even still greater measure than before, victories over a strong and organized enemy can be achieved only by the common efforts of all branches of naval forces and major commands of other branches of the armed forces. It is clear that, because of this, their operations must be properly coordinated and agreed upon and must be aimed at the successful and timely performance of appointed missions.

Interaction, as one of the principles for use of the forces, remains even today a very important factor in achieving the intended aims, not only in armed conflict at sea but also in a war as a whole. However, the colossal destructive force and the great range of modern weaponry, which have increased the pace of conduct of operations and battles, the high dynamicity of combat operations, and sharp and rapid change in the situation have introduced, of course, definite revisions into the practical execution of the interaction of naval forces, and especially of the strike forces that have been deployed to the expanses of the World Ocean, far from command centers.

NAVAL LOGISTICAL SERVICES. Just the same as before, these services are called upon for materials and equipment support (in the broad sense of the word) uninterruptedly for the activity of naval forces and organs. However, the presence of new weapons and strike forces in the fleets, a different system of basing, more complicated and improved armament and equipment, the different nature, pace and areas for the conduct of operations, the necessity for supplying forces not only at bases but also at sea (or in the ocean), the possibility of great losses and the destruction of naval shore facilities by enemy operations have necessitated an

*"VMS v budushchey voyne" [Naval Forces in Future Warfare]. Voenizdat, 1964, page 130.

improved, somewhat different approach to the supplying of materials and equipment and change in the content of naval logistical services activity.

The new conditions face logistical organs with extremely complicated and labor-intensive missions. Especially precise, coordinated and flexible operation of these organs is required, since the 'success of the naval forces' combat activity depends greatly upon them.

* * *

And so, under current conditions, the nature of armed conflict at sea is completely conditioned by the nature of modern warfare, since conflict at sea is a component and an inalienable part of it. The introduction of new weaponry and strike forces in navies is changing radically even the nature of combat operations on the seas and oceans.

The main weaponry of modern navies is nuclear, and the means for delivering weaponry to the target are missiles of various types. Both the one and the other have found wide application in naval strike forces, raising their tactical, operational and strategic capabilities. The main strike forces of modern navies are capable of performing their principal missions over the whole extent of the oceanic theater of combat operations, including even the enemy's land.

Even the basic missions of navies have undergone changes. They are charged now with the performance even of strategic missions, which greatly increases the share and significance of the fleets in the overall armed forces system.

Conflict with the enemy's naval strike forces will consist of operations that are extremely diverse and versatile in nature and which embrace the whole depth of the enemy's defense. The struggle for oceanic sea lanes and the fight with naval landing forces will probably acquire that same nature.

The level of the military might achieved by the Soviet Armed Forces and the high defensive capability of our country are cooling the hot heads of the bosses of the imperialist coalition, who still have not rejected the idea of unleashing a third world war, even a nuclear-missile war.

It is clear from what has been said that the Navy of the Soviet Union should constantly maintain high readiness of its strike forces for quick combat operations, in order not to allow the enemy to catch us napping.

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NAVAL FORCES

EXTENDED CRUISES MUST BE EXPLOITED TO INCREASE COMBAT READINESS TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Operate in Combat Fashion in the Ocean"]

[Text] Any departure of a ship for sea begins with a command that is customary for sailors: "Prepare the ship for battle and a voyage." The enunciation of this command mobilizes and tightens up the sailors, and it sounds the call to act boldly, decisively and skillfully, with full selflessness and in a vigorous manner, from the first mile and the first hours to the last mile and the last hours of the multimonth ocean cruise. That was how the renowned front-line fighters, whose sons and grandsons stand underway watches today at the battle stations of ships, acted during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The combat actions of Soviet sailors during the war years were distinguished by daring, courage and bravery, large-scale heroism and a striving in any situation to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and to achieve victory. Those crews whose level of preparation and vigilance were greatest, which enabled detection of the enemy in time, instantaneous reaction to change in the situation, performance of complicated maneuvers at any moment, effective use of weaponry, and complete realization of the combat capabilities incorporated in the equipment, achieved the greatest success.

Soviet sailors, like all the armed defenders of the motherland, are continuing worthily the relay race of battle glory. They are filled with resolve to effect new achievements in carrying out the historic decisions of the 26th Party Congress. The best combat-training school for a ship's crew are lengthy ocean cruises. The sailors, far from home shores, taking into account the experience of the front-line fighters and the advanced experience that has been gained in chast'i [units] and soyedineniya [forces], are persistently improving their combat skill and fulfilling training plans, programs and socialist commitments aimed at a further rise in combat readiness and in the quality of combat training.

The interests of increasing the combat readiness of ships require that crews at sea use every underway mile with maximum effectiveness and approach the organization of combat training in a way that takes the requirements of modern naval battle into account. Under the motto, "Go to sea to learn the way of combat," combat training is conducted during lengthy cruises on, for example, the ASW cruiser "Leningrad," the large ASW ship "Pétropavlovsk" and the minesweeper that Capt-3d Rank Zevchenko commands. Personnel here are being trained intensively how to use weaponry and to apply technical means, simultaneously working on questions of dealing

with damage control and protection from weapons of mass destruction. The main attention is being paid to training crews for action under conditions that are complicated and that approximate combat conditions to the maximum. Training practices and combat exercises are conducted in stormy weather, at night, and with the use of simulation.

The ship was created for battle. The ship's captain is the organizer of battle. He is obligated, as is written in the Shipboard Regulations of the USSR Navy, to maintain the ship entrusted to him in the prescribed readiness for combat action and to be responsible for the ship's fulfillment of combat missions. In order to perform these responsible tasks successfully, the ship's captain should persistently improve his ideological hardening and professional training and rely in his daily activity on party and Komsomol organizations.

The principle of teaching what is necessary for war and for acting at sea in accordance with the laws of battle are not in and of themselves new. But, as the forces and means for conducting armed struggle at sea develop, it acquires increasingly great importance. For example, an exercise to search for a submarine or that involves practice firings requires today the acquisition of substantial forces and of means for provisioning. The mission of flag officers and staffs is to thoroughly prepare each exercise at sea so that participation in it will help to the maximum in the combat development of ships' captains and in the growth of crew skills.

During any cruise, whatever its nature, the crew is obligated to use all opportunities for increasing the ship's combat readiness. Unfortunately, individual commanders sometimes forget this immutable requirement. Paying the main attention to the solution of current tasks of the cruise, they forget to conduct training practices and combat exercises and do not simulate the breakdown of equipment or disablement of personnel. As a result, the state of combat training of such crews increases slowly, and socialist commitments for perfecting interchangeability and for increasing the number of rated specialists are not carried out.

Modern battle requires that sailors be constantly ready to solve the most unexpected missions. Taking this into account, crews should be taught during cruises at sea. Unexpected tactical problems of various natures that are filled with complicated nonroutine elements, shipboard combat exercises, and change in the tactical background while carrying out firing exercises accustom naval officers to quickly evaluating the situation, making competent decisions and acting in a combat manner, and with daring. Good organization of training at the home port also promotes a rise in the effectiveness of combat training at sea.

Purposeful party and political work during the cruise are called upon to help to mobilize the sailors for selfless fulfillment of military duty and for victory in training battles. On a long-range cruise this work should be devised in business-like fashion and concretely, to take into account the complexity of the international situation, the specifics of the area of sailing and, above all, the place where success--victory--is being forged: in the subunits and at watch sections and battle stations. Any measure should approach to the maximum the combat-training tasks of the cruise. This will help to create in the crews an atmosphere of friendship, naval comradeship, mutual assistance--that moral climate under which each sailor enthusiastically takes to heart the overall success and strives to use effectively the equipment and weaponry entrusted to him and to carry out completely the commitments in the socialist competition for a worthy greeting to the 60th

anniversary of the USSR under the motto, "The Soviet people's peaceful work needs reliable protection."

The winter training period is being completed. Much experience in combat training has been accumulated during sea cruises in the forces and units and on ships. Everything that is better and advanced must be used creatively, assiduously and economically for a further increase in the ships' combat readiness.

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NAVAL FORCES

RESCUE-SHIP TRAINING EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Capt-2d Rank A. Slobozhanyuk: "'Mashuk' Hurries to the Rescue"]

[Text] Our son, seaman Aleksandr Idzikovskiy is serving on a rescue ship. He is a deep-sea diver. Tell us, please, in your newspaper pages about the combat training of rescue workers.--
R. Idzikovskaya and I. Idzikovskiy, Veterans of Labor (Kherson).

The ocean rescue ship "Mashuk" had returned to its home port. Before this, the sailors had spent a long time in a stormy sea working out missions to rescue the crew of a "sunken" submarine and to raise the submarine from the bottom. This was not done without irritating errors. But instructive lessons were learned and experience was gained, which, after being analyzed, should introduce some revisions into the training process.

"Now let's rest, let's get some sleep," thought the ship's captain, Capt-2d Rank I. Kinchin, after seeing ahead, on the starboard side, his home dock, "and more training later."

But actually they did not get to rest: an unexpected tactical training problem occurred--they had to go to one of the straits, where a ship "in trouble" awaited help. The hull of the ship had received "major damage" in a storm, the engine room was "completely flooded," and the machinery had "broken down."

And now the "Mashuk," after a night passage by sea, was at the indicated point. The training practice had begun with the skillful lowering of a launch from the rescue ship, which was rocking appreciably. Michman [Seagoing Warrant Officer] V. Chelotkanov knew how to steer the boat skillfully over the restless waves to the side of the "broken-down" ship. The divers' group was under Michman A. Velikanov--a man who, as they say, deserves his family name [of Giants]. He was that in both height and build. Each year, during the water-sports holiday in honor of Navy Day, he is the chief figure, Neptune. If, it stands to reason, the sea is calm. Twice he was not there for the holiday because Velikanov was a member of the Soviet Fleet's rescue expedition that worked in the People's Republic of Bangladesh and helped to clear the port of Chittagong. The republic noted his work with a medal that was specially stamped out in honor of the feat of Soviet sailors. And our motherland awarded him the Emblem of Honor. There have been no few deepwater descents in Velikanov's group of activists.

He descended to the side of the disabled ship with Michman I. Pasechnik, who has spent about 4,000 hours under the water. More precisely, he has worked sturdily. Testimony to that was the Order of Labor Red Banner. These two, who are probably the most remarkable divers of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, were soon to be joined by a well-known master, Michman V. Midyanyy--their comrade-in-work at Bangladesh, also an order-winner.

The master of diving affairs and their young but already fairly experienced colleagues, PO 1st Class P. Polpudov, Seamen S. Khot'ko and N. Ovcharenko and others (let us note that the divers' team of the "Mashuk" confirms each year the title of "excellent," and is repeatedly checked in the difficult business), thoroughly investigated the hull of the "disabled" ship. An enormous "hole," several meters long, was observed in the side, in the engine-room area. The experience that the veterans had gained at Chittagong, where they had to work under water at zero visibility was very suitable here, for the training practice occurred at night.

After refinement of the "hole's" dimensions, it was decided to use a welded grating made of metal bars, which they fastened at the site of the "hole." Now they had to place on it small sacks filled with a mix of cement and sand. The divers placed several layers of cement mortar, directly from the bucket, over the sacks. Then powerful pumps drove the water from the compartment: the "hole" was cemented reliably.

However, the water level did not drop. That meant that somewhere there was still another "breakage." They also detected this one after a routine reconnaissance. It was decided to introduce a soft patch from the outside of the ship. A layer of fiber packing impregnated with grease was placed between two sail-cloth panels. The soft patch reminded one of an enormous quilted blanket. They applied it on the "damaged" side with difficulty--a strong current was buffeting the divers.

There were several more complicated training practices, during which the divers and the whole crew of the rescue ship operated with precision, competently and with assurance. In particular, after the water had been pumped out, pontoons were brought to the "disabled" ship and a towing hawser was fastened to it. The rescue ship moved ahead slowly, gradually increasing the speed to full speed.

The weather forecasters had guaranteed calm weather. But scarcely had they passed the strait when a storm struck. Strong wind and high waves overturned the towed ship on its side, and the towing hawser sang like the tightened string of a musical instrument. The sailors on both the "disabled" ship and the "Mashuk" acted courageously in this situation. Engr-Sr Lt V. Voronov and Seaman M. Galyamov especially distinguished themselves.

The storm made a high check of the helmsman's skill of the captain of the "Mashuk," Capt-2d Rank I. Kinchin, and the naval maturity of the whole crew. Senior Seaman A. Molokanov worked watch on the wheel in skillful fashion. Engr-Capt 3d Rank R. Rashitov, Michman V. Safonov and other warriors of the electrical and machinery department maintained the prescribed rpms with maximum precision, so there would be no jerking during the towing. The ship's executive officer for political affairs Capt-Lt A. Grigorash again and again bypassed the management. After each short conversation with him, the sailors felt that their frame of mind had improved and their fatigue lessened.

The "Mashuk's" crew worked conscientiously during the difficult practice session, as they were always accustomed to doing. Indeed, they cannot do it any other way. During the year of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, the multinationality crew has committed itself to winning the title "excellent." The results of the winter training period testifies convincingly that the rescuers are moving with confidence toward the goals that have been set.

...The rescue ship is at its home port, and the ship seemingly is drowsing at the dock. The sailors do not know when they will make their next trip to sea, but the order for it can come at any moment. And no one knows whether it will be a training practice or someone who urgently requires actual help.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

DOSAAF LEADER MOSYAYKIN REVIEWS ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 26 Mar 82) pp 19-21

[Unattributed interview with Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee: "A Powerful Helping Force"]

[Text] The DOSAAF which this year celebrates its 55th anniversary has made a major contribution to strengthening the nation's defense capability.

Our correspondent turned to the Deputy Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee, Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin, with a request to describe the role and tasks of DOSAAF at the present stage.

[Question] Vladimir Vasil'yevich [Mosyaykin], first of all we would like to know what might characterize the scale of work being done by DOSAAF at present?

[Answer] In order that the scale of work carried out by our society is more striking, it is essential to look back to the recent past. There was Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to Defense and the Aviation-Chemical Construction of the USSR]! The members of the elder generation have many recollections linked to this word. Who does not remember with what pride the young men and women of the 1930's wore on their chests the insignias "Voroshilov marksman" and GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense]. Who could forget the famous slogan "Komsomol Member to the Aircraft!" when thousands of young people were sent by the Komsomol for training at the flight and technical schools of the Air Force and Civil Air Fleet and to the air clubs of Osoaviakhim. The names of many graduates of the society such as V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baydukov and S. P. Korolev have become part of history. And how many snipers, parachutists, machine gunners, signal troops and specialists for other military professions were trained for the young Red Army. Thousands of Soviet people took an active part in the work of the military patriotic society which was beloved and respected by the people. By the start of 1941, around 13 million persons were members of Osoaviakhim.

The society made a worthy contribution to achieving the world historical victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Tens of thousands of members of Osoaviakhim were awarded orders and medals for courage and valor shown in the battles against the Nazis while over a thousand of them received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The USSR DOSAAF took over the glorious traditions in the postwar years and at present it has more than 100 million people in its ranks. DOSAAF has grown not only quantitatively but in accord with the spirit of the times the range of tasks carried out by it has also grown wider.

The most important place in DOSAAF activities is held by the training of specialists for the Army and Navy and by the providing of ideologically tempered and technically skilled replacements for the troop units and fighting ships. At present, one out of every three inductees has obtained a military specialty in the DOSAAF training organizations.

The training of technical personnel for the nation's industrial enterprises and agriculture is also a matter of particular concern for our society. For carrying out this task the USSR DOSAAF has training organizations in virtually all rayons of the nation. In 1976-1980, we trained more than 10 million specialists for the mass technical professions. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the scale of this work will grow even more. We plan to train and retrain over 11.5 million specialists, including 7 million drivers of vehicles and 250,000 agricultural equipment operators.

The DOSAAF organizations have always devoted particular attention to developing the technical and paramilitary types of sports. At present, over 31 million persons, including 11 million school children, in our nation participate regularly in airplane, parachuting, gliding, helicopter, motor vehicle, motorcycle, shooting and radio technical types of sports. Over the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone, the number of persons studying in our types of sports increased by 11.5 million persons.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Further Increasing the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sports" confronted DOSAAF with the task of making the technical types of sports available to a majority of our nation's population.

[Question] As the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress put it: "The ability to shape a generation of persons who are politically active, knowledgeable, industrious and who know how to work and are always ready to defend their motherland--this is the most important and main thing in the work of the Komsomol." The same task also confronts the other social organizations, including the USSR DOSAAF. At present, what is the determining factor in the military-patriotic work of DOSAAF?

[Answer] Military-patriotic indoctrination must develop in the Soviet people an understanding of their civil duty and responsibility to society for the security of the nation and for its armed defense as well as a readiness to carry out one's military duty.

In recent years, many new, effective forms and methods of indoctrinational work have become part of our practice. Among them we must mention first of all the very widespread theoretical and scientific-practical conferences and the sociopolitical readings of the works of L. I. Brezhnev which have become desk references for millions of Soviet people.

Each year from 23 January through 23 February, months of mass defense work are held as well as weeks of mass defense work dedicated to Soviet Navy Day and Soviet Air Force Day. These measures conducted by the DOSAAF jointly with the trade union and Komsomol organizations year by year are coming to have an evermore mass nature. For example, in 1981, over 60 million persons participated in the month devoted to the 63d anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces and more than 1.6 million mass military-patriotic measures were carried out. Around 12 million persons participated in competitions for the technical and paramilitary types of sports while around a million persons passed the standards of the GTO Complex.

Of important significance in military-patriotic indoctrination of the younger generation of the Soviet people is the All-Union Hike of Komsomol Members to the Sites of the Revolutionary, Military and Labor Glory of the Soviet People. This is not only an effective form of indoctrinating the youth but also a unique schooling in military-technical training and physical conditioning of the youth as well as their preparation for military service.

The paramilitary games "Zarnitsa" [Summer Lightning] and "Orlenok" [Eaglet] are being conducted evermore interestingly and effectively and during them the Young Army-men acquire the rudiments of military science and develop physically.

It must be said that the technical and paramilitary types of sports play an important role in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. Here a special place is held by mass competitions devoted to the commemorative dates in the life of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, to the outstanding leaders of the Soviet state, to the Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor. For example, the Prizes imeni K. Voroshilov, S. Budenny, V. Chkalov, Yu. Gagarin and L. Pavlichenko are competed for. The indoctrinational role of these competitions consists in the fact that not only the participants of the meets try to equal the heroes and their feats but also hundreds of thousands of spectators.

In a word, the entire system of military-patriotic indoctrination is aimed at ensuring a succession of glorious traditions. The elder generation which followed a glorious military and labor path is being replaced by young people who by their peacetime feats have inscribed vivid new pages in the history of society and the Armed Forces. Here we should mention the graduate of the Vitebsk DOSAAF Air Club, Maj V. Shcherbakov, who has been awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for carrying out his international duty in the skies of Afghanistan, or Guards Pfc L. Manokha who obtained his military specialty in the group of sports parachutists at the Kiev DOSAAF Air Sports Club and who saved the life of his comrade during the "Zapad-81" [West-81] Exercises and for this feat has received the Red Star or the USSR and European champion, the world record holder for underwater sports and master of sports of the international class, Shavarsh Karapetyan, who, with his brother, performed an heroic feat of saving the life of 16 passengers in a trolley bus which fell into the water as well as many others.

[Question] Please tell us in greater detail about the DOSAAF training for specialists in the Army and Navy.

[Answer] The training of future military personnel is carried out in the motor vehicle, technical, naval and radio engineering schools, the air clubs and naval

clubs for 36 specialties. Here the young men become drivers of motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, tractors, radar operators, signalmen, helmsmen and signalers....

Each year around 96 percent of the students complete general education schools with outstanding and good grades, more than 75 percent become rated athletes and over 95 percent successfully pass the standards of the GTO Complex. The physical plant of the training organizations is also being strengthened. For example, in the 11th Five-Year Plan more than 120 million rubles are to be spent just on building training buildings, vehicle parking areas and dormitories.

The DOSAAF organizations constantly feel the guiding role of the party bodies, the concern and attention of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the troop units and subunits of the military commissariats in carrying out the important task of training specialists for the Armed Forces.

[Question] As is seen, sports are one of the basic areas in the DOSAAF activities. Could you please briefly describe the accomplishments of the DOSAAF athletes.

[Answer] During the years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the DOSAAF athletes set 306 world records and 25 European records in the world, European championships and in other major matches and they won over 3,000 medals, including 1,562 gold ones. During this five-year plan, 7,000 USSR masters of sports were trained and more than 18.8 million rated athletes.

The previous year of 1981 was also marked by high athletic achievements. The masters of the icy speedway S. Taraban'ko, A. Gladyshev, V. Lyubich and V. Sukhov reaffirmed the glory of the world's strongest. A number of world records were set by the masters of the racing types of underwater swimming and now all the higher world achievements in this type of sport are held by Soviet athletes. Our motorballers have won the Europe Cup for the 11th time. G. Petrochkova and V. Chistyakov have won gold medals at the first world championship in sports radio direction finding. V. Yaikova and V. Smolin have become absolute European champions for advanced aerobatics. The Soviet athlete N. Ushmayev is the absolute world champion for sports parachuting. As a total the representatives of the aviation types of sports in 1981 set 115 records, including 89 world ones. Our ship model makers also brought back 7 high awards from the world championship. Among the model car makers are several European first place medals. The eighth summer spartakiad of the Soviet peoples which started last year will be a significant event in the DOSAAF sports life.

[Question] After induction into military service a majority of the DOSAAF athletes continue to participate in the technical and paramilitary types of sports in the Army and Navy clubs as well as in the units and on the ships. What can you say about the development of these types of sports in the Army and Navy?

[Answer] The Armed Forces sports clubs possess outstanding facilities for developing the technical types of sports including modern vehicles, motorcycles, firearms and other equipment. Such types of sports as motor vehicle, motorcycle, aviation and parachuting are also well developed. The assembled teams which defend the sports honor of our motherland on the international scene are basically made up of armymen in the ranks of which are many world, European and Soviet champions.

But there also is a number of types of sports which either are little developed in the Armed Forces or are not developed at all, for example, the making of models. Motorized football has also completely disappeared from the army clubs while previously this sport was rather popular. Expensive foreign equipment is not needed for its development as our motorballers play on Soviet-made motorcycles.

It is a pleasure to note that many of our graduates continue to improve their athletic skills in military service. The army with good reason is called the school of life and here the young people acquire physical and moral conditioning so essential for victory in sports contests as well. It would be possible to name a number of our students who have achieved the heights of athletic skill in the army. I would like to mention an instance involving the repeated world speed skating champion, Sr Lt Sergey Taraban'ko.

At one of the recent world championships, Sergey was severely wounded when a spiked motorcycle wheel ran over his foot. But our athlete was still able to complete the distance.

During a break between heats, the armyman tried to remove his skate as blood was pouring out. Anyone else would have been removed from the competition but Taraban'ko several minutes later was back at the start. Is this not a manifestation of courage and a will for victory by an army athlete who has undergone army schooling!

[Question] How is scientific-technical progress being felt in the work of the DOSAAF sections and clubs, and in particular the ham radio ones?

[Answer] I would say there is a direct dependence between technical progress in the area of radio engineering and the development of the ham radio movement. The development of radio engineering thought has impelled the radio hams to seek new designs and to solve new problems in this area of technology. And to a certain degree this stimulates the advance of radio engineering.

Our radio hams have achieved truly cosmic heights in the literal and figurative senses. Recently, the Soviet Union launched earth satellites of the "Radio" series for providing ham radio communications. The DOSAAF radio hams took a most active part in their development.

For many years, the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements] has held all-Union exhibits of inventions by the radio hams and DOSAAF designers and these inevitably attract many thousands of visitors. The devices exhibited at this exhibit show the broadest range of interests among the amateur designers, a boldness of technical thought and a virtuosity of execution. Among many exhibits are designs which have been introduced into production and are employed in various sectors of industry and in medicine. They have produced a very tangible economic effect running into many hundreds of thousands of rubles.

In 1981, of the 700 exhibits represented at the exhibition, 204 were awarded VDNKh medals. Due to the developments of the radio hams, many competitors have demonstrated high achievements in the highest level competitions. Suffice it to say that on 1 January 1981, of the 838 records recorded by the international sports associations, Soviet competitors hold 343.

[Question] How would you assess the role of the mass information media in indoctrinating the DOSAAF members?

[Answer] It is hard to overestimate the role which is played by the radio, television, newspapers, magazines and books in indoctrinating the Soviet people, including the DOSAAF members. They help to indoctrinate and reinforce the qualities essential for the builder and defender of our socialist society, an ardent patriot of their motherland.

The theme of citizenship and the indoctrination of Soviet patriotism is one of the leading ones in our journalism. The central press organs such as the newspapers PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and many other publications constantly publish materials on the subject of heroism and love for the motherland.

In the work of military-patriotic indoctrination a significant place is assigned to the USSR DOSAAF press organs. We publish the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT and the magazines VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, KRYL'YA RODINY, RADIO and ZA RULEM the total single run of which is over 5 million copies. The USSR DOSAAF Izdatel'stvo also carries out important tasks in annually publishing 220-230 titles of books and art works. Around 40 percent of these products is comprised of documentary, heroic-patriotic prose and works propagandizing the military traditions and life of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Question] Vladimir Vasil'yevich, what problems, in particular, in the area of sports defense work presently concern the DOSAAF workers and what would you wish the readers of SOVETSKIY VOIN among whom are many future soldiers?

[Answer] The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Further Increasing the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sports" confronts the USSR DOSAAF with tasks of enormous importance, the main ones being: to aid in every possible way in strengthening the health of the Soviet people, increasing their work efficiency and labor productivity, their readiness to defend the motherland, the forming of high moral qualities and the indoctrination of a healthy and optimistic future generation.

We must solve many problems. In many primary DOSAAF organizations, particularly in the countryside, sports defense work is carried out extremely little and it does not involve a significant portion of the public. There are also serious shortcomings in organizing this work among secondary and primary school students.

Such types of sports as the paramilitary combined all-round tournament and model making have not been widely developed and there has been a decline in the number of persons participating in sports shooting. It is essential to establish closer ties with the trade unions, the Komsomol and sports organizations for solving the most important problems in developing the technical and paramilitary types of sports. It is essential to work harder on passing the standards of the GTO Complex by the public and primarily by the youth.

I have given a far from complete list of the problems stemming from the decree and we are presently at work on them.

I would like to say that a great deal also depends upon the youth who are studying in the DOSAAF system. The overall success of our cause depends upon their enthusiasm, aware discipline and active involvement in sports life and in the social, patriotic measures carried out by the society. I would like to wish an activist position in life for all the readers of SOVETSKIY VOIN, the present and future defenders of the motherland.

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